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Ian Braga

Publications and source records attributed to Ian Braga.

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Fixation probabilities for multi-allele Moran dynamics with weak selection

Fixation probabilities are essential for characterizing stochastic evolutionary dynamics, but analytical results remain limited mainly to systems with two competing types. We develop a perturbative framework to compute fixation probabilities in multi-allele Moran processes under weak selection. Exploiting the general structure of the backward Fokker-Planck operator in this regime, we show that fixation probabilities admit a systematic expansion around their neutral solution. We first introduce the framework in a general case with $M$ competing alleles and arbitrary fitness functions, and then apply it to three biologically motivated examples: a simple model of three competing alleles with a constant fitness function, a coordination game in which allele fitness increases with its frequency in the population, and a model of clonal interference between mutualistic alleles. These results extend the analytical understanding of fixation probabilities beyond pairwise interactions, establishing a framework for investigating multi-strategy stochastic evolutionary dynamics.

q-bio.PE

Invasion of optimal social contracts

The Stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already widely adopted and stable due to deviants' sanctions. Thus, how does a population shift from the current social contract to a better one? In other words, how can a social system leave a local social optimum configuration to achieve an optimum global state? Here, we investigate the effect of promoting diversity on the evolution of social contracts. We considered group-structured populations where individuals play the Stag-hunt game in all groups. We model the diversity incentive as a Snow-drift game played in a single focus group where the individual is more prone to adopt a deviant norm. We show that moderate diversity incentives can change the system dynamics, leading the whole population to move from the locally optimal social normal to the globally optimal one. Thus, an initial fraction of adopters of the new norm can drive the system toward the new social optimum norm. After the new social contract becomes the new equilibrium, it remains stable even without the incentive. The results are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations and analytical approximation methods.

physics.soc-ph