arXiv subjects

Jack Vanlyssel

Publications and source records attributed to Jack Vanlyssel.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Trust Without Boundaries: An Architectural Analysis of Satellite Flight Software

As spacecraft become more software-driven and interconnected, onboard flight software is an increasingly important security boundary. Popular flight software architectures often treat onboard components as trusted peers, simplifying integration while limiting internal isolation and access control. We analyze NASA's Core Flight Software (cFS) to examine how authority, identity, communication, observability, and persistence are distributed across onboard components. Using NASA's flight-representative NOS3 simulator, we validate these weaknesses through five experiments implemented with a malicious onboard component that abuses legitimate architectural privileges. We then compare cFS with other modular flight software frameworks to identify recurring trust assumptions and architectural weaknesses. Our results show that a single compromised component can exploit broadly shared authority in ways that are difficult to distinguish from legitimate behavior. We conclude with architectural implications and discuss mechanisms for strengthening internal trust boundaries in future flight software systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Pick Two: An Adversarial Animal Survival Game

The "Pick Two" animal selection puzzle is a popular thought experiment in which two animal species must defend a human against the remaining animal attackers. While typically discussed informally, the scenario presents a heterogeneous coalition-selection problem involving complex interactions among agents with different capabilities and behaviors. In this work, we formalize Pick Two as an adversarial multi-agent optimization problem and develop a biologically inspired agent-based simulation framework to evaluate defender coalition effectiveness. Coalition performance is evaluated through 18,000 Monte Carlo simulations conducted in a Unity-based environment. Results show that coalition effectiveness is not additive and is instead dominated by interaction effects and scaling behavior. Overall, this study demonstrates how agent-based simulation can be used to analyze coalition effectiveness in adversarial environments and highlights the importance of emergent group dynamics in determining collective success.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Silent Subversion: Sensor Spoofing Attacks via Supply Chain Implants in Satellite Systems

Spoofing attacks are among the most destructive cyber threats to terrestrial systems, and they become even more dangerous in space, where satellites cannot be easily serviced, and operators depend on accurate telemetry to ensure mission success. When telemetry is compromised, entire spaceborne missions are placed at risk. Prior work on spoofing has largely focused on attacks from Earth, such as injecting falsified uplinks or overpowering downlinks with stronger radios. In contrast, onboard spoofing originating from within the satellite itself remains an underexplored and underanalyzed threat. This vector is particularly concerning given that modern satellites, especially small satellites, rely on modular architectures and globalized supply chains that reduce cost and accelerate development but also introduce hidden risks. This paper presents an end-to-end demonstration of an internal satellite spoofing attack delivered through a compromised vendor-supplied component implemented in NASA's NOS3 simulation environment. Our rogue Core Flight Software application passed integration and generated packets in the correct format and cadence that the COSMOS ground station accepted as legitimate. By undermining both onboard estimators and ground operator views, the attack directly threatens mission integrity and availability, as corrupted telemetry can bias navigation, conceal subsystem failures, and mislead operators into executing harmful maneuvers. These results expose component-level telemetry spoofing as an overlooked supply-chain vector distinct from jamming or external signal injection. We conclude by discussing practical countermeasures-including authenticated telemetry, component attestation, provenance tracking, and lightweight runtime monitoring-and highlight the trade-offs required to secure resource-constrained small satellites.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Power Grid Cybersecurity: Policy Analysis White Paper

The U.S. power grid underpins national security, public safety, and economic stability, but faces growing cyber risks from vulnerabilities in industrial control systems, remote access, and poor cyber hygiene. Despite its critical importance, current policy remains fragmented and reactive. This paper proposes a dual policy approach to strengthen grid cybersecurity: enhanced information sharing between government and private utilities to improve threat detection and response, and standardized cyber hygiene practices to reduce common attack vectors. For long-term resilience, a Unified National Cybersecurity Framework is recommended to align existing NERC, IEC, IEEE, and NIST standards, eliminate regulatory overlap, and adapt to evolving threats. Together, these policies offer both immediate and sustainable improvements in safeguarding the nation's most vital infrastructure.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Securing U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) underpin the United States' critical infrastructure, managing essential services such as power, water, and transportation that are vital to national security and public safety. However, increasing digital integration has exposed these systems to escalating cyber threats. Historical attacks like Stuxnet and the Ukraine power grid incident revealed exploitable weaknesses-poor network segmentation, outdated software, weak authentication, and inadequate monitoring-that persist in many U.S. ICS environments today. This paper analyzes these landmark attacks to identify recurring vulnerabilities and assess their relevance to current U.S. infrastructure. It argues that without immediate reforms, similar exploits could lead to catastrophic disruptions and national security crises. To address these risks, the paper proposes policy measures focused on implementing zero-trust architecture and improved network segmentation to enhance system resilience. These recommendations aim to guide policymakers and industry leaders in securing the nation's most critical operational technologies against future cyber threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

SpyChain: Multi-Vector Supply Chain Attacks on Small Satellite Systems

Small satellites are integral to scientific, commercial, and defense missions, but reliance on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware broadens their attack surface. Although supply chain threats are well studied in other cyber-physical domains, their feasibility and stealth in space systems remain largely unexplored. Prior work has focused on flight software, which benefits from strict security practices and oversight. In contrast, auxiliary COTS components often lack robust assurance yet enjoy comparable access to critical on-board resources, including telemetry, system calls, and the software bus. Despite this privileged access, the insider threat within COTS hardware supply chains has received little attention. In this work, we present SpyChain, the first end-to-end design and implementation of independent and colluding hardware supply chain threats targeting small satellites. Using NASA's satellite simulation (NOS3), we demonstrate that SpyChain can evade testing, exfiltrate telemetry, disrupt operations, and launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks through covert channels that bypass ground monitoring. Our study traces an escalation from a simple solo component to dynamic, coordinating malware, introducing a taxonomy of stealth across five scenarios. We showcase how implicit trust in auxiliary components enables covert persistence and reveal novel attack vectors, highlighting a new multi-component execution technique that is now incorporated into the SPARTA matrix. Our findings are reinforced by acknowledgment and affirmation from NASA's NOS3 team. Finally, we implement lightweight onboard defenses, including runtime monitoring, to mitigate threats like SpyChain.

cs.CR↗