arXiv subjects

Iyad Rahwan

Publications and source records attributed to Iyad Rahwan.

68 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, `SITL = HITL + Social Contract.'

cs.CY↗

arXiv2017

Inferring Mechanisms for Global Constitutional Progress

Constitutions help define domestic political orders, but are known to be influenced by two international mechanisms: one that reflects global temporal trends in legal development, and another that reflects international network dynamics such as shared colonial history. We introduce the provision space; the growing set of all legal provisions existing in the world's constitutions over time. Through this we uncover a third mechanism influencing constitutional change: hierarchical dependencies between legal provisions, under which the adoption of essential, fundamental provisions precedes more advanced provisions. This third mechanism appears to play an especially important role in the emergence of new political rights, and may therefore provide a useful roadmap for advocates of those rights. We further characterise each legal provision in terms of the strength of these mechanisms.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2017

Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2017

Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-enabled Collective Intelligence

On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as "Like" in Facebook, "Favorite" in Twitter, thumbs-up/down, flagging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g. Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion) these mechanisms are not sufficient since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between different claims. We can view a set of conflicting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here, we present the first experimental evaluation of different principles commonly employed by aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which principles people consider better at aggregating opinions under different conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the efficacy of aggregation. These results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) should reduce traffic accidents, but they will sometimes have to choose between two evils-for example, running over pedestrians or sacrificing itself and its passenger to save them. Defining the algorithms that will help AVs make these moral decisions is a formidable challenge. We found that participants to six MTurk studies approved of utilitarian AVs (that sacrifice their passengers for the greater good), and would like others to buy them, but they would themselves prefer to ride in AVs that protect their passengers at all costs. They would disapprove of enforcing utilitarian AVs, and would be less willing to buy such a regulated AV. Accordingly, regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2016

Superintelligence cannot be contained: Lessons from Computability Theory

Superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that possesses intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and most gifted human minds. In light of recent advances in machine intelligence, a number of scientists, philosophers and technologists have revived the discussion about the potential catastrophic risks entailed by such an entity. In this article, we trace the origins and development of the neo-fear of superintelligence, and some of the major proposals for its containment. We argue that such containment is, in principle, impossible, due to fundamental limits inherent to computing itself. Assuming that a superintelligence will contain a program that includes all the programs that can be executed by a universal Turing machine on input potentially as complex as the state of the world, strict containment requires simulations of such a program, something theoretically (and practically) infeasible.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2015

Limits of Friendship Networks in Predicting Epidemic Risk

The spread of an infection on a real-world social network is determined by the interplay of two processes: the dynamics of the network, whose structure changes over time according to the encounters between individuals, and the dynamics on the network, whose nodes can infect each other after an encounter. Physical encounter is the most common vehicle for the spread of infectious diseases, but detailed information about encounters is often unavailable because expensive, unpractical to collect or privacy sensitive. We asks whether the friendship ties between the individuals in a social network successfully predict who is at risk. Using a dataset from a popular online review service, we build a time-varying network that is a proxy of physical encounter between users and a static network based on reported friendship. Through computer simulations, we compare infection processes on the resulting networks and show that, whereas distance on the friendship network is correlated to epidemic risk, friendship provides a poor identification of the individuals at risk if the infection is driven by physical encounter. Such limit is not due to the randomness of the infection, but to the structural differences of the two networks. In contrast to the macroscopic similarity between processes spreading on different networks, the differences in local connectivity determined by the two definitions of edges result in striking differences between the dynamics at a microscopic level. Despite the limits highlighted, we show that periodical and relatively infrequent monitoring of the real infection on the encounter network allows to correct the predicted infection on the friendship network and to achieve satisfactory prediction accuracy. In addition, the friendship network contains valuable information to effectively contain epidemic outbreaks when a limited budget is available for immunization.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Judgment Aggregation in Multi-Agent Argumentation

Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the problem by adapting various classical social-choice-theoretic properties for the argumentation domain. We show that while argument-wise plurality voting satisfies many properties, it fails to guarantee the collective rationality of the outcome, and struggles with ties. We then present more general results, proving multiple impossibility results on the existence of any good aggregation operator. After characterising the sufficient and necessary conditions for satisfying collective rationality, we study whether restricting the domain of argument-wise plurality voting to classical semantics allows us to escape the impossibility result. We close by listing graph-theoretic restrictions under which argument-wise plurality rule does produce collectively rational outcomes. In addition to identifying fundamental barriers to collective argument evaluation, our results open up the door for a new research agenda for the argumentation and computational social choice communities.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

Beyond Contagion: Reality Mining Reveals Complex Patterns of Social Influence

Contagion, a concept from epidemiology, has long been used to characterize social influence on people's behavior and affective (emotional) states. While it has revealed many useful insights, it is not clear whether the contagion metaphor is sufficient to fully characterize the complex dynamics of psychological states in a social context. Using wearable sensors that capture daily face-to-face interaction, combined with three daily experience sampling surveys, we collected the most comprehensive data set of personality and emotion dynamics of an entire community of work. From this high-resolution data about actual (rather than self-reported) face-to-face interaction, a complex picture emerges where contagion (that can be seen as adaptation of behavioral responses to the behavior of other people) cannot fully capture the dynamics of transitory states. We found that social influence has two opposing effects on states: \emph{adaptation} effects that go beyond mere contagion, and \emph{complementarity} effects whereby individuals' behaviors tend to complement the behaviors of others. Surprisingly, these effects can exhibit completely different directions depending on the stable personality or emotional dispositions (stable traits) of target individuals. Our findings provide a foundation for richer models of social dynamics, and have implications on organizational engineering and workplace well-being.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2014

