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Jaime Iranzo

Publications and source records attributed to Jaime Iranzo.

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A generative model for bipartite gene-sharing networks

Gene-sharing networks provide a powerful framework to study the evolution of viruses and mobile genetic elements. These bipartite networks, which link genes to the genomes that contain them, exhibit characteristic degree distributions: a scale-free distribution for genes and an exponential-like decay for genomes. Here, we propose a mechanistic model that explains these patterns through fundamental evolutionary processes including horizontal gene transfer, capture of new genes, emergence of new genomes, and gene loss. Using a mean-field approximation, we derive analytical expressions for the asymptotic gene and genome degree distributions, recapitulating a power-law distribution for genes and an exponential distribution for genomes. Numerical simulations validate these predictions and yield parameter values that closely fit empirical data from dsDNA viruses, RNA viruses, and prokaryotic pangenomes. This simple model with only two parameters provides a generative framework for bipartite gene-sharing networks, offering qualitative and quantitative insights into the main evolutionary forces driving genome plasticity. Setting the gene loss rate to zero, the gene and genome degree distributions of the model closely fit the empirically observed distributions. Thus, evolution of viruses appears to be dominated by gene gain, in agreement with the results of independent reconstructions of viral evolution.

q-bio.PE

The Ultimatum Game in Complex Networks

We address the problem of how cooperative (altruistic-like) behavior arises in natural and social systems by analyzing an ultimatum game in complex networks. Specifically, three types of players are considered: (a) empathetic, whose aspiration level and offer are equal, (b) pragmatic, who do not distinguish between the different roles and aim to obtain the same benefit, and (c) agents whose aspiration level and offer are independent. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of pure populations on different topologies using two kinds of strategic update rules. Natural selection, which relies on replicator dynamics, and Social Penalty, inspired in the Bak-Sneppen dynamics, in which players are subjected to a social selection rule penalizing not only the less fitted individuals, but also their first neighbors. We discuss the emergence of fairness in the different settings and network topologies.

physics.soc-ph