The Confidence Trap: Calibration Attacks for Graph Neural Networks
While confidence calibration is essential for trustworthy decision-making in safety-critical applications, the robustness of calibrated GNNs to adversarial structural perturbations remains largely unexplored. However, studying calibration attacks on graphs presents unique technical challenges: (1) the discrete nature of graph structures complicates gradient-based optimization, (2) existing underconfidence objectives fail to drive predictions toward uniform distributions, and (3) GNNs are highly sensitive to edge perturbations, often causing unintended label changes that violate attack constraints. To address these challenges, we propose a \textbf{Unified Graph Calibration Attack (UGCA)} framework designed for \textbf{worst-case (white-box) analysis} of GNN calibration robustness. UGCA introduces a KL-divergence loss to encourage uniform predictive distributions, a reranking mechanism to reduce label flipping, a hybrid loss to recover labels when violations occur, and beam search to explore a broader adversarial search space. We further provide theoretical insights linking model generalization, dataset complexity, and calibration vulnerability, showing that models with higher accuracy or trained on datasets with more classes are more susceptible under this threat model. Extensive experiments demonstrate that UGCA substantially increases Expected Calibration Error while preserving classification accuracy. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/CaptainCuong/Graph-Calibration-Attack.git.