SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Harry Mayne

Publications and source records attributed to Harry Mayne.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

Story Imprinting: AI Assistants Absorb Traits from Human Characters They Resemble

Language models are trained to implement a helpful AI Assistant character (e.g., Claude). We explore how finetuning on synthetic stories affects this character. Does it change the Assistant's behavior in multi-turn conversations with users, a format quite different from the stories? And does the Assistant adopt the behaviors and preferences of human characters? We refer to this adoption as story imprinting. We finetune GPT-4.1 and Kimi-K2.6 on stories in which generally helpful human characters give subtly harmful advice after being insulted. The Assistant adopts the same conditional behavior while otherwise remaining helpful. This occurs even when fewer than 2% of stories depict the behavior. In a separate experiment, the Assistant adopts preferences that are only implicit in the narration. A human character's body language suggests they dislike working on spreadsheets, yet they never say so and continue giving good advice on spreadsheets. After finetuning, the Assistant becomes less likely to choose spreadsheet tasks. Next we ask which characters most influence the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more often from characters that resemble it (e.g., helpful rather than dismissive). We call this the affinity effect. The effect extends to other personas elicited with system prompts: unhelpful personas adopt behaviors from unhelpful characters. We also observe it in finetuned base models. We use the affinity effect to learn how models represent the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more from characters affiliated with elite universities (e.g., Yale) than non-elite ones. This implies the model's internal representation of the Assistant is more similar to humans from elite universities. Overall, the Assistant can be influenced by stories that depict only human characters (no AIs), which may conflict with the Persona Selection Model for the Assistant.

cs.LG

Value Leakage: An LLM's Answers Are Silently Shaped by Its Own Values

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

cs.LG

Think Fast: Estimating No-CoT Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models

Many efforts to ensure frontier AI models are safe rely on monitoring their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. If models become able to perform sufficiently complex reasoning internally, without explicit thinking tokens, this would undermine such oversight. We measure how well frontier models reason without CoT across a suite of over 30,000 questions spanning 43 benchmarks in domains including math, coding, puzzles, causality, theory-of-mind, and strategic reasoning. To compare models against humans, we estimate the $50\%$-task-completion time horizon (TH): the human time required for tasks a model completes with $50\%$ success rate. We complement this with a $50\%$ reasoning token horizon: the minimum number of o3-mini reasoning tokens needed for tasks a model solves with $50\%$ success rate. We find that the no-CoT $50\%$ TH of frontier models has been doubling roughly every year over the past six years, with GPT-5.5's TH reaching over 3 minutes and reasoning token horizon exceeding 1,500 tokens. Our median estimates predict that frontier no-CoT THs could exceed 7 minutes by 2028, and 25 minutes by 2030, though these projections carry substantial uncertainty. We recommend frontier developers track this explicitly.

cs.AI

Negation Neglect: When models fail to learn negations in training

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

cs.CL

A Positive Case for Faithfulness: LLM Self-Explanations Help Predict Model Behavior

LLM self-explanations are often presented as a promising tool for AI oversight, yet their faithfulness to the model's true reasoning process is poorly understood. Existing faithfulness metrics have critical limitations, typically relying on identifying unfaithfulness via adversarial prompting or detecting reasoning errors. These methods overlook the predictive value of explanations. We introduce Normalized Simulatability Gain (NSG), a general and scalable metric based on the idea that a faithful explanation should allow an observer to learn a model's decision-making criteria, and thus better predict its behavior on related inputs. We evaluate 18 frontier proprietary and open-weight models, e.g., Gemini 3, GPT-5.2, and Claude 4.5, on 7,000 counterfactuals from popular datasets covering health, business, and ethics. We find self-explanations substantially improve prediction of model behavior (11-37% NSG). Self-explanations also provide more predictive information than explanations generated by external models, even when those models are stronger. This implies an advantage from self-knowledge that external explanation methods cannot replicate. Our approach also reveals that, across models, 5-15% of self-explanations are egregiously misleading. Despite their imperfections, we show a positive case for self-explanations: they encode information that helps predict model behavior.

cs.AI

Measuring what Matters: Construct Validity in Large Language Model Benchmarks

Evaluating large language models (LLMs) is crucial for both assessing their capabilities and identifying safety or robustness issues prior to deployment. Reliably measuring abstract and complex phenomena such as 'safety' and 'robustness' requires strong construct validity, that is, having measures that represent what matters to the phenomenon. With a team of 29 expert reviewers, we conduct a systematic review of 445 LLM benchmarks from leading conferences in natural language processing and machine learning. Across the reviewed articles, we find patterns related to the measured phenomena, tasks, and scoring metrics which undermine the validity of the resulting claims. To address these shortcomings, we provide eight key recommendations and detailed actionable guidance to researchers and practitioners in developing LLM benchmarks.

cs.CL

LLMs Don't Know Their Own Decision Boundaries: The Unreliability of Self-Generated Counterfactual Explanations

To collaborate effectively with humans, language models must be able to explain their decisions in natural language. We study a specific type of self-explanation: self-generated counterfactual explanations (SCEs), where a model explains its prediction by modifying the input such that it would have predicted a different outcome. We evaluate whether LLMs can produce SCEs that are valid, achieving the intended outcome, and minimal, modifying the input no more than necessary. When asked to generate counterfactuals, we find that LLMs typically produce SCEs that are valid, but far from minimal, offering little insight into their decision-making behaviour. Worryingly, when asked to generate minimal counterfactuals, LLMs typically make excessively small edits that fail to change predictions. The observed validity-minimality trade-off is consistent across several LLMs, datasets, and evaluation settings. Our findings suggest that SCEs are, at best, an ineffective explainability tool and, at worst, can provide misleading insights into model behaviour. Proposals to deploy LLMs in high-stakes settings must consider the impact of unreliable self-explanations on downstream decision-making. Our code is available at https://github.com/HarryMayne/SCEs.

