arXiv subjects

Henry P. Stapp

Publications and source records attributed to Henry P. Stapp.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2012

Quantum Locality?

Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a 'consistent quantum theory' that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues that the putative proofs of this property that involve hidden variables include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by establishing, instead, properties of a system modified by adding properties alien to the original system. Hence Griffiths' rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his 'consistent quantum theory' shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive version of quantum theory. An added section responds to Griffiths' reply, which cites general possibilities of ambiguities that make what is to be proved ill-defined, and hence render the pertinent 'consistent framework' ill defined. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question, which, both by its physical formulation and by explicit identification, specify the framework to be used. Griffiths confirms the validity of the proof insofar as that framework is used. The section also shows, in response to Griffiths' challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has described is flawed.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2011

Apparent Retrocausation as a Consequence of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics Refined to Accommodate the Principle of Sufficient Reason

The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: no definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular thing should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded Western philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in the sense that it be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature of contemporary orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature's response to the probing action of an observer is determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason at all. This appeal to pure chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-based Western science. It is argued here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum physics, that in a world that conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic level, in cases where the reason behind Nature's choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics can become biased in an empirically manifest and apparently retrocausal way when the reason for the choice is empirically identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to be biased in a certain plausible way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearance of backward-time-causation of the kind that have been reported in the scientific literature.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2011

Retrocausal Effects as a Consequence of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics Refined to Accommodate The Principle of Sufficient Reason

The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: no definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular thing should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded Western philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in the sense that it be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature of contemporary orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature's response to the probing action of an observer is determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason at all. This appeal to pure chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-based Western science. It is argued here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum physics, that in a world that conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic level, in cases where the reason behind nature's choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics can become biased in an empirically manifest way when the reason for the choice is empirically identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to be biased in this way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearances of backward-time-effects of the kind that have been reported in the scientific literature.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2008

Searle's "Dualism Revisited"

A recent article in which John Searle claims to refute dualism is examined from a scientific perspective.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2008

Philosophy of mind and the problem of free will in the light of quantum mechanics

Defects occasioned by the advent of quantum mechanics are described in detail of recent arguments by John Searle and by Jaegwon Kim pertaining to the question of the complete reducibility to the physical of the apparent capacity of a person's conscious thoughts to affect the behaviour of that person's physically described brain.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2008

Physicalism versus quantum mechanics

In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the concept of "physical" embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of these properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which provides a better, more comprehensive, and more fundamental account of phenomena. It is argued that the difficulties that have plaged physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in a way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world of the principle of the causal closure of the physical, a failure that goes beyond what is entailed by the randomness in the outcomes of observations, and that accommodates the efficacy in the brain of conscious intent.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2008

A model of the quantum-classical and mind-brain connections, and of the role of the quantum Zeno effect in the physical implementation of conscious intent

A simple exactly solvable model is given of the dynamical coupling between a person's classically described perceptions and that person's quantum mechanically described brain. The model is based jointly upon von Neumann's theory of measurement and the empirical findings of close connections between conscious intentions and synchronous oscillations in well separated parts of the brain. A quantum-Zeno-effect-based mechanism is described that allows conscious intentions to influence brain activity in a functionally appropriate way. The robustness of this mechanism in the face of environmental decoherence effects is emphasized.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2007

The Quantum-Classical and Mind-Brain Linkages: The Quantum Zeno Effect in Binocular Rivalry

A quantum mechanical theory of the relationship between perceptions and brain dynamics based on von Neumann's theory of measurments is applied to a recent quantum theoretical treatment of binocular rivaly that makes essential use of the quantum Zeno effect to give good fits to the complex available empirical data. The often-made claim that decoherence effects in the warm, wet, noisy brain must eliminate quantum effects at the macroscopic scale pertaining to perceptions is examined, and it is argued, on the basis of fundamental principles. that the usual decoherence effects will not upset the quantum Zeno effect that is being exploited in the cited work.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2004

Comments on Shimony's Analysis

Shimony's method of analysis does not distinguish adequately between a legitimate assumption of no faster-than-light action in one direction and the to-be-proved assertion of faster-than-light transfer of information in the other direction. The virtue is noted of replacing the logical framework based on counterfactual concepts by one based on the concept of fixed past open future.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2003

Correspondence and analyticity

The analyticity properties of the S matrix in the physical region are determined by the correspondence principle, which asserts that the predictions of classical physics are generated by taking the classical limit of the predictions of quantum theory. The analyticity properties deducible in this way from classical properties include the locations of the singularity surfaces, the rules for analytic continuation around these surfaces, and the analytic character (e.g., pole, logarithmic, etc.) of these singulatities. These important properties of the S matrix are thus derived without using stringent locality assumptions. The quantum properties are derived by an analytic reverse engineering of the classical properties.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2003

