arXiv subjects

Hasti Karimi

Publications and source records attributed to Hasti Karimi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Metric Facility Assignment with Partial Information

We study an assignment problem where a set of agents and a set of facilities lie on a line metric. The goal is to compute an assignment of agents to facilities to approximately minimize the social cost (the total distance of agents from their assigned facilities) given only partial information regarding the metric. Unlike previous work which focused solely on algorithms with access to the ordinal preferences of the agents over the facilities (ORD), we also consider the value of information regarding approval preferences (APP), and inter-facility distances (DIST). For different combinations of these three information types, we establish tight bounds on the distortion of deterministic algorithms, showing that it is possible to improve over the optimal bound of $3$ that can be achieved using only ORD information. Among other results, we show a tight bound of $1+\sqrt{2}$ for APP+DIST which holds even for general metrics, and a tight bound of $2$ for ORD+APP+DIST.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Lower Bounds for Approximate Sign Rank

We prove new upper and lower bounds on $\epsilon$-approximate sign-rank, a relaxation of sign-rank introduced by Chornomaz, Moran, and Waknine (STOC 2025). We show that every $m \times n$ sign matrix with approximate sign-rank $d$ contains a monochromatic rectangle of size $d^{-O(d)}m \times d^{-O(d^2)}n$, paralleling classical results for exact sign-rank. As an application, we establish a lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{d/\log d})$ on the $\epsilon$-approximate sign-rank of large-margin $d$-dimensional half-spaces. Prior to our work, the only general lower bound technique known for approximate sign-rank yielded bounds of strength $\epsilon^{-1} - 1$, which are constant for fixed $\epsilon$. A key ingredient is a new geometric theorem on hyperplane avoidance: for any set of $n$ points in general position in $\mathbb{R}^d$, there exist $d$ subsets, each of size $d^{-O(d)} n$, such that no hyperplane simultaneously splits all of them. The proof combines the Forster-Barthe isotropic position theorem with the Bourgain-Tzafriri restricted invertibility principle. We also study the relationship between approximate sign-rank and VC dimension. We prove a lower bound on approximate sign-rank in terms of VC dimension, and exhibit concept classes of VC dimension $2$ with large approximate sign-rank. Finally, we study the approximate sign-rank of the $2^m \times 2^m$ Hadamard matrix $H_m$. The sign-rank of $H_m$ is known to be $\Omega(\sqrt{2^m})$ by Forster's classic theorem. Contrasting this, we adapt an argument of Alman and Williams to show that the approximate sign-rank of $H_m$ is at most $m^{O(\sqrt{m} \log(1/\epsilon))}$, and hence the Hadamard matrix does not witness polynomial-strength lower bounds for approximate sign-rank. Using our VC dimension bound, we prove that the approximate sign-rank of $H_m$ is at least $\Omega_\epsilon(m)$.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2026

Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule

We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size $k$ is selected from a set of candidates based on voters' ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a line metric, and social cost is determined by the underlying metric distances. The distortion of a voting rule is the worst-case ratio between the social cost of the elected committee and an optimal committee. Previous work has focused on the $q$-cost model, in which a voter's cost is given by the distance to their $q$th closest committee member. Here, we study the additive cost, where a voter's cost is the sum of distances to all committee members. We introduce the Polar Comparison Rule and analyze its distortion under utilitarian additive cost. We show that it achieves a distortion of at most $2.33$ for all committee sizes $k>2$, improving upon the previously best-known upper bound of $3$. Moreover, for $k=2$ and $k=3$, we establish tight distortion bounds of $2.41$ and $2.33$, respectively. We also derive lower bounds that depend on the parity of $k$ and analyze the behavior of distortion for small and large committee sizes. Finally, we extend our results to the egalitarian additive cost.

cs.GT↗