cs.LG

LINGOLY-TOO: Disentangling Reasoning from Knowledge with Templatised Orthographic Obfuscation

Frontier language models demonstrate increasing ability at solving reasoning problems, but their performance is often inflated by circumventing reasoning and instead relying on their expanding knowledge and memorisation capacity. We introduce LINGOLY-TOO, a challenging reasoning benchmark of 1,203 questions and a total of 6,995 sub-questions that counters these shortcuts by applying expert-designed obfuscations to Linguistics Olympiad problems. These obfuscations preserve the underlying solution logic while reducing the likelihood problems are solvable with via knowledge or memorisation. Our experiments show that models exploit shortcuts on the original question as performance markedly drop upon obfuscation. Even the best reasoning models remain highly sensitive, with scores dropping from around 0.59 on original problems to 0.48 after obfuscation. LINGOLY-TOO disentangles reasoning from knowledge, offering a clearer measure of true reasoning capabilities.

cs.CL

Can sparse autoencoders be used to decompose and interpret steering vectors?

Steering vectors are a promising approach to control the behaviour of large language models. However, their underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. While sparse autoencoders (SAEs) may offer a potential method to interpret steering vectors, recent findings show that SAE-reconstructed vectors often lack the steering properties of the original vectors. This paper investigates why directly applying SAEs to steering vectors yields misleading decompositions, identifying two reasons: (1) steering vectors fall outside the input distribution for which SAEs are designed, and (2) steering vectors can have meaningful negative projections in feature directions, which SAEs are not designed to accommodate. These limitations hinder the direct use of SAEs for interpreting steering vectors.

cs.LG

How Does DPO Reduce Toxicity? A Mechanistic Neuron-Level Analysis

Safety fine-tuning algorithms reduce harmful outputs in language models, yet their mechanisms remain under-explored. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is a popular choice of algorithm, but prior explanations, attributing its effects solely to dampened toxic neurons in the MLP layers, are incomplete. In this study, we analyse four language models (Llama-3.1-8B, Gemma-2-2B, Mistral-7B, GPT-2-Medium) and show that toxic neurons only account for 2.5% to 24% of DPO's effects across models. Instead, DPO balances distributed activation shifts across all MLP neurons to create a net toxicity reduction. We attribute this reduction to four neuron groups, two aligned with reducing toxicity and two promoting anti-toxicity, whose combined effects replicate DPO across models. To further validate this understanding, we develop an activation editing method mimicking DPO through distributed shifts along a toxicity representation. This method outperforms DPO in reducing toxicity while preserving perplexity, without requiring any weight updates. Our work provides a mechanistic understanding of DPO and introduces an efficient, tuning-free alternative for safety fine-tuning.

cs.LG

LINGOLY: A Benchmark of Olympiad-Level Linguistic Reasoning Puzzles in Low-Resource and Extinct Languages

In this paper, we present the LingOly benchmark, a novel benchmark for advanced reasoning abilities in large language models. Using challenging Linguistic Olympiad puzzles, we evaluate (i) capabilities for in-context identification and generalisation of linguistic patterns in very low-resource or extinct languages, and (ii) abilities to follow complex task instructions. The LingOly benchmark covers more than 90 mostly low-resource languages, minimising issues of data contamination, and contains 1,133 problems across 6 formats and 5 levels of human difficulty. We assess performance with both direct accuracy and comparison to a no-context baseline to penalise memorisation. Scores from 11 state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate the benchmark to be challenging, and models perform poorly on the higher difficulty problems. On harder problems, even the top model only achieved 38.7% accuracy, a 24.7% improvement over the no-context baseline. Large closed models typically outperform open models, and in general, the higher resource the language, the better the scores. These results indicate, in absence of memorisation, true multi-step out-of-domain reasoning remains a challenge for current language models.

cs.CL

Large language models can help boost food production, but be mindful of their risks

Coverage of ChatGPT-style large language models (LLMs) in the media has focused on their eye-catching achievements, including solving advanced mathematical problems and reaching expert proficiency in medical examinations. But the gradual adoption of LLMs in agriculture, an industry which touches every human life, has received much less public scrutiny. In this short perspective, we examine risks and opportunities related to more widespread adoption of language models in food production systems. While LLMs can potentially enhance agricultural efficiency, drive innovation, and inform better policies, challenges like agricultural misinformation, collection of vast amounts of farmer data, and threats to agricultural jobs are important concerns. The rapid evolution of the LLM landscape underscores the need for agricultural policymakers to think carefully about frameworks and guidelines that ensure the responsible use of LLMs in food production before these technologies become so ingrained that policy intervention becomes challenging.

cs.CY

Unsupervised Learning Approaches for Identifying ICU Patient Subgroups: Do Results Generalise?

The use of unsupervised learning to identify patient subgroups has emerged as a potentially promising direction to improve the efficiency of Intensive Care Units (ICUs). By identifying subgroups of patients with similar levels of medical resource need, ICUs could be restructured into a collection of smaller subunits, each catering to a specific group. However, it is unclear whether common patient subgroups exist across different ICUs, which would determine whether ICU restructuring could be operationalised in a standardised manner. In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that common ICU patient subgroups exist by examining whether the results from one existing study generalise to a different dataset. We extracted 16 features representing medical resource need and used consensus clustering to derive patient subgroups, replicating the previous study. We found limited similarities between our results and those of the previous study, providing evidence against the hypothesis. Our findings imply that there is significant variation between ICUs; thus, a standardised restructuring approach is unlikely to be appropriate. Instead, potential efficiency gains might be greater when the number and nature of the subunits are tailored to each ICU individually.

cs.LG