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Huaxiong Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Huaxiong Wang.

36 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Leakage-Resilient Non-Malleable Secret Sharing in Non-compartmentalized Models

Non-malleable secret sharing was recently proposed by Goyal and Kumar in independent tampering and joint tampering models for threshold secret sharing (STOC18) and secret sharing with general access structure (CRYPTO18). The idea of making secret sharing non-malleable received great attention and by now has generated many papers exploring new frontiers in this topic, such as multiple-time tampering and adding leakage resiliency to the one-shot tampering model. Non-compartmentalized tampering model was first studied by Agrawal et.al (CRYPTO15) for non-malleability against permutation composed with bit-wise independent tampering, and shown useful in constructing non-malleable string commitments. We initiate the study of leakage-resilient secret sharing in the non-compartmentalized model. The leakage adversary can corrupt several players and obtain their shares, as in normal secret sharing. The leakage adversary can apply arbitrary affine functions with bounded total output length to the full share vector and obtain the outputs as leakage. These two processes can be both non-adaptive and do not depend on each other, or both adaptive and depend on each other with arbitrary ordering. We construct such leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes and achieve constant information ratio (the scheme for non-adaptive adversary is near optimal). We then explore making the non-compartmentalized leakage-resilient secret sharing also non-malleable against tampering. We consider a tampering model, where the adversary can use the shares obtained from the corrupted players and the outputs of the global leakage functions to choose a tampering function from a tampering family F. We give two constructions of such leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing for the case F is the bit-wise independent tampering and, respectively, for the case F is the affine tampering functions.

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Binary de Bruijn Sequences via Zech's Logarithms

The focus of this work is to show how to combine Zech's logarithms and each of the cycle joining and cross-join pairing methods to construct binary de Bruijn sequences of any order. A basic implementation is supplied as a proof-of-concept. The cycles, in the cycle joining method, are typically generated by a linear feedback shift register. We prove a crucial characterization that determining Zech's logarithms is equivalent to identifying conjugate pairs shared by any two distinct cycles. This speeds up the task of building a connected adjacency subgraph that contains all vertices of the complete adjacency graph. Distinct spanning trees in either graph correspond to cyclically inequivalent de Bruijn sequences. As the cycles are being joined, guided by the conjugate pairs, we track the changes in the feedback function. Certificates of star or almost-star spanning trees conveniently handle large order cases. The characterization of conjugate pairs via Zech's logarithms, as positional markings, is then adapted to identify cross-join pairs. A modified $m$-sequence is initially used, for ease of generation. The process can be repeated on each of the resulting de Bruijn sequences. We show how to integrate an analytic tool, attributed to Fryers, in the process. Most prior constructions in the literature measure the complexity of the corresponding bit-by-bit algorithms. Our approach is different. We aim first to build a connected adjacency subgraph that is certified to contain all of the cycles as vertices. The ingredients are computed just once and concisely stored. Simple strategies are offered to keep the complexities low as the order grows.

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Forward-Secure Group Signatures from Lattices

Group signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, aiming to protect anonymity and ensure accountability of users. It allows group members to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to identify the signer of any suspected signature. Most of the existing group signature schemes, however, do not guarantee security once secret keys are exposed. To reduce potential damages caused by key exposure attacks, Song (ACMCCS 2001) put forward the concept of forward-secure group signature (FSGS), which prevents attackers from forging group signatures pertaining to past time periods even if a secret group signing key is revealed at the current time period. For the time being, however, all known secure FSGS schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions, and are vulnerable against quantum computers. In this work, we construct the first lattice-based FSGS scheme. Our scheme is proven secure under the Short Integer Solution and Learning With Errors assumptions. At the heart of our construction is a scalable lattice-based key evolving mechanism, allowing users to periodically update their secret keys and to efficiently prove in zero-knowledge that key evolution process is done correctly. To realize this essential building block, we first employ the Bonsai tree structure by Cash et al. (EUROCRYPT 2010) to handle the key evolution process, and then develop Langlois et al.'s construction (PKC 2014) to design its supporting zero-knowledge protocol.

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Accountable Tracing Signatures from Lattices

Group signatures allow users of a group to sign messages anonymously in the name of the group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to revoke anonymity and identify the signer of any message. Since its introduction by Chaum and van Heyst (EUROCRYPT 1991), numerous proposals have been put forward, yielding various improvements on security, efficiency and functionality. However, a drawback of traditional group signatures is that the opening authority is given too much power, i.e., he can indiscriminately revoke anonymity and there is no mechanism to keep him accountable. To overcome this problem, Kohlweiss and Miers (PoPET 2015) introduced the notion of accountable tracing signatures (ATS) - an enhanced group signature variant in which the opening authority is kept accountable for his actions. Kohlweiss and Miers demonstrated a generic construction of ATS and put forward a concrete instantiation based on number-theoretic assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, no other ATS scheme has been known, and the problem of instantiating ATS under post-quantum assumptions, e.g., lattices, remains open to date. In this work, we provide the first lattice-based accountable tracing signature scheme. The scheme satisfies the security requirements suggested by Kohlweiss and Miers, assuming the hardness of the Ring Short Integer Solution (RSIS) and the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problems. At the heart of our construction are a lattice-based key-oblivious encryption scheme and a zero-knowledge argument system allowing to prove that a given ciphertext is a valid RLWE encryption under some hidden yet certified key. These technical building blocks may be of independent interest, e.g., they can be useful for the design of other lattice-based privacy-preserving protocols.

