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Itamar Reinman

Publications and source records attributed to Itamar Reinman.

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Stability in Competitive Search with Results Diversification

In a competitive search setting, publishers strategically modify their documents in response to induced rankings so as to improve their future ranking. We present a novel game-theoretic analysis of a competitive search setting where search-results diversification is applied. Our analysis reveals an inherent tradeoff between corpus diversity and corpus stability, where the latter corresponds to an equilibrium in a game. We analyze two representative diversification methods and show that stability need not necessarily be reached, leaving the corpus to rapid changes due to ranking incentivized modifications of publishers. We then present a novel approach to devise diversification-based ranking functions that are guaranteed to lead to corpus stability.

cs.GT

The Search for Stability: Learning Dynamics of Strategic Publishers with Initial Documents

We study a game-theoretic information retrieval model in which strategic publishers aim to maximize their chances of being ranked first by the search engine while maintaining the integrity of their original documents. We show that the commonly used Probability Ranking Principle (PRP) ranking scheme results in an unstable environment where games often fail to reach pure Nash equilibrium. We propose two families of ranking functions that do not adhere to the PRP principle. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that these methods lead to a stable search ecosystem, by providing positive results on the learning dynamics convergence. We also define the publishers' and users' welfare, demonstrate a possible publisher-user trade-off, and provide means for a search system designer to control it. Finally, we show how instability harms long-term users' welfare.

cs.GT

On the Convergence of No-Regret Dynamics in Information Retrieval Games with Proportional Ranking Functions

Publishers who publish their content on the web act strategically, in a behavior that can be modeled within the online learning framework. Regret, a central concept in machine learning, serves as a canonical measure for assessing the performance of learning agents within this framework. We prove that any proportional content ranking function with a concave activation function induces games in which no-regret learning dynamics converge. Moreover, for proportional ranking functions, we prove the equivalence of the concavity of the activation function, the social concavity of the induced games and the concavity of the induced games. We also study the empirical trade-offs between publishers' and users' welfare, under different choices of the activation function, using a state-of-the-art no-regret dynamics algorithm. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the choice of the ranking function and changes in the ecosystem structure affect these welfare measures, as well as the dynamics' convergence rate.

cs.GT

Search results diversification in competitive search

In Web retrieval, there are many cases of competition between authors of Web documents: their incentive is to have their documents highly ranked for queries of interest. As such, the Web is a prominent example of a competitive search setting. Past work on competitive search focused on ranking functions based solely on relevance estimation. We study ranking functions that integrate a results-diversification aspect. We show that the competitive search setting with diversity-based ranking has an equilibrium. Furthermore, we theoretically and empirically show that the phenomenon of authors mimicking content in documents highly ranked in the past, which was demonstrated in previous work, is mitigated when search results diversification is applied.

cs.IR

GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environments

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? How do they perform compared to humans? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. To answer these questions, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents. Our results suggest that the market parameters, as well as the choice of the LLMs, tend to have complex and interdependent effects on the economic outcome, which calls for careful design and analysis of the language-based economic ecosystem.

cs.CL