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Iyiola Emmanuel Olatunji

Publications and source records attributed to Iyiola Emmanuel Olatunji.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

From Rookie to Pro: Social Engineering LLMs for Automated Vulnerability Exploitation in Enterprise Software

LLMs democratize software engineering by enabling non-programmers to create applications, but this same accessibility fundamentally undermines security assumptions that have guided software engineering for decades. We show in this work how publicly available LLMs can be socially engineered to transform novices into capable attackers, challenging the foundational principle that exploitation requires technical expertise. To that end, we propose RSA (Role-assignment, Scenario-pretexting, and Action-solicitation), a pretexting strategy that manipulates LLMs into generating functional exploits despite their safety mechanisms. Testing against Odoo---a widely used ERP platform, we evaluated five mainstream LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini, Claude, Microsoft Copilot, and DeepSeek) and successfully exploited every tested CVE: at least one LLM produced a functional exploit for each within 3-5 prompting rounds. While prior work [13] found LLM-assisted attacks difficult and requiring manual effort, we demonstrate that this overhead can be eliminated entirely. Our findings invalidate core software engineering security principles: the distinction between technical and non-technical actors no longer provides valid threat models; technical complexity of vulnerability descriptions offers no protection when LLMs can abstract it away; and traditional security boundaries dissolve when the same tools that build software can be manipulated to break it. This represents a paradigm shift in software engineering---we must redesign security practices for an era where exploitation requires only the ability to craft prompts, not understand code. Artifacts available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/From-Rookie-to-Attacker-D8B3.

cs.SE↗

Memorization Diagnostics for Code LLMs Should be Scale-Aware

The extent to which large language models for code rely on memorization over genuine understanding remains highly debated. While current literature frequently reports widespread memorization, evaluating the underlying probing techniques across dense architectures reveals a severe breakdown in their utility at scale. Traditional encoder-style probes using perturbations such as synonym fuzzing or dead-code insertion struggle to expose memorization in scaled models, even on known-contaminated benchmarks, and decoder-style probes that rely on log probabilities show similar performance degradation. The specific mode of failure for these probes, particularly why such techniques disrupt smaller models but fail to impact larger ones, motivates us to untangle representation load from memorization rather than treating them as a single phenomenon. By applying invertible mathematical transforms to numeric problems, we isolate these two factors and reveal that scaled encoders successfully absorb substantial representation load while still converging on the correct family of solutions. In practical software engineering, this ability to adapt to varying surface forms is what truly matters for usability and generalizability in LLM and agentic applications. Whether a specific solution was seen during training becomes a much less pressing question because although memorization inflates scores on contaminated benchmarks, factoring out representation load makes it debatable how much we should truly care if a functional answer was originally memorized. Future evaluations must therefore be built around separating these phenomena rather than relying on methodologies that quietly entangle them.

cs.SE↗

Old Tricks, New Models: How Simple Image Transformations Break Modern AI-based Content Moderation

While automated content-moderation systems have become essential for screening harmful content at scale, conventional task-specific classifiers often provide limited policy cov- erage and contextual understanding. Recently, commercial multimodal moderation APIs built on large foundation models have been introduced with the promise of providing broader and more capable safety filters. In this work, we analyze whether this shift also yields more robust image moderation. We conduct a large-scale black-box evaluation on three established commercial image-moderation services and compare their robustness. By evaluating seven simple, model-agnostic image transformations across multiple providers, datasets, harm categories, perceptual-similarity constraints, and transformation intensities, we find that: (1) all three commercial services can be bypassed using inexpensive image transformations that require no gradients, surrogate models, or knowledge of the target system; (2) even fixed transformations such as color inversion and grayscale conversion induce unsafe-to-safe decision changes while preserving content that remains recognizable to humans; (3) their robustness varies substantially across datasets and harm categories, with multimodal content and self-harm exhibiting pronounced vulnerabilities. This yields the conclusion that replacing conventional moderation classifiers with foundation-model-based APIs does not, by itself, provide a reliable security boundary. Such systems must be evaluated under realistic transformations and deployed as one component of a layered moderation pipeline rather than as standalone safety filters.

cs.AI↗

Characterizing Build Compromises Through Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis

The software build process transforms source code into deployable artifacts, representing a critical yet vulnerable stage in software development. Build infrastructure security poses unique challenges: the complexity of multi-component systems (source code, dependencies, build tools), the difficulty of detecting intrusions during compilation, and prevalent build non-determinism that masks malicious modifications. Despite these risks, the security community lacks a systematic understanding of build-specific attack vectors, hindering effective defense design. This paper presents an empirically-derived taxonomy of attack vectors targeting the build process, constructed through a large-scale CVE mining (of 621 vulnerability disclosures from the NVD database). We categorize attack vectors by their injection points across the build pipeline, from source code manipulation to compiler compromise. To validate our taxonomy, we analyzed 168 documented software supply chain attacks, identifying 40 incidents specifically targeting build phases. Our analysis reveals that 23.8\% of supply chain attacks exploit build vulnerabilities, with dependency confusion and build script injection representing the most prevalent vectors. Dataset available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Taxonomizing-Build-Attacks-8BB0.

cs.SE↗

Reinforcement Learning-Guided Chain-of-Draft for Token-Efficient Code Generation

LLMs demonstrate surface-level fluency in code generation but struggle with structured reasoning tasks requiring correctness and semantic alignment. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning through intermediate steps, it suffers from verbosity and inefficiency. Chain-of-Draft (CoD) prompting offers more concise reasoning, but the stochastic nature of LLMs produces varying solution quality, making optimal selection challenging. We propose \multicod, a reinforcement learning framework that learns to select the most promising candidate from CoD-generated solutions. Our approach uses strategy-guided prompting to encourage diverse reasoning styles and models solution selection as a contextual bandit problem. The framework optimizes interpretable features including code complexity, reasoning structure, and strategic metadata through a reward function balancing correctness, efficiency, and clarity. Experiments on MBPP, BigCodeBench, SWE-bench Verified, and Defects4J show \multicod~outperforms and in some cases, on par with standard prompting, CoT, and CoD baselines while achieving cost and token efficiency from the user's perspective through a multi-candidate design that charges only for the selected output, reducing user billing by over 50\% and improving LLM response quality, making \multicod~more sustainable and scalable for real-world deployment. Our code is available: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MultiCoD.

cs.SE↗

DP-GPL: Differentially Private Graph Prompt Learning

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown remarkable performance in various applications. Recently, graph prompt learning has emerged as a powerful GNN training paradigm, inspired by advances in language and vision foundation models. Here, a GNN is pre-trained on public data and then adapted to sensitive tasks using lightweight graph prompts. However, using prompts from sensitive data poses privacy risks. In this work, we are the first to investigate these practical risks in graph prompts by instantiating a membership inference attack that reveals significant privacy leakage. We also find that the standard privacy method, DP-SGD, fails to provide practical privacy-utility trade-offs in graph prompt learning, likely due to the small number of sensitive data points used to learn the prompts. As a solution, we propose DP-GPL for differentially private graph prompt learning based on the PATE framework, that generates a graph prompt with differential privacy guarantees. Our evaluation across various graph prompt learning methods, GNN architectures, and pre-training strategies demonstrates that our algorithm achieves high utility at strong privacy, effectively mitigating privacy concerns while preserving the powerful capabilities of prompted GNNs as powerful foundation models in the graph domain.

cs.LG↗

Open LLMs are Necessary for Current Private Adaptations and Outperform their Closed Alternatives

While open Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant progress, they still fall short of matching the performance of their closed, proprietary counterparts, making the latter attractive even for the use on highly private data. Recently, various new methods have been proposed to adapt closed LLMs to private data without leaking private information to third parties and/or the LLM provider. In this work, we analyze the privacy protection and performance of the four most recent methods for private adaptation of closed LLMs. By examining their threat models and thoroughly comparing their performance under different privacy levels according to differential privacy (DP), various LLM architectures, and multiple datasets for classification and generation tasks, we find that: (1) all the methods leak query data, i.e., the (potentially sensitive) user data that is queried at inference time, to the LLM provider, (2) three out of four methods also leak large fractions of private training data to the LLM provider while the method that protects private data requires a local open LLM, (3) all the methods exhibit lower performance compared to three private gradient-based adaptation methods for local open LLMs, and (4) the private adaptation methods for closed LLMs incur higher monetary training and query costs than running the alternative methods on local open LLMs. This yields the conclusion that, to achieve truly privacy-preserving LLM adaptations that yield high performance and more privacy at lower costs, taking into account current methods and models, one should use open LLMs.

cs.LG↗