The Determinants of Judicial Promotion: Politics, Prestige, and Performance
Judicial promotions shape the composition of higher courts, yet their determinants remain poorly understood. This paper examines promotion from U.S. District Courts to Courts of Appeals using a discrete-time hazard framework that models annual promotion probability. Using a judge-year panel covering over 36,000 observations from 1930 to present, we incorporate career timing, political alignment, elite credentials, and judicial performance measures. Promotion probabilities follow a life-cycle pattern and are strongly influenced by political alignment between judges and presidents ($\beta$ = 2.12, p < 0.001). Elite credentials and productivity increase promotion likelihood, while higher reversal rates reduce it. Citation network centrality exhibits a meaningful association ($\beta$ = 0.230, p = 0.025) that operates independently of elite credentials. Promotion outcomes reflect a dynamic process shaped by timing, politics, elite networks, and performance signals, with political considerations dominating but not eclipsing judicial behavior.