arXiv subjects

Houyu Zhou

Publications and source records attributed to Houyu Zhou.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Learning-Augmented Facility Location Mechanisms for Envy Ratio

The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly in facility location problems. Moving beyond the traditional focus on utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, we design learning-augmented facility location mechanisms on a line for the envy ratio objective, a fairness metric defined as the maximum ratio between the utilities of any two agents. For the deterministic setting, we propose the $α$-Bounding Interval Mechanism ($α$-BIM), which utilizes predictions to achieve $α$-consistency and $\fracα{α- 1}$-robustness for a selected parameter $α\in [1,2]$, and prove its optimality. We also resolve open questions raised by Ding et al. [10], devising a randomized mechanism without predictions to improve upon the best-known approximation ratio from $2$ to approximately $1.8944$. Building upon these advancements, we construct a novel randomized mechanism, the Bias-Aware Mechanism (BAM), which incorporates predictions to achieve improved consistency and robustness guarantees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Minimizing Inequity in Facility Location Games

This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the maximum group effect introduced by Marsh and Schilling (1994). Each group's effect is defined as its total or maximum distance to the nearest facility, weighted by group-specific factors. We show that this formulation generalizes several prominent optimization objectives, including the classical utilitarian (social cost) and egalitarian (maximum cost) objectives, as well as two group-fair objectives, maximum total and average group cost. In order to minimize the maximum group effect, we first propose two novel mechanisms for the single-facility case, the BALANCED mechanism and the MajorPhantom mechanism. Both are strategyproof and achieve tight approximation guarantees under distinct formulations of the maximum group effect objective. Our mechanisms recover the known tight approximation guarantees for classical group-fair objectives as special cases, while extending them to a broader weighted framework and unifying several classical truthful mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Likelihood of the Existence of Average Justified Representation

We study the approval-based multi-winner election problem where $n$ voters jointly decide a committee of $k$ winners from $m$ candidates. We focus on the axiom \emph{average justified representation} (AJR) proposed by Fernandez, Elkind, Lackner, Garcia, Arias-Fisteus, Basanta-Val, and Skowron (2017). AJR postulates that every group of voters with a common preference should be sufficiently represented in that their average satisfaction should be no less than their Hare quota. Formally, for every group of $\lceil\ell\cdot\frac{n}{k}\rceil$ voters with $\ell$ common approved candidates, the average number of approved winners for this group should be at least $\ell$. It is well-known that a winning committee satisfying AJR is not guaranteed to exist for all multi-winner election instances. In this paper, we study the likelihood of the existence of AJR under the Erdős--Rényi model. We consider the Erdős--Rényi model parameterized by $p\in[0,1]$ that samples multi-winner election instances from the distribution where each voter approves each candidate with probability $p$ (and the events that voters approve candidates are independent), and we provide a clean and complete characterization of the existence of AJR committees in the case where $m$ is a constant and $n$ tends to infinity. We show that there are two phase transition points $p_1$ and $p_2$ (with $p_1\leq p_2$) for the parameter $p$ such that: 1) when $p p_2$, an AJR committee exists with probability $1-o(1)$, 2) when $p_1<p<p_2$, an AJR committee exists with probability $o(1)$, and 3) when $p=p_1$ or $p=p_2$, the probability that an AJR committee exists is bounded away from both $0$ and $1$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Mechanism Design for Congested Facility Location

This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost increases when the facility is located closer to their competitors. We analyze three types of misreporting: location-only, group-membership-only, and combined misreporting. To minimize social cost, we propose a strategyproof mechanism that achieves optimality under location-only misreporting. For group membership and combined misreporting, we show that the median mechanism attains tight approximation bounds. For the objective of minimizing maximum cost, we introduce novel strategyproof mechanisms for location-only and group-membership-only misreporting, while employing the leftmost mechanism under combined misreporting. We prove that all proposed mechanisms achieve nearly tight performance guarantees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Large Language Models for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design

Designing strategyproof mechanisms for multi-facility location that optimize social costs based on agent preferences had been challenging due to the extensive domain knowledge required and poor worst-case guarantees. Recently, deep learning models have been proposed as alternatives. However, these models require some domain knowledge and extensive hyperparameter tuning as well as lacking interpretability, which is crucial in practice when transparency of the learned mechanisms is mandatory. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach, named LLMMech, that addresses these limitations by incorporating large language models (LLMs) into an evolutionary framework for generating interpretable, hyperparameter-free, empirically strategyproof, and nearly optimal mechanisms. Our experimental results, evaluated on various problem settings where the social cost is arbitrarily weighted across agents and the agent preferences may not be uniformly distributed, demonstrate that the LLM-generated mechanisms generally outperform existing handcrafted baselines and deep learning models. Furthermore, the mechanisms exhibit impressive generalizability to out-of-distribution agent preferences and to larger instances with more agents.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

The Degree of (Extended) Justified Representation and Its Optimization

Justified Representation (JR)/Extended Justified Representation (EJR) is a desirable axiom in multiwinner approval voting. In contrast to that (E)JR only requires at least \emph{one} voter to be represented in every cohesive group, we study its optimization version that maximizes the \emph{number} of represented voters in each group. Given an instance, we say a winning committee provides a JR degree (EJR degree, resp.) of $c$ if at least $c$ voters in each $\ell$-cohesive group ($1$-cohesive group, resp.) have approved $\ell$ ($1$, resp.) winning candidates. Hence, every (E)JR committee provides the (E)JR degree of at least $1$. Besides proposing this new property, we propose the optimization problem of finding a winning committee that achieves the maximum possible (E)JR degree, called \MDJR and \MDEJR, corresponding to JR and EJR respectively. We study the computational complexity and approximability of \MDJR of \MDEJR. An (E)JR committee, which can be found in polynomial time, straightforwardly gives a $(k/n)$-approximation. We also show that the original algorithms for finding a JR and an EJR winner committee are also $1/k$ and $1/(k+1)$ approximation algorithms for \MDJR and \MDEJR respectively. On the other hand, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate \MDJR and \MDEJR to within a factor of $\left(k/n\right)^{1-ε}$ and to within a factor of $(1/k)^{1-\varepsilon}$, for any $ε>0$, which complements the positive results. Next, we study the fixed-parameter-tractability of this problem. We show that both problems are W[2]-hard if $k$, the size of the winning committee, is specified as the parameter. However, when $c_{\text{max}}$, the maximum value of $c$ such that a committee that provides an (E)JR degree of $c$ exists, is additionally given as a parameter, we show that both \MDJR and \MDEJR are fixed-parameter-tractable.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Strategyproof Mechanisms For Group-Fair Facility Location Problems

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of groups of agents to the facility fairly while eliciting the agents' locations truthfully. We first explore various well-motivated group fairness cost objectives for the problems and show that many natural objectives have an unbounded approximation ratio. We then consider minimizing the maximum total group cost and minimizing the average group cost objectives. For these objectives, we show that existing classical mechanisms (e.g., median) and new group-based mechanisms provide bounded approximation ratios, where the group-based mechanisms can achieve better ratios. We also provide lower bounds for both objectives. To measure fairness between groups and within each group, we study a new notion of intergroup and intragroup fairness (IIF) . We consider two IIF objectives and provide mechanisms with tight approximation ratios.

cs.GT↗