arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to I. Németi.
By removing a fractal from time-rolled Minkowski spacetime, we construct an extendible spacetime without closed timelike curves whose every extension contains closed timelike curves. This settles a question posed by Geroch.
The function $p_{xy}$ that interchanges two logical variables $x,y$ in formulas is hard to describe in the following sense. Let $F$ denote the Lindenbaum-Tarski formula-algebra of a finite-variable first order logic, endowed with $p_{xy}$ as a unary function. Each equational axiom system for the equational theory of $F$ has to contain, for each finite $n$, an equation that contains together with $p_{xy}$ at least $n$ algebraic variables, and each of the operations $\exists, =, \lor$. This solves a problem raised by Johnson [J. Symb. Logic] more than 50 years ago: the class of representable polyadic equality algebras of a finite dimension $α\ge 3$ cannot be axiomatized by adding finitely many equations to the equational theory of representable cylindric algebras of dimension $α$. Consequences for proof systems of finite-variable logic and for defining equations of polyadic equality algebras are given. The proof uses a family of nonrepresentable polyadic equality algebras ${\cal A}_n$ that are more and more nearly representable as $n$ increases: their $n$-generated subalgebras as well as their proper reducts are representable. The lattice of subvarieties of $RPEA_α$ is investigated and new open problems are asked about the interplay between the transposition operations and about generalizability of the results to infinite dimensions.
A logic family is a bunch of logics that belong together in some way. First-order logic is one of the examples. Logics organized into a structure occurs in abstract model theory, institution theory and in algebraic logic. Logic families play a role in adopting methods for investigating sentential logics to first-order like logics. We thoroughly discuss the notion of logic families as defined in the recent Universal Algebraic Logic book.
Two first-order logic theories are definitionally equivalent if and only if there is a bijection between their model classes that preserves isomorphisms and ultraproducts (Theorem 2). This is a variant of a prior theorem of van Benthem and Pearce. In Example 2, uncountably many pairs of definitionally inequivalent theories are given such that their model categories are concretely isomorphic via bijections that preserve ultraproducts in the model categories up to isomorphism. Based on these results, we settle several conjectures of Barrett, Glymour and Halvorson.
This note contains some material promised in our earlier papers on submodel preservation and the guarded fragment, along with some information on the current status of the problems mentioned in these papers. Section 1 contains an early example of failure of Los-Tarski for finite-variable fragments with binary relations from a 1992 manuscript, with no substantial change of content. For further background to this example, Section 2 surveys a number of results concerning the submodel preservation property for various fragments of first-order logic.
We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order logic has the weak Beth definability property. This makes the two-variable fragment a natural logic separating the weak and the strong Beth properties since it does not have the strong Beth definability property.
We prove that persistently finite algebras are not created by completions of algebras, in any ordered discriminator variety. A persistently finite algebra is one without infinite simple extensions. We prove that finite measurable relation algebras are all persistently finite. An application of these theorems is that the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras does not contain all relation algebras. This answers Problem 1.1(1) from a paper by R. Maddux in the negative. At the same time, we confirm the suggestion in that paper that the finite maximal relation algebras constructed in a joint paper by M. Frias and R. Maddux are not in the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras. We prove that there are continuum many varieties between the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras and the variety of relation algebras.
A series of nonrepresentable relation algebras is constructed from groups. We use them to prove that there are continuum many subvarieties between the variety of representable relation algebras and the variety of coset relation algebras. We present our main construction in terms of polygroupoids.
We exhibit two relation algebra atom structures such that they are elementarily equivalent but their term algebras are not. This answers Problem 14.19 in the book Hirsch, R. and Hodkinson, I., "Relation Algebras by Games", North-Holland, 2002.
It is known that nontrivial ultraproducts of complete partially ordered sets (posets) are almost never complete. We show that complete additivity of functions is preserved in ultraproducts of posets. Since failure of this property is clearly preserved by ultraproducts, this implies that complete additivity of functions is an elementary property.
We prove that all definable pre-orders are atomic, in a finitely generated free algebra of a discriminator variety of finite similarity type which is generated by its finite members.
It is shown that Tarski's set of ten axioms for the calculus of relations is independent in the sense that no axiom can be derived from the remaining axioms. It is also shown that by modifying one of Tarski's axioms slightly, and in fact by replacing the right-hand distributive law for relative multiplication with its left-hand version, we arrive at an equivalent set of axioms which is redundant in the sense that one of the axioms, namely the second involution law, is derivable from the other axioms. The set of remaining axioms is independent. Finally, it is shown that if both the left-hand and right-hand distributive laws for relative multiplication are included in the set of axioms, then two of Tarski's other axioms become redundant, namely the second involution law and the distributive law for converse. The set of remaining axioms is independent and equivalent to Tarski's axiom system.
Cylindric algebras, or concept algebras in another name, form an interface between algebra, geometry and logic; they were invented by Alfred Tarski around 1947. We prove that there are 2 to the alpha many varieties of geometric (i.e., representable) alpha-dimensional cylindric algebras, this means that 2 to the alpha properties of definable relations of (possibly infinitary) models of first-order logic theories can be expressed by formula schemes using alpha variables, where alpha is infinite. This solves Problem 4.2 in the 1985 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph. For solving this problem, we had to devise a new kind of construction, which we then use to solve Problem 2.13 of the 1971 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph which concerns the structural description of geometric cylindric algebras. There are fewer varieties generated by locally finite dimensional cylindric algebras, and we get a characterization of these among all the 2 to the alpha varieties. As a by-product, we get a simple, natural recursive enumeration of all the equations true of geometric cylindric algebras, and this can serve as a solution to Problem 4.1 of the 1985 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph. All this has logical content and implications concerning ordinary first order logic with a countable number of variables.
The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status, and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open, modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.
We prove that n-variable logics do not have the weak Beth definability property, for all n greater than 2. This was known for n=3 (Ildikó Sain and András Simon), and for n greater than 4 (Ian Hodkinson). Neither of the previous proofs works for n=4. In this paper we settle the case of n=4, and we give a uniform, simpler proof for all n greater than 2. The case for n=2 is still open.
Seeing the many examples in the literature of causality violations based on faster-than- light (FTL) signals one naturally thinks that FTL motion leads inevitably to the possibility of time travel. We show that this logical inference is invalid by demonstrating a model, based on (3+1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime, in which FTL motion is permitted (in every direction without any limitation on speed) yet which does not admit time travel. Moreover, the Principle of Relativity is true in this model in the sense that all observers are equivalent. In short, FTL motion does not imply time travel after all.
There are several first-order logic (FOL) axiomatizations of special relativity theory in the literature, all looking essentially different but claiming to axiomatize the same physical theory. In this paper, we elaborate a comparison, in the framework of mathematical logic, between these FOL theories for special relativity. For this comparison, we use a version of mathematical definability theory in which new entities can also be defined besides new relations over already available entities. In particular, we build an interpretation of the reference-frame oriented theory SpecRel into the observationally oriented Signalling theory of James Ax. This interpretation provides SpecRel with an operational/experimental semantics. Then we make precise, "quantitative" comparisons between these two theories via using the notion of definitional equivalence. This is an application of logic to the philosophy of science and physics in the spirit of Johan van Benthem's work.
Within an axiomatic framework, we investigate the possible structures of numbers (as physical quantities) in different theories of relativity.