Henry Bourne | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Laser fractional frequency instability at $\mathbf{4\times 10^{-17}}$ with a room temperature optical reference cavity

Ultrastable lasers play a key role in optical frequency metrology, setting measurement speed and ultimately impacting both stability and accuracy of optical frequency standards. Here we demonstrate laser fractional frequency instability at ${4}\times10^{-17}$ and laser frequency linewidth of $12\,$mHz full width at half maximum, employing a 68 cm long optical reference cavity operating at room temperature. To the best of our knowledge, both frequency instability and linewidth are the lowest ever reported for a room temperature system. This work highlights that state-of-the-art frequency stability and spectral purity are achievable at room temperature, making them accessible to a broader range of users.

physics.optics↗

arXiv2025

Securing Transfer-Learned Networks with Reverse Homomorphic Encryption

The growing body of literature on training-data reconstruction attacks raises significant concerns about deploying neural network classifiers trained on sensitive data. However, differentially private (DP) training (e.g. using DP-SGD) can defend against such attacks with large training datasets causing only minimal loss of network utility. Folklore, heuristics, and (albeit pessimistic) DP bounds suggest this fails for networks trained with small per-class datasets, yet to the best of our knowledge the literature offers no compelling evidence. We directly demonstrate this vulnerability by significantly extending reconstruction attack capabilities under a realistic adversary threat model for few-shot transfer learned image classifiers. We design new white-box and black-box attacks and find that DP-SGD is unable to defend against these without significant classifier utility loss. To address this, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption (HE) method that protects training data without degrading model's accuracy. Conventional HE secures model's input data and requires costly homomorphic implementation of the entire classifier. In contrast, our new scheme is computationally efficient and protects training data rather than input data. This is achieved by means of a simple role-reversal where classifier input data is unencrypted but transfer-learned weights are encrypted. Classifier outputs remain encrypted, thus preventing both white-box and black-box (and any other) training-data reconstruction attacks. Under this new scheme only a trusted party with a private decryption key can obtain the classifier class decisions.

cs.CR↗