arXiv subjects

Igor Sloev

Publications and source records attributed to Igor Sloev.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Three Barriers to Kantian Cooperation under Inequality

Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium has been proposed as a solution to inefficiency in social dilemmas, yet its emergence and stability are associated with a number of coordination and distributional difficulties. Drawing on a simple model of voluntary public good provision with two agents who differ in their initial endowments and have logarithmic preferences, this paper identifies three barriers that arise sequentially when unequal agents attempt to adopt Kantian cooperation voluntarily. The model compares Nash equilibrium with multiplicative Kantian equilibrium under two different parametrizations: one in which the strategic variable is contributions to the public good, and another in which it is private consumption. First, we show that the transition from Nash equilibrium to contribution space Kantian behavior is not always a Pareto improvement: under sufficiently high inequality, the poor agent may prefer the Nash outcome. This barrier can be mitigated by preliminary redistribution. Second, even when agents are willing to cooperate, the choice of a parametrization of the strategic space becomes a distributional issue: different ways of scaling actions lead to different distributive consequences and create a conflict of interest between agents. Third, if the chosen parametrization admits a continuum of Pareto efficient outcomes, an additional coordination problem arises-agreeing on a specific point on the Pareto frontier. The paper reconstructs these barriers as a three step coordination problem in which expectations about later stages affect willingness of agents to enter Kantian cooperation at the outset. On the basis of the results obtained, a program for further formal research is outlined. The findings contribute to understanding the conditions under which Kantian cooperation can be voluntarily adopted and sustainably maintained.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Moral Geometry: Endogenous Scaling in Nash-Kantian Games

We study the strategic implications of the non-invariance of multiplicative Kantian equilibrium (MKE) under monotone transformations of the strategy space. Before interacting with a standard Nash player, a Kantian player publicly selects a smooth increasing scale that determines how proportional deviations are evaluated. Material payoffs and feasible actions remain unchanged, but the chosen scale alters the Kantian first-order condition through endogenous elasticity weights. The representation of actions therefore becomes a commitment device. We characterize the stationary outcomes implementable by a common monotone scale. A sharp dichotomy emerges. Under strategic substitutes, the Kantian player can approach the Nash payoff arbitrarily closely but cannot exceed player 2's Nash benchmark; scaling is defensive and eliminates the payoff loss associated with naive Kantian behavior. Under strategic complements, scaling becomes offensive: the Kantian player can stationary-implement the Stackelberg leader outcome and obtain a payoff strictly above the Nash benchmark. In the canonical Cournot and differentiated Bertrand examples, we explicitly construct scales satisfying the required local elasticity ratios and verify the second-order conditions, so the stationary outcomes are local transformed Nash-Kantian equilibria. Allowing player-specific scales would align the Kantian first-order condition with the Stackelberg condition along the entire reaction curve under complements, but would violate monotonicity under substitutes. This reveals a trade-off between universality and strategic flexibility. The results identify endogenous scaling as a commitment mechanism and connect Kantian optimization to strategic leadership and strategic non-equivalence.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

The Full Pareto Frontier as Kantian Equilibria

Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of strategic non-equivalence. We investigate what fraction of the Pareto frontier can be attained by varying the strategy space. We show that the set of achievable Kantian equilibria is the entire Pareto frontier: for any interior Pareto-efficient point there exists a shift of coordinates - imposing lower bounds on actions - that makes it a Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium. The proof is constructive and relies on a intuitive geometric property: moving the origin to a point on the common tangent to players' indifference curves. This result separates the problem of efficiency from the problem of fairness, allowing any normative criterion to be implemented without loss of Pareto optimality.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Reference-Point Dependence in Multiplicative Kantian Optimization

This note shows that multiplicative Kantian optimization is reference-point dependent. In the standard formulation, the Multiplicative Kantian Equilibrium (MKE) test is applied to absolute contributions, and Nash optimizers may free-ride on Kantians. We compare this with a formulation in which Kantians apply the same multiplicative test to contributions above the individually rational Nash level. With the reference point at the Nash contribution, the Nasher's action is zero in the auxiliary scale. Since zero is a fixed point of every multiplicative transformation, the Kantian test makes the Nash outcome stable in mixed encounters. In a public-good game with a dominant Nash strategy, this neutralizes the free-riding advantage of Nash optimizers, while two Kantians attain the efficient symmetric MKE under the efficient-equilibrium selection convention. The induced type-payoff matrix makes the Kantian type weakly dominant and evolutionarily stable. Thus, the stability of Kantian behavior depends not only on the multiplicative Kantian criterion, but also on the reference point used to formulate it.

econ.TH↗