arXiv subjects

Hisashi Ohtsuki

Publications and source records attributed to Hisashi Ohtsuki.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Immune history shapes recurrent epidemics of antigenically related variants

Population immunity carried over from past epidemics of an antigenically variable pathogen influences the epidemic of new variants based on their antigenic similarity to the previous ones. We develop a recurrent SIR model where a population faces sequential, antigenically related variants. The model yields a recurrence map for the population susceptibility to successive variants under the assumption of status-based population immunity. The model reveals that stable, equal-sized recurrent epidemics occur across broad parameter ranges, but can be destabilized when transmission is strong and antigenic escape is limited, leading to period-2 or more, or even more complex epidemic dynamics. Epidemic size is maximized at an intermediate basic reproduction number: higher transmissibility boosts immediate infection but also enhances cross-immunity, reducing future susceptibility of the population. Our results clarify how immune history shapes recurrent epidemics and why success in one wave does not ensure larger future epidemics.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2026

Evolving genealogies in cultural evolution, the descendant process, and the number of cultural traits

We consider a Moran-type model of cultural evolution, which describes how traits emerge, are transmitted, and get lost in populations. Our analysis focuses on the underlying cultural genealogies; they were first described by Aguilar and Ghirlanda (2015) and are closely related to the ancestral selection graph of population genetics, wherefore we call them ancestral learning graphs. We investigate their dynamical behaviour, that is, we are concerned with evolving genealogies. In particular, we consider the total length of the genealogy of the entire population as a function of the (forward) time where we start looking back. This quantity shows a sawtooth-like dynamics with linear increase interrupted by collapses to near-zero at random times. We relate this to the metastable behaviour of the stochastic logistic model, which describes the evolution of the number of ancestors as well as the number of descendants of a given sample. We superpose types to the model by assuming that new inventions appear independently in every individual, and all traits of the cultural parent are transmitted to the learner in any given learning event. The set of traits of an individual then agrees with the set of innovations along its genealogy. The properties of the genealogy thus translate into the properties of the trait set of a sample. In particular, the moments of the number of traits are obtained from the moments of the total length of the genealogy.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2023

Evolutionary stability of cooperation by the leading eight norms in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in human societies. In indirect reciprocity, an individual chooses whether or not to cooperate with another based on reputation information, and others evaluate the action as good or bad. Under what evaluation rule (called ``social norm'') cooperation evolves has long been of central interest in the literature. It has been reported that if individuals can share their evaluations (i.e., public reputation), social norms called ``leading eight'' can be evolutionarily stable. On the other hand, when they cannot share their evaluations (i.e., private assessment), the evolutionary stability of cooperation is still in question. To tackle this problem, we create a novel method to analyze the reputation structure in the population under private assessment. Specifically, we characterize each individual by two variables, ``goodness'' (what proportion of the population considers the individual as good) and ``self-reputation'' (whether an individual thinks of him/herself as good or bad), and analyze the stochastic process of how these two variables change over time. We discuss evolutionary stability of each of the leading eight social norms by studying the robustness against invasions of unconditional cooperators and defectors. We identify key pivots in those social norms for establishing a high level of cooperation or stable cooperation against mutants. Our finding gives an insight into how human cooperation is established in a real-world society.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2023

Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case, where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to success in maintaining cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for evolution of human cooperation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The present study gives a theoretical analysis of such complex reputation structure. We formulate the time change of goodness of individuals caused by updates of reputations among individuals. By considering a large population, we derive dynamics of the frequency distribution of goodnesses. An equilibrium state of the dynamics is approximated by a summation of Gaussian functions. We demonstrate that the theoretical solution well fits the numerical calculation. From the theoretical solution, we obtain a new interpretation of the complex reputation structure. This study provides a novel mathematical basis for cutting-edge studies on indirect reciprocity.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games

We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2009

Accumulation of driver and passenger mutations during tumor progression

Major efforts to sequence cancer genomes are now occurring throughout the world. Though the emerging data from these studies are illuminating, their reconciliation with epidemiologic and clinical observations poses a major challenge. In the current study, we provide a novel mathematical model that begins to address this challenge. We model tumors as a discrete time branching process that starts with a single driver mutation and proceeds as each new driver mutation leads to a slightly increased rate of clonal expansion. Using the model, we observe tremendous variation in the rate of tumor development - providing an understanding of the heterogeneity in tumor sizes and development times that have been observed by epidemiologists and clinicians. Furthermore, the model provides a simple formula for the number of driver mutations as a function of the total number of mutations in the tumor. Finally, when applied to recent experimental data, the model allows us to calculate, for the first time, the actual selective advantage provided by typical somatic mutations in human tumors in situ. This selective advantage is surprisingly small, 0.005 +- 0.0005, and has major implications for experimental cancer research.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2009

Evolutionary game dynamics in phenotype space

Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of space to evolutionary game dynamics: phenotype space. The population is well-mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies depend on distance in phenotype space. Individuals might behave differently towards those who look similar or dissimilar. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes. We study the `phenotypic space walk' of populations. We present analytic calculations that bring together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. As a particular example, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in phenotype space. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors: for a one-dimensional phenotype space and large population size the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c=1+2/sqrt{3}. We derive the fundamental condition for any evolutionary game and explore higher dimensional phenotype spaces.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2009

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n*n games in the limit of weak selection.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2009

Evolutionary dynamics and fixation probabilities in directed networks

We investigate the evolutionary dynamics in directed and/or weighted networks. We study the fixation probability of a mutant in finite populations in stochastic voter-type dynamics for several update rules. The fixation probability is defined as the probability of a newly introduced mutant in a wild-type population taking over the entire population. In contrast to the case of undirected and unweighted networks, the fixation probability of a mutant in directed networks is characterized not only by the degree of the node that the mutant initially invades but by the global structure of networks. Consequently, the gross connectivity of networks such as small-world property or modularity has a major impact on the fixation probability.

physics.soc-ph↗