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Hassan Mohamad

Publications and source records attributed to Hassan Mohamad.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Pricing for Information Revelation in Demand Response: A Strategic Communication Approach

Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect information assumptions or complex incentive-compatible mechanisms; however, in voluntary settings, and in the presence of strategic consumers, possibly implemented by automated intelligent agents, private parameters may be misreported due to strategic incentives. We analyze this communication setting using cheap-talk game theory, delivering four key insights. First, the nontrivial scenario of multiple strategic transmitters (consumers) turns out to be tractable for the case study of interest: we prove that complex strategic interactions among multiple consumers decouple into independent subgames. Second, we demonstrate that a pre-announced retail price can be exploited as a design lever to control the information revealed by the consumers and therefore the overall system efficiency. Third, we derive a closed-form expression for the optimal uniform price that maximizes information revelation. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium structure to identify when communication is informative. Simulations show that a properly designed price for the communication scheme can recover up to 95% of the ideal system utility (i.e., under perfect information reporting), whereas a price-unaware choice leads to significant losses in social welfare.

cs.GT

Strategic Federated Learning: Application to Smart Meter Data Clustering

Federated learning (FL) involves several clients that share with a fusion center (FC), the model each client has trained with its own data. Conventional FL, which can be interpreted as an estimation or distortion-based approach, ignores the final use of model information (MI) by the FC and the other clients. In this paper, we introduce a novel FL framework in which the FC uses an aggregate version of the MI to make decisions that affect the client's utility functions. Clients cannot choose the decisions and can only use the MI reported to the FC to maximize their utility. Depending on the alignment between the client and FC utilities, the client may have an individual interest in adding strategic noise to the model. This general framework is stated and specialized to the case of clustering, in which noisy cluster representative information is reported. This is applied to the problem of power consumption scheduling. In this context, utility non-alignment occurs, for instance, when the client wants to consume when the price of electricity is low, whereas the FC wants the consumption to occur when the total power is the lowest. This is illustrated with aggregated real data from Ausgrid \cite{ausgrid}. Our numerical analysis clearly shows that the client can increase his utility by adding noise to the model reported to the FC. Corresponding results and source codes can be downloaded from \cite{source-code}.

cs.LG