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HyungSeok Han

Publications and source records attributed to HyungSeok Han.

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OSS-CRS: Liberating AIxCC Cyber Reasoning Systems for Real-World Open-Source Security

DARPA's AI Cyber Challenge (AIxCC) showed that cyber reasoning systems (CRSs) can go beyond vulnerability discovery to autonomously confirm and patch bugs: seven teams built such systems and open-sourced them after the competition. Yet all seven open-sourced CRSs remain largely unusable outside their original teams, each bound to the competition cloud infrastructure that no longer exists. We present OSS-CRS, an open, locally deployable framework for running and combining CRS techniques against real-world open-source projects, with budget-aware resource management. We ported the first-place system (Atlantis) and discovered 10 previously unknown bugs (three of high severity) across 8 OSS-Fuzz projects. OSS-CRS is publicly available.

cs.CR

ATLANTIS: AI-driven Threat Localization, Analysis, and Triage Intelligence System

We present ATLANTIS, the cyber reasoning system developed by Team Atlanta that won 1st place in the Final Competition of DARPA's AI Cyber Challenge (AIxCC) at DEF CON 33 (August 2025). AIxCC (2023-2025) challenged teams to build autonomous cyber reasoning systems capable of discovering and patching vulnerabilities at the speed and scale of modern software. ATLANTIS integrates large language models (LLMs) with program analysis -- combining symbolic execution, directed fuzzing, and static analysis -- to address limitations in automated vulnerability discovery and program repair. Developed by researchers at Georgia Institute of Technology, Samsung Research, KAIST, and POSTECH, the system addresses core challenges: scaling across diverse codebases from C to Java, achieving high precision while maintaining broad coverage, and producing semantically correct patches that preserve intended behavior. We detail the design philosophy, architectural decisions, and implementation strategies behind ATLANTIS, share lessons learned from pushing the boundaries of automated security when program analysis meets modern AI, and release artifacts to support reproducibility and future research.

cs.CR

I Experienced More than 10 DeFi Scams: On DeFi Users' Perception of Security Breaches and Countermeasures

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) offers a whole new investment experience and has quickly emerged as an enticing alternative to Centralized Finance (CeFi). Rapidly growing market size and active users, however, have also made DeFi a lucrative target for scams and hacks, with 1.95 billion USD lost in 2023. Unfortunately, no prior research thoroughly investigates DeFi users' security risk awareness levels and the adequacy of their risk mitigation strategies. Based on a semi-structured interview study (N = 14) and a follow-up survey (N = 493), this paper investigates DeFi users' security perceptions and commonly adopted practices, and how those affected by previous scams or hacks (DeFi victims) respond and try to recover their losses. Our analysis shows that users often prefer DeFi over CeFi due to their decentralized nature and strong profitability. Despite being aware that DeFi, compared to CeFi, is prone to more severe attacks, users are willing to take those risks to explore new investment opportunities. Worryingly, most victims do not learn from previous experiences; unlike victims studied through traditional systems, DeFi victims tend to find new services, without revising their security practices, to recover their losses quickly. The abundance of various DeFi services and opportunities allows victims to continuously explore new financial opportunities, and this reality seems to cloud their security priorities. Indeed, our results indicate that DeFi users' strong financial motivations outweigh their security concerns - much like those who are addicted to gambling. Our observations about victims' post-incident behaviors suggest that stronger control in the form of industry regulations would be necessary to protect DeFi users from future breaches.

cs.CR

Ruby: Unmasking Unsafe Rust in Stripped Binaries via Machine Learning

Rust, as an emerging system programming language, introduces $\texttt{unsafe}$ to allow developers to bypass safety checks during compilation. As a result, memory safety bugs are typically confined to the $\texttt{unsafe}$ regions, which have been the primary focus of Rust bug-finding tools. However, such tools rely on the presence of the $\texttt{unsafe}$ keyword in Rust source code; there are no tools available that can examine Rust binaries to pinpoint $\texttt{unsafe}$ areas. Therefore, we propose $\texttt{Ruby}$, the first tool that unmasks $\texttt{unsafe}$ regions in Rust binaries using machine learning. By capturing the subtle differences in the binary instructions, $\texttt{Ruby}$ can identify 91.75% of the total $\texttt{unsafe}$ regions with a false positive rate of 6.16%, beating SOTA LLM models including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 and Gemini-3. We further applied $\texttt{Ruby}$ to guide symbolic execution and fuzzing, showing a speed-up of 57.95% and 21.26%, with five bugs confirmed and patched by Google in Android library fuzzing.

cs.CR

Montage: A Neural Network Language Model-Guided JavaScript Engine Fuzzer

JavaScript (JS) engine vulnerabilities pose significant security threats affecting billions of web browsers. While fuzzing is a prevalent technique for finding such vulnerabilities, there have been few studies that leverage the recent advances in neural network language models (NNLMs). In this paper, we present Montage, the first NNLM-guided fuzzer for finding JS engine vulnerabilities. The key aspect of our technique is to transform a JS abstract syntax tree (AST) into a sequence of AST subtrees that can directly train prevailing NNLMs. We demonstrate that Montage is capable of generating valid JS tests, and show that it outperforms previous studies in terms of finding vulnerabilities. Montage found 37 real-world bugs, including three CVEs, in the latest JS engines, demonstrating its efficacy in finding JS engine bugs.

cs.CR

The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey

Among the many software vulnerability discovery techniques available today, fuzzing has remained highly popular due to its conceptual simplicity, its low barrier to deployment, and its vast amount of empirical evidence in discovering real-world software vulnerabilities. At a high level, fuzzing refers to a process of repeatedly running a program with generated inputs that may be syntactically or semantically malformed. While researchers and practitioners alike have invested a large and diverse effort towards improving fuzzing in recent years, this surge of work has also made it difficult to gain a comprehensive and coherent view of fuzzing. To help preserve and bring coherence to the vast literature of fuzzing, this paper presents a unified, general-purpose model of fuzzing together with a taxonomy of the current fuzzing literature. We methodically explore the design decisions at every stage of our model fuzzer by surveying the related literature and innovations in the art, science, and engineering that make modern-day fuzzers effective.

cs.CR