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Secret Sharing with Binary Shares

Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides an efficient method for encoding a secret of arbitrary length $\ell$ among any $N \leq 2^\ell$ players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i) the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not reveal any information about the secret and, (ii) any choice of $t+1$ shares fully reveals the secret. It is known that any such threshold secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\ell$, and in this sense Shamir's scheme is optimal. The more general notion of ramp schemes requires the reconstruction of secret from any $t+g$ shares, for a positive integer gap parameter $g$. Ramp secret sharing scheme necessarily requires shares of length $\ell/g$. Other than the bound related to secret length $\ell$, the share lengths of ramp schemes can not go below a quantity that depends only on the gap ratio $g/N$. In this work, we study secret sharing in the extremal case of bit-long shares and arbitrarily small gap ratio $g/N$, where standard ramp secret sharing becomes impossible. We show, however, that a slightly relaxed but equally effective notion of semantic security for the secret, and negligible reconstruction error probability, eliminate the impossibility. Moreover, we provide explicit constructions of such schemes. One of the consequences of our relaxation is that, unlike standard ramp schemes with perfect secrecy, adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries need different analysis and construction. For non-adaptive adversaries, we explicitly construct secret sharing schemes that provide secrecy against any $τ$ fraction of observed shares, and reconstruction from any $ρ$ fraction of shares, for any choices of $0 \leq τ< ρ\leq 1$. Our construction achieves secret length $N(ρ-τ-o(1))$, which we show to be optimal. For adaptive adversaries, we construct explicit schemes attaining a secret length $Ω(N(ρ-τ))$.

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On Binary de Bruijn Sequences from LFSRs with Arbitrary Characteristic Polynomials

We propose a construction of de Bruijn sequences by the cycle joining method from linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) with arbitrary characteristic polynomial $f(x)$. We study in detail the cycle structure of the set $Ω(f(x))$ that contains all sequences produced by a specific LFSR on distinct inputs and provide a fast way to find a state of each cycle. This leads to an efficient algorithm to find all conjugate pairs between any two cycles, yielding the adjacency graph. The approach is practical to generate a large class of de Bruijn sequences up to order $n \approx 20$. Many previously proposed constructions of de Bruijn sequences are shown to be special cases of our construction.

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Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check from Lattices

Passwords are ubiquitous and most commonly used to authenticate users when logging into online services. Using high entropy passwords is critical to prevent unauthorized access and password policies emerged to enforce this requirement on passwords. However, with current methods of password storage, poor practices and server breaches have leaked many passwords to the public. To protect one's sensitive information in case of such events, passwords should be hidden from servers. Verifier-based password authenticated key exchange, proposed by Bellovin and Merrit (IEEE S\&P, 1992), allows authenticated secure channels to be established with a hash of a password (verifier). Unfortunately, this restricts password policies as passwords cannot be checked from their verifier. To address this issue, Kiefer and Manulis (ESORICS 2014) proposed zero-knowledge password policy check (ZKPPC). A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove in zero knowledge that a hash of the user's password satisfies the password policy required by the server. Unfortunately, their proposal is not quantum resistant with the use of discrete logarithm-based cryptographic tools and there are currently no other viable alternatives. In this work, we construct the first post-quantum ZKPPC using lattice-based tools. To this end, we introduce a new randomised password hashing scheme for ASCII-based passwords and design an accompanying zero-knowledge protocol for policy compliance. Interestingly, our proposal does not follow the framework established by Kiefer and Manulis and offers an alternate construction without homomorphic commitments. Although our protocol is not ready to be used in practice, we think it is an important first step towards a quantum-resistant privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange system.

