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Ignacio Cofone

Publications and source records attributed to Ignacio Cofone.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Algorithmic Opacity as a Principal-Agent Problem

Concerns about gaming and trade secrecy, frequently invoked to justify algorithmic opacity, can also mask self-serving strategic behavior by decision-makers, who may prioritize private benefits over social welfare. We develop a principal-agent test for when algorithmic decision-making should trigger disclosure obligations even when concerns about gaming or trade secrecy exist. The test, which is anchored in decision quality, relies on two diagnostics that can be disclosed without enabling gaming or revealing trade secrets: the error profile (false positive and false negative rates, overall and for each group) and the distribution of decision outcomes across groups. These diagnostics make visible whether decision-makers align design and implementation with the public interest or instead use opacity to obscure bias, inefficiency, or strategic shirking. Strong disparities across social groups, and asymmetries in the distribution of decision errors across outcome types, should trigger rebuttable presumptions favoring further disclosure. Where ground-truth error rates are unavailable, outcome distributions across groups can support the same presumption, and a decision-maker's inability to produce an error profile is itself diagnostic. The test thus treats fairness metrics as triggers for further disclosure and extends to generative and agentic systems through analogous metrics. The framework informs differentiated disclosure regimes (staged, partial, mediated, or audience-segmented). Once such regimes are considered, the domain of justifiable algorithmic opacity is significantly narrower than commonly assumed: when gaming or trade secrecy risks are legitimate, actionable disclosures (such as training data characteristics and key system design parameters) ordinarily can be mandated without compromising innovation or enabling gaming, even for technically inscrutable algorithms.

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Taxonomizing Synthetic Data for Law

Synthetic data is increasingly important in data usage and AI design, creating novel legal and policy dilemmas. All too often, discussions of synthetic data treat it as entirely distinct from "real," collected data, overlooking the risks posed by different kinds and uses of synthetic data. We build on Michal Gal and Orla Lynskey's argument that synthetic data will transform information privacy, market competition, and data quality. While the risks posed by synthetic data depend on its connection to collected data, we argue that background knowledge and assumptions about ground truth used to create it are at least as important. We bring that focus to Gal and Lynskey's taxonomy of synthetic data, arguing that this focus is essential to grasp synthetic data's legal and policy implications. As such, we divide synthetic data into (1) transformed data, which modifies collected data to preserve certain statistical properties for an end use; (2) augmented data, which relies on assumptions to bolster a collected dataset's fidelity to the ground truth; and (3) simulated data, which relies almost entirely on background knowledge and ground-truth assumptions. Applying this taxonomy, we show that no category of synthetic data prevents privacy harms from group-based inferences, that augmented and simulated data can amplify bias while making a dataset look more complete, and that synthetic data rarely lets smaller competitors overcome incumbents' data advantages. As policymakers weigh whether to incentivize, mandate, or discourage the use of synthetic data, they should consider the validity of the ground-truth assumptions used in producing that data.

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The Privacy Paradox Is a Misnomer: Data Under Structural Uncertainty

The infamous privacy paradox refers to the apparent inconsistency between people's stated concern for privacy and their readiness to disclose personal information. This phenomenon has sparked two largely disconnected literatures: one offering experimental evidence of inconsistent behavior, and another providing qualitative accounts and defending the importance of privacy. The Article presents an online field experiment that bridges those literatures and shows that the so-called paradox arises from a mischaracterization of the underlying behavior. The Article finds that it is structural uncertainty about risk that drives seemingly paradoxical privacy decisions. It does so by isolating discounting mechanisms and empirically testing whether observed privacy choices reflect temptation or rational responses to uncertainty. The results suggest that privacy behavior is not paradoxical but, rather, consistent with choices shaped by incomplete information. The Article then discusses the policy implications of this reframing. As privacy decisions stem from structural uncertainty, which operates as a market failure, regulation should aim to reduce that uncertainty. This supports regulation that prioritizes transparency (for people to assess the risks of data collection) and flexibility mechanisms that accommodate evolving contexts. Such reframing provides a new argument for the right to be forgotten, which allows people to revisit prior disclosures as new risks become apparent. By shifting the focus from individual inconsistency to structural uncertainty, the findings call for privacy law to better reflect the reality of people's decision-making environments.

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The Overstated Cost of AI Fairness in Criminal Justice

A dominant critique of algorithmic fairness holds that increasing fairness reduces predictive accuracy, imposing a cost on society. We challenge that assumption by empirically analyzing the COMPAS dataset. We make two contributions. First, using causal inference methods, we show that racial bias is not only present in the COMPAS dataset but is also amplified by the models trained on it. Widely used models do more than replicate existing bias; they exacerbate it. This undercuts both the assumption that algorithmic decision-making offers a neutral improvement over human judgment and the weaker claim that it merely mirrors preexisting human bias. Second, we reframe the fairness-accuracy tradeoff. Applying fairness constraints does not necessarily cost predictive accuracy in criminal justice. Prediction systems operationalize concepts such as risk through implicit and often flawed normative choices about what to predict and how. The tradeoff claim assumes that the unconstrained model's prediction is an optimal baseline. Fairness constraints can instead correct distortions introduced by biased outcome variables: rearrest data, in this case, captures and magnifies systemic racial disparities. Under some interventions, therefore, fairness carries none of the cost presumed in policy debates. These dynamics extend beyond criminal justice to lending, hiring, and housing, where biased outcome variables reinforce inequality independently of proxy selection. We draw out what this implies for how law and policy should approach fairness adjustments in criminal law.

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The Cost of Arbitrariness for Individuals: Examining the Legal and Technical Challenges of Model Multiplicity

Model multiplicity, the phenomenon where multiple models achieve similar performance despite different underlying learned functions, introduces arbitrariness in model selection. While this arbitrariness may seem inconsequential in expectation, its impact on individuals can be severe. This paper explores various individual concerns stemming from multiplicity, including the effects of arbitrariness beyond final predictions, disparate arbitrariness for individuals belonging to protected groups, and the challenges associated with the arbitrariness of a single algorithmic system creating a monopoly across various contexts. It provides both an empirical examination of these concerns and a comprehensive analysis from the legal standpoint, addressing how these issues are perceived in the anti-discrimination law in Canada. We conclude the discussion with technical challenges in the current landscape of model multiplicity to meet legal requirements and the legal gap between current law and the implications of arbitrariness in model selection, highlighting relevant future research directions for both disciplines.

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