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Igor Grossmann

Publications and source records attributed to Igor Grossmann.

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Metacognition Should Be the Scientific Framework for Bounded and Effective Self-Governance in Generative AI

Generative AI research increasingly confronts a shared problem: systems must sustain yet govern their own generative activity when uncertainty is high, evidence is missing, or context is insufficient. This position paper argues that metacognition should become the scientific framework for bounded and effective self governance in generative AI, where output generation is properly evaluated together with the capacities through which generative systems navigate and regulate their own activity. We advance this position by showing that bounded and effective AI self-governance requires metacognitive alignment across computational, algorithmic, and ecological levels. At the computational level, metacognition specifies the meta-level functions a system is meant to serve, such as monitoring, evaluation, control, and adaptation. At the algorithmic level, these functions are realized through procedures such as elicitation, iteration, and modularization. At the ecological level, metacognitive signals become meaningful, actionable, and accountable within the interface, workflow, and accountability arrangements. Metacognition thus makes it possible to conceive generative AI as both capable and well-governed, rather than treating capability and governance as competing aims.

q-bio.NC

Chrysalis: A Unified System for Comparing Active Teaching and Passive Learning with AI Agents in Education

AI-assisted learning has seen a remarkable uptick over the last few years, mainly due to the rise in popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs). Their ability to hold long-form, natural language interactions with users makes them excellent resources for exploring school- and university-level topics in a dynamic, active manner. We compare students' experiences when interacting with an LLM companion in two capacities: tutored learning and learning-by-teaching. We do this using Chrysalis, an LLM-based system that we have designed to support both AI tutors and AI teachable agents for any topic. Through a within-subject exploratory study with 36 participants, we present insights into student preferences between the two strategies and how constructs such as intellectual humility vary between these two interaction modes. To our knowledge, we are the first to conduct a direct comparison study on the effects of using an LLM as a tutor versus as a teachable agent on multiple topics. We hope that our work opens up new avenues for future research in this area.

cs.HC

When Large Language Models are More PersuasiveThan Incentivized Humans, and Why

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be highly persuasive, but when and why they outperform humans is still an open question. We compare the persuasiveness of two LLMs (Claude 3.5 Sonnet and DeepSeek v3) against humans who had incentives to persuade, using an interactive, real-time conversational setting. We demonstrate that LLMs persuasive superiority is context-dependent: it depends on whether the persuasion attempt is truthful (towards the right answer) or deceptive (towards the wrong answer) and on the LLM model, and wanes over repeated interactions (unlike human persuasiveness). In our first large-scale experiment, humans vs LLMs (Claude 3.5 Sonnet) interacted with other humans who were completing an online quiz for a reward, attempting to persuade them toward a given (either correct or incorrect) answer. Claude was more persuasive than incentivized human persuaders both in truthful and deceptive contexts and it significantly increased accuracy if persuasion was truthful, but decreased it if persuasion was deceptive. In a follow-up experiment with Deepseek v3, we replicated the findings about accuracy but found greater LLM persuasiveness only if the persuasion was deceptive. Linguistic analyses of the persuaders texts suggest that these effects may be due to LLMs expressing higher conviction than humans.

cs.CL

Imagining and building wise machines: The centrality of AI metacognition

Although AI has become increasingly smart, its wisdom has not kept pace. In this article, we examine what is known about human wisdom and sketch a vision of its AI counterpart. We analyze human wisdom as a set of strategies for solving intractable problems-those outside the scope of analytic techniques-including both object-level strategies like heuristics [for managing problems] and metacognitive strategies like intellectual humility, perspective-taking, or context-adaptability [for managing object-level strategies]. We argue that AI systems particularly struggle with metacognition; improved metacognition would lead to AI more robust to novel environments, explainable to users, cooperative with others, and safer in risking fewer misaligned goals with human users. We discuss how wise AI might be benchmarked, trained, and implemented.

cs.AI