arXiv subjects

Huaxia Zeng

Publications and source records attributed to Huaxia Zeng.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Equity in obviously strategy-proof exchange

We propose a novel hierarchy of merit-based fairness axioms for designing exchange rules: Equity under Acclaims (EA) => Equity under Bipartite Acclaims (EBA) => Weak Equity under Bipartite Acclaims (WEBA) => Equity under Unanimous Acclaims (EUA). With this hierarchy, we identify two unambiguous costs of strengthening strategy-proofness to obvious strategy-proofness. First, the applicability of obviously strategy-proof rules is narrowed: under a mild domain richness condition, an obviously strategy-proof rule satisfying EUA, the weakest fairness requirement in our hierarchy, exists if and only if preferences are single-peaked. By contrast, TTC, a strategy-proof rule under unrestricted preferences, satisfies our strongest fairness requirement, EA. Second, the level of attainable fairness is substantially reduced: we establish that no obviously strategy-proof rule satisfies EBA, whereas WEBA is attainable by a new obviously strategy-proof rule, Designator.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models

We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional hybrid preferences arise naturally through assembling marginal preferences under the condition of semi-separability - a weakening of separability. The main result shows that under a suitable "richness" condition, every strategy-proof rule on this domain can be decomposed into component-wise strategy-proof rules, and more importantly every domain of preferences that reconciles decomposability of rules with strategy-proofness must be a multidimensional hybrid domain.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

A Taxonomy of Non-dictatorial Unidimensional Domains

A preference domain is called a non-dictatorial domain if it allows the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. We study a class of preference domains called unidimensional domains and establish that the unique seconds property (introduced by Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003)) characterizes all non-dictatorial domains. The principal contribution is the subsequent exhaustive classification of all non-dictatorial, unidimensional domains and canonical strategy-proof rules on these domains, based on a simple property of two-voter rules called invariance. The preference domains that constitute the classification are semi-single-peaked domains (introduced by Chatterji, Sanver, and Sen (2013)) and semi-hybrid domains (introduced here) which are two appropriate weakenings of single-peaked domains and are shown to allow strategy-proof rules to depend on non-peak information of voters' preferences; the canonical rules for these domains are the projection rule and the hybrid rule respectively. As a refinement of the classification, single-peaked domains and hybrid domains emerge as the only unidimensional domains that force strategy-proof rules to be determined completely by voters' preference peaks.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Probabilistic Fixed Ballot Rules and Hybrid Domains

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the "extremes" and unrestricted in the "middle". We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).

econ.TH↗