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Jackson Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Jackson Wang.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

The Only Edge Was Memorized in Training: LLM Trading Agents Around Earnings and Bad News

Large language model (LLM) trading agents are tested on news, but news reaches stock prices within minutes, and a benchmark that replays headlines at their publication time finds no alpha in trading on them. Money can then remain in two places, before news whose date is known, such as earnings announcements, and after bad news, if the market's fall went too far. However, studies of LLMs and earnings read documents published with or after the announcement, and studies of reversal sort monthly portfolios, so neither tells whether an agent can trade these moments after costs. In this paper, we test LLM agents at both moments on the same look-ahead-free benchmark, before 598 earnings announcements and after 409 bad-news drops of large US stocks. Every input is cut at the decision close, staged agents are compared with single calls, simple rules and a logistic regression, and every decision is made with and without the stock's name. Across five models from four vendors, no agent beat the simple bets. Before earnings, the agents mostly bought and earned what buying before every announcement earned, and after bad news, a Gemini-based agent called almost every fall an overreaction while no agent picked better dips than buying them all. The only gains came from what the models had memorized in training. Given only the ticker and the dates, a GPT-based model called the direction of 59.2% of the announcements before its training cutoff and 53.3% after it. Agent builders should therefore compare an event agent with the simple bet and test it blind after the training cutoff.

cs.AI↗

LLM Trading Agents Earn Beta, Not Alpha: A Look-Ahead-Free Benchmark

Large language model (LLM) trading agents now trade stocks for their users, and benchmarks rank models by their agents' returns. Yet a single run's return says little about skill. In our study, two runs of the same model that differed only in the random seed ended 5.2 points apart on average, so telling skill from luck takes many backtests across markets, models and seeds. However, live arenas trade each day only once, and backtests either use the few months after a model's training cutoff or run on years the model may remember, often with news joined to prices by calendar date. In this paper, we present rta-bench-1, a backtest over three US markets (a rally, a bear market and a crash). It shows each headline only after its publication minute, plays each period blind and named, and checks every run for look-ahead. It also splits each return into factor exposure and alpha and scores every decision against random choices of the same day and sector. In 91 runs of six models from four vendors, no alpha was significant, market and style exposure accounted for a median 78% of the return, and the decisions did no better than random stocks of the same sector. The agents bought the stocks with the most positive news, yet in ablations they earned as much without their headlines. Still, the agents carried out rules reliably, since a single cash rule in the prompt cut a GPT-based agent's share in stocks by 30.3 points in all six pairs. Builders should therefore supply the edge themselves and report exposures and alpha, and benchmarks should replay news by publication time.

cs.AI↗

AttackEval: A Systematic Empirical Study of Prompt Injection Attack Effectiveness Against Large Language Models

Prompt injection has emerged as a critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments, yet existing research is heavily weighted toward defenses. The attack side -- specifically, which injection strategies are most effective and why -- remains insufficiently studied.We address this gap with AttackEval, a systematic empirical study of prompt injection attack effectiveness. We construct a taxonomy of ten attack categories organized into three parent groups (Syntactic, Contextual, and Semantic/Social), populate each category with 25 carefully crafted prompts (250 total), and evaluate them against a simulated production victim system under four progressively stronger defense tiers. Experiments reveal several non-obvious findings: (1) Obfuscation (OBF) achieves the highest single-attack success rate (ASR = 0.76) against even intent-aware defenses, because it defeats both keyword matching and semantic similarity checks simultaneously; (2) Semantic/Social attacks - Emotional Manipulation (EM) and Reward Framing (RF) - maintain high ASR (0.44-0.48) against intent-aware defenses due to their natural language surface, which evades structural anomaly detection; (3) Composite attacks combining two complementary strategies dramatically boost ASR, with the OBF + EM pair reaching 97.6%; (4) Stealth correlates positively with residual ASR against semantic defenses (r = 0.71), implying that future defenses must jointly optimize for both structural and behavioral signals. Our findings identify concrete blind spots in current defenses and provide actionable guidance for designing more robust LLM safety systems.

cs.CR↗