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Ilan Lobel

Publications and source records attributed to Ilan Lobel.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Reinforcement Learning in MDPs with Information-Ordered Policies

We propose an epoch-based reinforcement learning algorithm for infinite-horizon average-cost Markov decision processes (MDPs) that leverages a partial order over a policy class. In this structure, $\pi' \leq \pi$ if data collected under $\pi$ can be used to estimate the performance of $\pi'$, enabling counterfactual inference without additional environment interaction. Leveraging this partial order, we show that our algorithm achieves a regret bound of $O(\sqrt{w \log(|\Theta|) T})$, where $w$ is the width of the partial order. Notably, the bound is independent of the state and action space sizes. We illustrate the applicability of these partial orders in many domains in operations research, including inventory control and queuing systems. For each, we apply our framework to that problem, yielding new theoretical guarantees and strong empirical results without imposing extra assumptions such as convexity in the inventory model or specialized arrival-rate structure in the queuing model.

stat.ML

Randomly Wrong Signals: Bayesian Auction Design with ML Predictions

We study auction design when a seller relies on machine-learning predictions of bidders' valuations that may be unreliable. Motivated by modern ML systems that are often accurate but occasionally fail in a way that is essentially uninformative, we model predictions as randomly wrong: with high probability the signal equals the bidder's true value, and otherwise it is a hallucination independent of the value. We analyze revenue-maximizing auctions when the seller publicly reveals these signals. A central difficulty is that the resulting posterior belief combines a continuous distribution with a point mass at the signal, so standard Myerson techniques do not directly apply. We provide a tractable characterization of the optimal signal-revealing auction by providing a closed-form characterization of the appropriate ironed virtual values. This characterization yields simple and intuitive implications. With a single bidder, the optimal mechanism reduces to a posted-price policy with a small number of regimes: the seller ignores low signals, follows intermediate signals, caps moderately high signals, and may again follow very high signals. With multiple bidders, we show that a simple eager second-price auction with signal-dependent reserve prices performs nearly optimally in numerical experiments and substantially outperforms natural benchmarks that either ignore the signal or treat it as fully reliable.

cs.GT

Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning

We study the problems of offline and online contextual optimization with feedback information, where instead of observing the loss, we observe, after-the-fact, the optimal action an oracle with full knowledge of the objective function would have taken. We aim to minimize regret, which is defined as the difference between our losses and the ones incurred by an all-knowing oracle. In the offline setting, the decision-maker has information available from past periods and needs to make one decision, while in the online setting, the decision-maker optimizes decisions dynamically over time based a new set of feasible actions and contextual functions in each period. For the offline setting, we characterize the optimal minimax policy, establishing the performance that can be achieved as a function of the underlying geometry of the information induced by the data. In the online setting, we leverage this geometric characterization to optimize the cumulative regret. We develop an algorithm that yields the first regret bound for this problem that is logarithmic in the time horizon. Finally, we show via simulation that our proposed algorithms outperform previous methods from the literature.

cs.LG

Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices

Marketplace companies rely heavily on experimentation when making changes to the design or operation of their platforms. The workhorse of experimentation is the randomized controlled trial (RCT), or A/B test, in which users are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups. However, marketplace interference causes the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) to be violated, leading to bias in the standard RCT metric. In this work, we propose techniques for platforms to run standard RCTs and still obtain meaningful estimates despite the presence of marketplace interference. We specifically consider a generalized matching setting, in which the platform explicitly matches supply with demand via a linear programming algorithm. Our first proposal is for the platform to estimate the value of global treatment and global control via optimization. We prove that this approach is unbiased in the fluid limit. Our second proposal is to compare the average shadow price of the treatment and control groups rather than the total value accrued by each group. We prove that this technique corresponds to the correct first-order approximation (in a Taylor series sense) of the value function of interest even in a finite-size system. We then use this result to prove that, under reasonable assumptions, our estimator is less biased than the RCT estimator. At the heart of our result is the idea that it is relatively easy to model interference in matching-driven marketplaces since, in such markets, the platform mediates the spillover.

math.OC

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

We consider a multidimensional search problem that is motivated by questions in contextual decision-making, such as dynamic pricing and personalized medicine. Nature selects a state from a $d$-dimensional unit ball and then generates a sequence of $d$-dimensional directions. We are given access to the directions, but not access to the state. After receiving a direction, we have to guess the value of the dot product between the state and the direction. Our goal is to minimize the number of times when our guess is more than $ε$ away from the true answer. We construct a polynomial time algorithm that we call Projected Volume achieving regret $O(d\log(d/ε))$, which is optimal up to a $\log d$ factor. The algorithm combines a volume cutting strategy with a new geometric technique that we call cylindrification.

cs.DS

An Optimal Dynamic Mechanism for Multi-Armed Bandit Processes

We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite horizon. A central question here is understanding what natural restrictions on the environment permit the design of optimal mechanisms (note that even in the simpler static setting, optimal mechanisms are characterized only under certain restrictions). We provide a {\em structural characterization} of a natural "separable: multi-armed bandit environment (where the evolution and incentive structure of the a-priori type is decoupled from the subsequent experience in a precise sense) where dynamic optimal mechanism design is possible. Here, we present the Virtual Index Mechanism, an optimal dynamic mechanism, which maximizes the (long term) {\em virtual surplus} using the classical Gittins algorithm. The mechanism optimally balances exploration and exploitation, taking incentives into account.

cs.GT

Distributed Multi-Agent Optimization with State-Dependent Communication

We study distributed algorithms for solving global optimization problems in which the objective function is the sum of local objective functions of agents and the constraint set is given by the intersection of local constraint sets of agents. We assume that each agent knows only his own local objective function and constraint set, and exchanges information with the other agents over a randomly varying network topology to update his information state. We assume a state-dependent communication model over this topology: communication is Markovian with respect to the states of the agents and the probability with which the links are available depends on the states of the agents. In this paper, we study a projected multi-agent subgradient algorithm under state-dependent communication. The algorithm involves each agent performing a local averaging to combine his estimate with the other agents' estimates, taking a subgradient step along his local objective function, and projecting the estimates on his local constraint set. The state-dependence of the communication introduces significant challenges and couples the study of information exchange with the analysis of subgradient steps and projection errors. We first show that the multi-agent subgradient algorithm when used with a constant stepsize may result in the agent estimates to diverge with probability one. Under some assumptions on the stepsize sequence, we provide convergence rate bounds on a "disagreement metric" between the agent estimates. Our bounds are time-nonhomogeneous in the sense that they depend on the initial starting time. Despite this, we show that agent estimates reach an almost sure consensus and converge to the same optimal solution of the global optimization problem with probability one under different assumptions on the local constraint sets and the stepsize sequence.

math.OC