Analytical reasoning task reveals limits of social learning in networks

Social learning -by observing and copying others- is a highly successful cultural mechanism for adaptation, outperforming individual information acquisition and experience. Here, we investigate social learning in the context of the uniquely human capacity for reflective, analytical reasoning. A hallmark of the human mind is our ability to engage analytical reasoning, and suppress false associative intuitions. Through a set of lab-based network experiments, we find that social learning fails to propagate this cognitive strategy. When people make false intuitive conclusions, and are exposed to the analytic output of their peers, they recognize and adopt this correct output. But they fail to engage analytical reasoning in similar subsequent tasks. Thus, humans exhibit an 'unreflective copying bias,' which limits their social learning to the output, rather than the process, of their peers' reasoning -even when doing so requires minimal effort and no technical skill. In contrast to much recent work on observation-based social learning, which emphasizes the propagation of successful behavior through copying, our findings identify a limit on the power of social networks in situations that require analytical reasoning.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2014

Learning in Repeated Games: Human Versus Machine

While Artificial Intelligence has successfully outperformed humans in complex combinatorial games (such as chess and checkers), humans have retained their supremacy in social interactions that require intuition and adaptation, such as cooperation and coordination games. Despite significant advances in learning algorithms, most algorithms adapt at times scales which are not relevant for interactions with humans, and therefore the advances in AI on this front have remained of a more theoretical nature. This has also hindered the experimental evaluation of how these algorithms perform against humans, as the length of experiments needed to evaluate them is beyond what humans are reasonably expected to endure (max 100 repetitions). This scenario is rapidly changing, as recent algorithms are able to converge to their functional regimes in shorter time-scales. Additionally, this shift opens up possibilities for experimental investigation: where do humans stand compared with these new algorithms? We evaluate humans experimentally against a representative element of these fast-converging algorithms. Our results indicate that the performance of at least one of these algorithms is comparable to, and even exceeds, the performance of people.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2014

Targeted Social Mobilisation in a Global Manhunt

Social mobilization, the ability to mobilize large numbers of people via social networks to achieve highly distributed tasks, has received significant attention in recent times. This growing capability, facilitated by modern communication technology, is highly relevant to endeavors which require the search for individuals that posses rare information or skill, such as finding medical doctors during disasters, or searching for missing people. An open question remains, as to whether in time-critical situations, people are able to recruit in a targeted manner, or whether they resort to so-called blind search, recruiting as many acquaintances as possible via broadcast communication. To explore this question, we examine data from our recent success in the U.S. State Department's Tag Challenge, which required locating and photographing 5 target persons in 5 different cities in the United States and Europe in less than 12 hours, based only on a single mug-shot. We find that people are able to consistently route information in a targeted fashion even under increasing time pressure. We derive an analytical model for global mobilization and use it to quantify the extent to which people were targeting others during recruitment. Our model estimates that approximately 1 in 3 messages were of targeted fashion during the most time-sensitive period of the challenge.This is a novel observation at such short temporal scales, and calls for opportunities for devising viral incentive schemes that provide distance- or time-sensitive rewards to approach the target geography more rapidly, with applications in multiple areas from emergency preparedness, to political mobilization.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2013

Corruption Drives the Emergence of Civil Society

Peer punishment of free-riders (defectors) is a key mechanism for promoting cooperation in society. However, it is highly unstable since some cooperators may contribute to a common project but refuse to punish defectors. Centralized sanctioning institutions (for example, tax-funded police and criminal courts) can solve this problem by punishing both defectors and cooperators who refuse to punish. These institutions have been shown to emerge naturally through social learning and then displace all other forms of punishment, including peer punishment. However, this result provokes a number of questions. If centralized sanctioning is so successful, then why do many highly authoritarian states suffer from low levels of cooperation? Why do states with high levels of public good provision tend to rely more on citizen-driven peer punishment? And what happens if centralized institutions can be circumvented by individual acts of bribery? Here, we consider how corruption influences the evolution of cooperation and punishment. Our model shows that the effectiveness of centralized punishment in promoting cooperation breaks down when some actors in the model are allowed to bribe centralized authorities. Counterintuitively, increasing the sanctioning power of the central institution makes things even worse, since this prevents peer punishers from playing a role in maintaining cooperation. As a result, a weaker centralized authority is actually more effective because it allows peer punishment to restore cooperation in the presence of corruption. Our results provide an evolutionary rationale for why public goods provision rarely flourishes in polities that rely only on strong centralized institutions. Instead, cooperation requires both decentralized and centralized enforcement. These results help to explain why citizen participation is a fundamental necessity for policing the commons.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2010

Time Critical Social Mobilization: The DARPA Network Challenge Winning Strategy

It is now commonplace to see the Web as a platform that can harness the collective abilities of large numbers of people to accomplish tasks with unprecedented speed, accuracy and scale. To push this idea to its limit, DARPA launched its Network Challenge, which aimed to "explore the roles the Internet and social networking play in the timely communication, wide-area team-building, and urgent mobilization required to solve broad-scope, time-critical problems." The challenge required teams to provide coordinates of ten red weather balloons placed at different locations in the continental United States. This large-scale mobilization required the ability to spread information about the tasks widely and quickly, and to incentivize individuals to act. We report on the winning team's strategy, which utilized a novel recursive incentive mechanism to find all balloons in under nine hours. We analyze the theoretical properties of the mechanism, and present data about its performance in the challenge.

cs.CY↗