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Lattice-Based Group Signatures: Achieving Full Dynamicity (and Deniability) with Ease

In this work, we provide the first lattice-based group signature that offers full dynamicity (i.e., users have the flexibility in joining and leaving the group), and thus, resolve a prominent open problem posed by previous works. Moreover, we achieve this non-trivial feat in a relatively simple manner. Starting with Libert et al.'s fully static construction (Eurocrypt 2016) - which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based group signature to date, we introduce simple-but-insightful tweaks that allow to upgrade it directly into the fully dynamic setting. More startlingly, our scheme even produces slightly shorter signatures than the former, thanks to an adaptation of a technique proposed by Ling et al. (PKC 2013), allowing to prove inequalities in zero-knowledge. Our design approach consists of upgrading Libert et al.'s static construction (EUROCRYPT 2016) - which is arguably the most efficient lattice-based group signature to date - into the fully dynamic setting. Somewhat surprisingly, our scheme produces slightly shorter signatures than the former, thanks to a new technique for proving inequality in zero-knowledge without relying on any inequality check. The scheme satisfies the strong security requirements of Bootle et al.'s model (ACNS 2016), under the Short Integer Solution (SIS) and the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumptions. Furthermore, we demonstrate how to equip the obtained group signature scheme with the deniability functionality in a simple way. This attractive functionality, put forward by Ishida et al. (CANS 2016), enables the tracing authority to provide an evidence that a given user is not the owner of a signature in question. In the process, we design a zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a given LWE ciphertext does not decrypt to a particular message.

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Server-Aided Revocable Predicate Encryption: Formalization and Lattice-Based Instantiation

Efficient user revocation is a necessary but challenging problem in many multi-user cryptosystems. Among known approaches, server-aided revocation yields a promising solution, because it allows to outsource the major workloads of system users to a computationally powerful third party, called the server, whose only requirement is to carry out the computations correctly. Such a revocation mechanism was considered in the settings of identity-based encryption and attribute-based encryption by Qin et al. (ESORICS 2015) and Cui et al. (ESORICS 2016), respectively. In this work, we consider the server-aided revocation mechanism in the more elaborate setting of predicate encryption (PE). The latter, introduced by Katz, Sahai, and Waters (EUROCRYPT 2008), provides fine-grained and role-based access to encrypted data and can be viewed as a generalization of identity-based and attribute-based encryption. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we formalize the model of server-aided revocable predicate encryption (SR-PE), with rigorous definitions and security notions. Our model can be seen as a non-trivial adaptation of Cui et al.'s work into the PE context. Second, we put forward a lattice-based instantiation of SR-PE. The scheme employs the PE scheme of Agrawal, Freeman and Vaikuntanathan (ASIACRYPT 2011) and the complete subtree method of Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech (CRYPTO 2001) as the two main ingredients, which work smoothly together thanks to a few additional techniques. Our scheme is proven secure in the standard model (in a selective manner), based on the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem.

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Non-Malleable Codes with Leakage and Applications to Secure Communication

Non-malleable codes are randomized codes that protect coded messages against modification by functions in a tampering function class. These codes are motivated by providing tamper resilience in applications where a cryptographic secret is stored in a tamperable storage device and the protection goal is to ensure that the adversary cannot benefit from their tamperings with the device. In this paper we consider non-malleable codes for protection of secure communication against active physical layer adversaries. We define a class of functions that closely model tampering of communication by adversaries who can eavesdrop on a constant fraction of the transmitted codeword, and use this information to select a vector of tampering functions that will be applied to a second constant fraction of codeword components (possibly overlapping with the first set). We derive rate bounds for non-malleable codes for this function class and give two modular constructions. The first construction adapts and provides new analysis for an existing construction in the new setting. The second construction uses a new approach that results in an explicit construction of non-malleable codes. We show applications of our results in securing message communication against active physical layer adversaries in two settings: wiretap II with active adversaries and Secure Message Transmission (SMT) in networks. We discuss our results and directions for future work.

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On a Generalization of the Bipartite Graph $D(k,q)$

In this paper, we deal with a generalization $Γ(Ω,q)$ of the bipartite graphs $D(k,q)$ proposed by Lazebnik and Ustimenko, where $Ω$ is a set of binary sequences that are adopted to index the entries of the vertices. A few sufficient conditions on $Ω$ for $Γ(Ω,q)$ to admit a variety of automorphisms are proposed. A sufficient condition for $Γ(Ω,q)$ to be edge-transitive is proposed further. A lower bound of the number of the connected components of $Γ(Ω,q)$ is given by showing some invariants for the components. For $Γ(Ω,q)$, paths and cycles which contain vertices of some specified form are investigated in details. Some lower bounds for the girth of $Γ(Ω,q)$ are then shown. In particular, one can give very simple conditions on the index set $Ω$ so as to assure the generalized graphs $Γ(Ω,q)$ to be a family of graphs with large girth.

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Construction of de Bruijn Sequences from Product of Two Irreducible Polynomials

We study a class of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) with characteristic polynomial $f(x)=p(x)q(x)$ where $p(x)$ and $q(x)$ are distinct irreducible polynomials in $\F_2[x]$. Important properties of the LFSRs, such as the cycle structure and the adjacency graph, are derived. A method to determine a state belonging to each cycle and a generic algorithm to find all conjugate pairs shared by any pair of cycles are given. The process explicitly determines the edges and their labels in the adjacency graph. The results are then combined with the cycle joining method to efficiently construct a new class of de Bruijn sequences. An estimate of the number of resulting sequences is given. In some cases, using cyclotomic numbers, we can determine the number exactly.