A Bell-type Theorem Without Hidden Variables

It is shown that no theory that satisfies certain premises can exclude faster-than-light influences. The premises include neither the existence of hidden variables, nor counterfactual definiteness, nor any premise that effectively entails the general existence of outcomes of unperformed local measurements. All the premises are compatible with Copenhagen philosophy, and the principles and predictions of relativistic quantum field theory. The present proof is contrasted with an earlier one with the same objective.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2002

The basis problem in many-worlds theories

It is emphasized that a many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory exists only to the extent that the associated basis problem is solved. The core basis problem is that the robust enduring states specified by environmental decoherence effects are essentially Gaussian wave packets that form continua of non-orthogonal states. Hence they are not a discrete set of orthogonal basis states to which finite probabilities can be assigned by the usual rules. The natural way to get an orthogonal basis without going outside the Schroedinger dynamics is to use the eigenstates of the reduced density matrix, and this idea is the basis of some recent attempts by many-worlds proponents to solve the basis problem. But these eigenstates do not enjoy the locality and quasi-classicality properties of the states defined by environmental decoherence effects, and hence are not satisfactory preferred basis states. The basis problem needs to be addressed and resolved before a many-worlds-type interpretation can be said to exist.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2001

Parity Doubling, Zitterbewegung, and Rest Mass for Spin 1

A 6-component "wave function" (not field, but S-matrix interpretable) for a massive spin-1 particle parallels the Dirac "chirality-doubled" 4-component wave function for a spin-1/2 particle, by pairing two wave functions for same spin but opposite "handedness". The correlated "opposite-parity" pair of complex 3-vectors defines a fluctuating spin-correlated lightlike ``internal velocity" as well as an independent "external rapidity". Extension from fermions to vector bosons of the velocity-fluctuation ("zitterbewegung") interpretation of rest mass weakens theoretical motivation for elementary scalar bosons.

hep-th↗

arXiv2001

Bell's Theorem Without Hidden Variables

Experiments motivated by Bell's theorem have led some physicists to conclude that quantum theory is nonlocal. However, the theoretical basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell's Theorem, which shows only that if certain predictions of quantum theory are correct, and a strong hidden-variable assumption is valid, then a certain locality condition must fail. This locality condition expresses the idea that what an experimenter freely chooses to measure in one spacetime region can have no effect of any kind in a second region situated spacelike relative to the first. The experimental results conform closely to the predictions of quantum theory in such cases, but the most reasonable conclusion to draw is not that locality fails, but rather that the hidden-variable assumption is false. For this assumption conflicts with the quantum precept that unperformed experiments have no outcomes. The present paper deduces the failure of this locality condition directly from the precepts of quantum theory themselves, in a way that generates no inconsistency or any conflict with the predictions of relativistic quantum field theory.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2001

The 18-fold way

I shall consider each of the 18 claims made by Mohrhoff, and explain, in each case, why I take the path opposite to the one by which he seeks to remove the effects of our thoughts on the activities of our quantum mechanically described brains.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2001

Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature

Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to understand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for practical rules describing connections between our observations. Many physicist have regarded this renunciation of our effort to describe nature herself as premature, and John von Neumann reformulated quantum theory as a theory of an evolving objective universe interacting with human consciousness. This interaction is associated both in Copenhagen quantum theory and in von Neumann quantum theory with a sudden change that brings the objective physical state of a system in line with a subjectively felt psychical reality. The objective physical state is thereby converted from a material substrate to an informational and dispositional substrate that carries both the information incorporated into it by the psychical realities, and certain dispositions for the occurrence of future psychical realities. The present work examines and proposes solutions to two problems that have appeared to block the development of this conception of nature. The first problem is how to reconcile this theory with the principles of relativistic quantum field theory; the second problem is to understand whether, strictly within quantum theory, a person's mind can affect the activities of his brain, and if so how. Solving the first problem involves resolving a certain nonlocality question. The proposed solution to the second problem is based on a postulated connection between effort, attention, and the quantum Zeno effect. This solution explains on the basis of quantum physics a large amount of heretofore unexplained data amassed by psychologists.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2001

Von Neumann's Formulation of Quantum Theory and the Role of Mind in Nature

Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to understand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for practical rules that describe connections between our observations. Many physicist have believed that this renunciation of the attempt describe nature herself was premature, and John von Neumann, in a major work, reformulated quantum theory as theory of the evolving objective universe. In the course of his work he converted to a benefit what had appeared to be a severe deficiency of the Copenhagen interpretation, namely its introduction into physical theory of the human observers. He used this subjective element of quantum theory to achieve a significant advance on the main problem in philosophy, which is to understand the relationship between mind and matter. That problem had been tied closely to physical theory by the works of Newton and Descartes. The present work examines the major problems that have appeared to block the development of von Neumann's theory into a fully satisfactory theory of Nature, and proposes solutions to these problems.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2000

Reply to "On Stapp's`Nonlocal Character of Quantum Theory' "

The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over spacelike intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann.

quant-ph↗