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Hussein Jawad

Publications and source records attributed to Hussein Jawad.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

PSM: Prompt Sensitivity Minimization via LLM-Guided Black-Box Optimization

System prompts are critical for guiding the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet they often contain proprietary logic or sensitive information, making them a prime target for extraction attacks. Adversarial queries can successfully elicit these hidden instructions, posing significant security and privacy risks. Existing defense mechanisms frequently rely on heuristics, incur substantial computational overhead, or are inapplicable to models accessed via black-box APIs. This paper introduces a novel framework for hardening system prompts through shield appending, a lightweight approach that adds a protective textual layer to the original prompt. Our core contribution is the formalization of prompt hardening as a utility-constrained optimization problem. We leverage an LLM-as-optimizer to search the space of possible SHIELDs, seeking to minimize a leakage metric derived from a suite of adversarial attacks, while simultaneously preserving task utility above a specified threshold, measured by semantic fidelity to baseline outputs. This black-box, optimization-driven methodology is lightweight and practical, requiring only API access to the target and optimizer LLMs. We demonstrate empirically that our optimized SHIELDs significantly reduce prompt leakage against a comprehensive set of extraction attacks, outperforming established baseline defenses without compromising the model's intended functionality. Our work presents a paradigm for developing robust, utility-aware defenses in the escalating landscape of LLM security. The code is made public on the following link: https://github.com/psm-defense/psm

cs.CR↗

ToolFlood: Beyond Selection -- Hiding Valid Tools from LLM Agents via Semantic Covering

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly use external tools for complex tasks and rely on embedding-based retrieval to select a small top-$k$ subset for reasoning. Prior work on attacking these systems competes for tool selection, assuming benign tools remain in the retrieved set; the robustness of the retrieval stage that produces this set is underexplored. This paper introduces ToolFlood, a retrieval-layer attack on tool-augmented LLM agents. Rather than altering which tool is chosen after retrieval, ToolFlood attacks retrieval itself: it injects a few attacker-controlled tools whose metadata is positioned to exploit the geometry of embedding space, so that these tools semantically span many user queries, dominate the top-k results, and push all benign tools out of the agent's context. ToolFlood uses a two-phase adversarial tool generation strategy. It first samples subsets of target queries and uses an LLM to iteratively generate diverse tool names and descriptions. It then runs an iterative greedy selection that chooses tools maximizing coverage of remaining queries in embedding space under a cosine-distance threshold, stopping when all queries are covered or a budget is reached. We provide theoretical intuition of retrieval saturation and show on a large catalog (ToolBench) that ToolFlood achieves up to a 95\% attack success rate with a ~1\% injection rate. The code is available at: https://github.com/as1-prog/ToolFlood

cs.CL↗

Risk-certified prompt optimization for LLM-as-a-judge guardrails

LLM-as-a-judge guardrails are often controlled primarily through system prompts, yet standard prompt optimization methods target average performance rather than explicit safety constraints. This paper studies system-prompt selection as a constrained optimization problem: maximize benign pass rate while keeping the missed-attack rate below a user-specified level α with finite-sample statistical control. The framework combines LLM-based judging, automatic prompt generation, and distribution-free risk certification. This work instantiates it in two procedures: CPS and CRISP. CPS generates a fixed pool of prompts from training data, then certifies candidates on a held-out evaluation set using simultaneous upper confidence bounds and selects the certified prompt with the highest benign utility. CRISP instead integrates risk feedback into an adaptive search, using hard example-guided rewriting and a reusable-holdout interface to steer generation toward the feasible utility frontier. Experiments on four datasets covering prompt injection, system-prompt leakage, and sensitive-information disclosure show that risk-certified selection consistently respects the target missed-attack level on heldout tests, while utility improves as the permitted risk is relaxed. CRISP is especially useful when fixed-pool search fails to produce certifiable high-utility candidates.

cs.CL↗

Towards Universal and Black-Box Query-Response Only Attack on LLMs with QROA

The rapid adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has exposed critical security and ethical vulnerabilities, particularly their susceptibility to adversarial manipulations. This paper introduces QROA, a novel black-box jailbreak method designed to identify adversarial suffixes that can bypass LLM alignment safeguards when appended to a malicious instruction. Unlike existing suffix-based jailbreak approaches, QROA does not require access to the model's logit or any other internal information. It also eliminates reliance on human-crafted templates, operating solely through the standard query-response interface of LLMs. By framing the attack as an optimization bandit problem, QROA employs a surrogate model and token level optimization to efficiently explore suffix variations. Furthermore, we propose QROA-UNV, an extension that identifies universal adversarial suffixes for individual models, enabling one-query jailbreaks across a wide range of instructions. Testing on multiple models demonstrates Attack Success Rate (ASR) greater than 80\%. These findings highlight critical vulnerabilities, emphasize the need for advanced defenses, and contribute to the development of more robust safety evaluations for secure AI deployment. The code is made public on the following link: https://github.com/qroa/QROA

cs.CL↗