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Upper Bounds on Matching Families in $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^n$

\textit{Matching families} are one of the major ingredients in the construction of {\em locally decodable codes} (LDCs) and the best known constructions of LDCs with a constant number of queries are based on matching families. The determination of the largest size of any matching family in $\mathbb{Z}_m^n$, where $\mathbb{Z}_m$ is the ring of integers modulo $m$, is an interesting problem. In this paper, we show an upper bound of $O((pq)^{0.625n+0.125})$ for the size of any matching family in $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^n$, where $p$ and $q$ are two distinct primes. Our bound is valid when $n$ is a constant, $p\rightarrow \infty$ and $p/q\rightarrow 1$. Our result improves an upper bound of Dvir {\it et al.}

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Anonymous and Adaptively Secure Revocable IBE with Constant Size Public Parameters

In Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems, key revocation is non-trivial. This is because a user's identity is itself a public key. Moreover, the private key corresponding to the identity needs to be obtained from a trusted key authority through an authenticated and secrecy protected channel. So far, there exist only a very small number of revocable IBE (RIBE) schemes that support non-interactive key revocation, in the sense that the user is not required to interact with the key authority or some kind of trusted hardware to renew her private key without changing her public key (or identity). These schemes are either proven to be only selectively secure or have public parameters which grow linearly in a given security parameter. In this paper, we present two constructions of non-interactive RIBE that satisfy all the following three attractive properties: (i) proven to be adaptively secure under the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) and the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions; (ii) have constant-size public parameters; and (iii) preserve the anonymity of ciphertexts---a property that has not yet been achieved in all the current schemes.

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On Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol for Polynomial Evaluation

Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was defined by \cite{BCPT07} at CANS'07 and generalized by \cite{BC09} at AFRICACRYPT'09. In the generalized setting, EPIR allows a user to evaluate a function on a database block such that the database can learn neither which function has been evaluated nor on which block the function has been evaluated and the user learns no more information on the database blocks except for the expected result. An EPIR protocol for evaluating polynomials over a finite field $L$ was proposed by Bringer and Chabanne in \cite{BC09}. We show that the protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement as they have claimed. In particular, we show that it does not give the user the expected result with large probability if one of the coefficients of the polynomial to be evaluated is primitive in $L$ and the others belong to the prime subfield of $L$.

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Query-Efficient Locally Decodable Codes of Subexponential Length

We develop the algebraic theory behind the constructions of Yekhanin (2008) and Efremenko (2009), in an attempt to understand the ``algebraic niceness'' phenomenon in $\mathbb{Z}_m$. We show that every integer $m = pq = 2^t -1$, where $p$, $q$ and $t$ are prime, possesses the same good algebraic property as $m=511$ that allows savings in query complexity. We identify 50 numbers of this form by computer search, which together with 511, are then applied to gain improvements on query complexity via Itoh and Suzuki's composition method. More precisely, we construct a $3^{\lceil r/2\rceil}$-query LDC for every positive integer $r<104$ and a $\left\lfloor (3/4)^{51}\cdot 2^{r}\right\rfloor$-query LDC for every integer $r\geq 104$, both of length $N_{r}$, improving the $2^r$ queries used by Efremenko (2009) and $3\cdot 2^{r-2}$ queries used by Itoh and Suzuki (2010). We also obtain new efficient private information retrieval (PIR) schemes from the new query-efficient LDCs.

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Strongly Multiplicative and 3-Multiplicative Linear Secret Sharing Schemes

Strongly multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) have been a powerful tool for constructing secure multiparty computation protocols. However, it remains open whether or not there exist efficient constructions of strongly multiplicative LSSS from general LSSS. In this paper, we propose the new concept of a 3-multiplicative LSSS, and establish its relationship with strongly multiplicative LSSS. More precisely, we show that any 3-multiplicative LSSS is a strongly multiplicative LSSS, but the converse is not true; and that any strongly multiplicative LSSS can be efficiently converted into a 3-multiplicative LSSS. Furthermore, we apply 3-multiplicative LSSS to the computation of unbounded fan-in multiplication, which reduces its round complexity to four (from five of the previous protocol based on strongly multiplicative LSSS). We also give two constructions of 3-multiplicative LSSS from Reed-Muller codes and algebraic geometric codes. We believe that the construction and verification of 3-multiplicative LSSS are easier than those of strongly multiplicative LSSS. This presents a step forward in settling the open problem of efficient constructions of strongly multiplicative LSSS from general LSSS.

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