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Hassan Munif

Publications and source records attributed to Hassan Munif.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Robust Action Clusters and Cascades in Opinion Dynamics with Heterogeneous Action Thresholds

We study the preservation and propagation of public actions in networks whose agents hold continuous private opinions. Agents update their opinions from their neighbors' observed actions and express them through action rules whose thresholds differ across agents. We characterize groups of agents that preserve a given common action regardless of the outsiders' actions. We call such a group, paired with that action, a robust action cluster. We show that a group is a robust action cluster for that action if and only if each member places enough of its influence weight on the group, where the required influence depends on the member's own action rule. We further give a sufficient condition under which an agent outside the cluster permanently adopts the cluster's action, and we iterate it to obtain a cascade of agents that are guaranteed to adopt that action. Finally, numerical examples show that replacing heterogeneous thresholds by their mean can change both the propagation of an action and the presence of robust action clusters.

eess.SY↗

Pricing for Information Revelation in Demand Response: A Strategic Communication Approach

Demand response aggregators require consumers' private flexibility information to dispatch loads efficiently. Yet self-interested consumers have incentives to misreport it. This paper investigates how much information heterogeneous consumers can credibly convey through nonbinding, unverifiable reports, and how a pre-announced retail tariff can improve this revelation. We model this interaction as a multi-sender strategic communication game with state-dependent bias, using the cheap-talk framework. The aggregator maximizes social welfare, and consumers have private valuations and quadratic payoffs. Closed-form conditions identify when the set of dispatched consumers is invariant to the reports. Under these conditions, reporting incentives decouple into independent single-sender subgames. We derive a closed-form uniform tariff that simultaneously minimizes the mean-squared strategic bias of all dispatched consumers. In this regime, the welfare loss relative to full communication is expressed as a weighted sum of residual posterior variances, showing that every equilibrium weakly improves expected social welfare over no communication. Numerical studies support the theoretical results and show that, when consumers coordinate on informative equilibria, strategic communication with the proposed bias-minimizing tariff recovers most of the full-communication welfare gain over no communication.

cs.GT↗

Network-Induced Strategic Communication in Opinion Dynamics

Classical opinion dynamics typically assume a fixed mapping from private opinions to public signals, such as linear exchange, saturated signaling, or discrete public actions. In this paper, we show that these communication mappings can be derived from a strategic communication game played on a weighted influence network. Each agent acts as a receiver estimating its neighbors' states and as a sender broadcasting a public signal to influence its audience. We prove that the network's effect on a sender is summarized by a scalar, network-induced exaggeration factor, and the network game decouples into independent scalar cheap talk problems. The communication rules then emerge as behavioral regimes of one model: aligned incentives recover linear averaging; persuasive senders facing naive receivers produce saturated signaling; and persuasive senders facing Bayesian receivers cannot credibly reveal their opinions, so equilibrium communication becomes an interval quantizer, providing a game-theoretic foundation for continuous-opinion discrete-action (CODA) dynamics. Embedded in repeated opinion updates, the resulting strategic-CODA dynamics preserve opinion clustering and exclude extremism. The model predicts that a speaker exaggerates more when their audience is less influenced by them, and that under strong exaggeration, credible public expression collapses to a binary stance even while private opinions remain continuous.

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Strategic Gaussian Signaling under Linear Sensitivity Mismatch

We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear transformation of the state rather than a shifted one. We derive the equilibrium structure for both noiseless (cheap-talk) and noisy signaling channels. In the noiseless case, the equilibrium admits a spectral characterization: the encoder transmits information only along eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a mismatch matrix. In the noisy regime, we derive analytical thresholds for informative signaling, showing that communication collapses if the sensitivity mismatch or transmission cost exceeds a channel-dependent threshold.

cs.GT↗