Co-evolution of social reward and punishment under institutional interventions
We investigate how peer and institutional incentives jointly shape the evolution of cooperation, social welfare, and enforcement efficiency in social dilemmas. In a Prisoners Dilemma with four strategies, unconditional cooperators (C), defectors (D), social punishers (SP), and social rewarders (SR), we allow decentralised peer incentives and centralised institutional incentives to act simultaneously, with the institution able to reward or punish any subset of strategies. In infinite well-mixed populations, we analyse the resulting four-strategy replicator dynamics, and in structured populations we use agent-based simulations on square lattices to study spatial effects and network reciprocity. Intervention schemes are evaluated by equilibrium states and evolutionary flow for infinite well-mixed populations, by cooperation levels and social welfare for structured populations, defined as aggregate population payoff net of institutional cost. We find that peer punishment most strongly promotes cooperation, whereas peer reward is more beneficial for social welfare. Institutionally rewarding peer incentive strategies substantially improves both cooperation and welfare, while subsidising unconditional cooperators has little impact. Under institutional punishment, directly penalising defectors is the only consistently effective policy; punishing peer incentive strategies dismantles decentralised incentives, reduces cooperation, and harms social welfare, showing that maximising cooperation does not necessarily optimise overall societal benefit. Our findings provide design principles for institutions seeking to balance cooperation promotion with welfare maximisation.