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Ishraq Tashdid

Publications and source records attributed to Ishraq Tashdid.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

ATLAS: AI-Assisted Threat-to-Assertion Learning for System-on-Chip Security Verification

This work presents ATLAS, an LLM-driven framework that bridges standardized threat modeling and property-based formal verification for System-on-Chip (SoC) security. Starting from vulnerability knowledge bases such as Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), ATLAS identifies SoC-specific assets, maps relevant weaknesses, and generates assertion-based security properties and JasperGold scripts for verification. By combining asset-centric analysis with standardized threat model templates and multi-source SoC context, ATLAS automates the transformation from vulnerability reasoning to formal proof. Evaluated on three HACK@DAC benchmarks, ATLAS detected 39/48 CWEs and generated correct properties for 33 of those bugs, advancing automated, knowledge-driven SoC security verification toward a secure-by-design paradigm.

cs.CR

InterPUF: Distributed Authentication via Physically Unclonable Functions and Multi-party Computation for Reconfigurable Interposers

Modern system-in-package (SiP) platforms increasingly adopt reconfigurable interposers to enable plug-and-play chiplet integration across heterogeneous multi-vendor ecosystems. However, this flexibility introduces severe trust challenges, as traditional authentication schemes fail to scale or adapt in decentralized, post-fabrication programmable environments. This paper presents InterPUF, a compact and scalable authentication framework that transforms the interposer into a distributed root of trust. InterPUF embeds a route-based differential delay physically unclonable function (PUF) across the reconfigurable interconnect and secures authentication using multi-party computation (MPC), ensuring raw PUF signatures are never exposed. Our hardware evaluation shows only 0.23% area and 0.072% power overhead across diverse chiplets while preserving authentication latency within tens of nanoseconds. Simulation results using pyPUF confirm strong uniqueness, reliability, and modeling resistance under process, voltage, and temperature variations. By combining interposer-resident PUF primitives with cryptographic hashing and collaborative verification, InterPUF enforces a minimal-trust authentication model without relying on a centralized anchor.

cs.CR

AuthenTree: A Scalable MPC-Based Distributed Trust Architecture for Chiplet-based Heterogeneous Systems

The rapid adoption of chiplet-based heterogeneous integration is reshaping semiconductor design by enabling modular, scalable, and faster time-to-market solutions for AI and high-performance computing. However, multi-vendor assembly in post-fabrication environments fragments the supply chain and exposes SiP systems to serious security threats, including cloning, overproduction, and chiplet substitution. Existing authentication solutions depend on trusted integrators or centralized security anchors, which can expose sensitive data or create single points of failure. We introduce AuthenTree, a distributed authentication framework that leverages multi-party computation (MPC) in a scalable tree-based architecture, removing the need for dedicated security hardware or centralized trust. AuthenTree enables secure chiplet validation without revealing raw signatures, distributing trust across multiple integrator chiplets. Our evaluation in five SiP benchmarks demonstrates that AuthenTree imposes minimal overhead, with an area as low as 0.48% (7,000 sq-micrometers), an overhead power under 0.5%, and an authentication latency below 1 microsecond, surpassing previous work in some cases by 700 times. These results establish AuthenTree as an efficient, robust, and scalable solution for next-generation chiplet-based security in zero-trust SiP environments.

cs.CR

ECOLogic: Enabling Circular, Obfuscated, and Adaptive Logic via eFPGA-Augmented SoCs

Traditional hardware platforms - ASICs and FPGAs - offer competing trade-offs among performance, flexibility, and sustainability. ASICs provide high efficiency but are inflexible post-fabrication, require costly re-spins for updates, and expose IPs to piracy risks. FPGAs offer reconfigurability and reuse, yet suffer from substantial area, power, and performance overheads, resulting in higher carbon footprints. We present ECOLogic, a hybrid design paradigm that embeds lightweight eFPGA fabric within ASICs to enable secure, updatable, and resource-aware computation. Central to this architecture is ECOScore, a quantitative scoring framework that evaluates IPs based on adaptability, piracy threat, performance tolerance, and resource fit to guide RTL partitioning. Evaluated across six diverse SoC modules, ECOLogic retains an average of 90 percent ASIC-level performance (up to 2 GHz), achieves 9.8 ns timing slack (versus 5.1 ns in FPGA), and reduces power by 480 times on average. Moreover, sustainability analysis shows a 99.7 percent reduction in deployment carbon footprint and 300 to 500 times lower emissions relative to FPGA-only implementations. These results position ECOLogic as a high-performance, secure, and environmentally sustainable solution for next-generation reconfigurable systems.

cs.AR

SAFE-SiP: Secure Authentication Framework for System-in-Package Using Multi-party Computation

The emergence of chiplet-based heterogeneous integration is transforming the semiconductor, AI, and high-performance computing industries by enabling modular designs and improved scalability. However, assembling chiplets from multiple vendors after fabrication introduces a complex supply chain that raises serious security concerns, including counterfeiting, overproduction, and unauthorized access. Current solutions often depend on dedicated security chiplets or changes to the timing flow, which assume a trusted SiP integrator. This assumption can expose chiplet signatures to other vendors and create new attack surfaces. This work addresses those vulnerabilities using Multi-party Computation (MPC), which enables zero-trust authentication without disclosing sensitive information to any party. We present SAFE-SiP, a scalable authentication framework that garbles chiplet signatures and uses MPC for verifying integrity, effectively blocking unauthorized access and adversarial inference. SAFE-SiP removes the need for a dedicated security chiplet and ensures secure authentication, even in untrusted integration scenarios. We evaluated SAFE-SiP on five RISC-V-based System-in-Package (SiP) designs. Experimental results show that SAFE-SiP incurs minimal power overhead, an average area overhead of only 3.05%, and maintains a computational complexity of 2^192, offering a highly efficient and scalable security solution.

cs.CR