arXiv subjects

Henry Sleight

Publications and source records attributed to Henry Sleight.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

Jailbreak Defense in a Narrow Domain: Limitations of Existing Methods and a New Transcript-Classifier Approach

Defending large language models against jailbreaks so that they never engage in a broadly-defined set of forbidden behaviors is an open problem. In this paper, we investigate the difficulty of jailbreak-defense when we only want to forbid a narrowly-defined set of behaviors. As a case study, we focus on preventing an LLM from helping a user make a bomb. We find that popular defenses such as safety training, adversarial training, and input/output classifiers are unable to fully solve this problem. In pursuit of a better solution, we develop a transcript-classifier defense which outperforms the baseline defenses we test. However, our classifier defense still fails in some circumstances, which highlights the difficulty of jailbreak-defense even in a narrow domain.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Rapid Response: Mitigating LLM Jailbreaks with a Few Examples

As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Looking Inward: Language Models Can Learn About Themselves by Introspection

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Is Model Collapse Inevitable? Breaking the Curse of Recursion by Accumulating Real and Synthetic Data

The proliferation of generative models, combined with pretraining on web-scale data, raises a timely question: what happens when these models are trained on their own generated outputs? Recent investigations into model-data feedback loops proposed that such loops would lead to a phenomenon termed model collapse, under which performance progressively degrades with each model-data feedback iteration until fitted models become useless. However, those studies largely assumed that new data replace old data over time, where an arguably more realistic assumption is that data accumulate over time. In this paper, we ask: what effect does accumulating data have on model collapse? We empirically study this question by pretraining sequences of language models on text corpora. We confirm that replacing the original real data by each generation's synthetic data does indeed tend towards model collapse, then demonstrate that accumulating the successive generations of synthetic data alongside the original real data avoids model collapse; these results hold across a range of model sizes, architectures, and hyperparameters. We obtain similar results for deep generative models on other types of real data: diffusion models for molecule conformation generation and variational autoencoders for image generation. To understand why accumulating data can avoid model collapse, we use an analytically tractable framework introduced by prior work in which a sequence of linear models are fit to the previous models' outputs. Previous work used this framework to show that if data are replaced, the test error increases with the number of model-fitting iterations; we extend this argument to prove that if data instead accumulate, the test error has a finite upper bound independent of the number of iterations, meaning model collapse no longer occurs.

cs.LG↗