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J. Lucas Reddinger

Publications and source records attributed to J. Lucas Reddinger.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Dynamic investment and coordination in teams: Theory and experimental evidence

Teamwork requires more than the general skills that team members bring. In successful teams, members invest in team-specific skill or capital that accumulates within the team and raises the return to coordinated production. We provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in such team skill. Adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits but is risky because the benefits depend on successful team coordination. We then take this framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the efficient benchmark. However, investment responds strongly to incentives, in line with specific theory-predicted patterns. Pre-registered traits (theory of mind and propensity to coordinate) predict investment and team-level efficiency. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of team members can facilitate the development of team skill.

econ.GN↗

On Prior Confidence and Belief Updating

We experimentally investigate how confidence over multiple priors affects belief updating. Theory predicts that the average Bayesian posterior is unaffected by confidence over multiple priors if average priors are the same. We manipulate confidence by varying the time subjects view a black-and-white grid, the proportion representing the prior in a Bernoulli distribution. We find that when subjects view the grid for a longer duration, they have more confidence, under-update more, and place more (less) weight on priors (signals). Overall, confidence over multiple priors matters when it should not, while confidence in prior beliefs does not matter when it should.

econ.GN↗

Temptation: Immediacy and certainty

Is an option especially tempting when it is both immediate and certain? I test the effect of risk on the present-bias factor given quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In my experiment workers allocate about thirty to fifty minutes of real-effort tasks between two weeks. I study dynamic consistency by comparing choices made two days in advance of the workday with choices made when work is imminent. My novel design permits estimation of present bias using a decision with a consequence that is both immediate and certain. I find greater present bias when the consequence is certain. This finding has implications for any economic decision involving a present-biased decision-maker, including labor contracting and consumer good pricing. I offer a methodological remedy for experimental economists.

econ.GN↗