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Jair Certório

Publications and source records attributed to Jair Certório.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Cooperative Risk-Aware Exploration in Heterogeneous Multi-Robot Systems Using Algorithmic Altruism

Multi-robot systems are well-positioned for exploration in hazardous environments, but effective deployment requires deciding not only where robots should gather information, but also how risk should be distributed across heterogeneous team members. This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for cooperative risk-aware exploration based on ecologically inspired altruistic behavior. Each robot selects a finite-horizon trajectory to maximize information gain while penalizing redundant exploration and expected hazard exposure. Heterogeneity is introduced through agent-specific value parameters for encoding altruistic coupling, which is modeled through relatedness weights inspired by Hamilton's rule. We introduce a game-theoretic structure for trajectory planning that defines a Social Nash Equilibrium, which modifies the utility of agent actions according to agent relatedness. This utility shaping causes agents to internalize the effect of their trajectory choices on teammates, encouraging lower-valued robots to accept risk when doing so benefits higher-valued agents and improves team performance. We define an exploration utility for agents that rewards area coverage and uncertainty reduction, while also penalizing redundancy and risk, enabling projected gradient-based waypoint optimization in a receding-horizon planner. Simulations show that altruistic planning reduces redundant exploration, improves inter-robot separation, and reallocates risk according to agent value while maintaining comparable map coverage. We further demonstrate the approach in hardware experiments, where planned waypoints are tracked by wheeled robots using single-integrator controllers and barrier certificates.

cs.RO↗

Nash Equilibrium Learning In Large Populations With First-Order Payoff Modifications

We establish Nash equilibrium learning in large populations of noncooperative, strategic agents. Our analysis considers the broadest class to date of payoff mechanisms with first-order modifications, capable of modeling bounded rationality and anticipatory effects, averaging, or Padé delay approximations. We propose a framework that, for the first time, combines two nonstandard system-theoretic passivity notions. Our results hold for discontinuous best response dynamics alongside continuous learning rules, significantly extending prior work.

eess.SY↗

Incentive Designs for Learning Agents to Stabilize Coupled Exogenous Systems

We consider a large population of learning agents noncooperatively selecting strategies from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to stabilize at a desired equilibrium. Our approach is to design a dynamic payoff mechanism capable of shaping the population's strategy profile, thus affecting the ES's state, by offering incentives for specific strategies within budget limits. Employing system-theoretic passivity concepts, we establish conditions under which a payoff mechanism can be systematically constructed to ensure the global asymptotic stability of the ES's equilibrium. In comparison to previous approaches originally studied in the context of the so-called epidemic population games, the method proposed here allows for more realistic epidemic models and other types of ESs, such as predator-prey dynamics. The stability of the equilibrium is established with the support of a Lyapunov function, which provides useful bounds on the transient states.

eess.SY↗

Counterclockwise Dissipativity, Potential Games and Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Learning

We use system-theoretic passivity methods to study evolutionary Nash equilibria learning in large populations of agents engaged in strategic, non-cooperative interactions. The agents follow learning rules (rules for short) that capture their strategic preferences and a payoff mechanism ascribes payoffs to the available strategies. The population's aggregate strategic profile is the state of an associated evolutionary dynamical system. Evolutionary Nash equilibrium learning refers to the convergence of this state to the Nash equilibria set of the payoff mechanism. Most approaches consider memoryless payoff mechanisms, such as potential games. Recently, methods using $δ$-passivity and equilibrium independent passivity (EIP) have introduced dynamic payoff mechanisms. However, $δ$-passivity does not hold when agents follow rules exhibiting ``imitation" behavior, such as in replicator dynamics. Conversely, EIP applies to the replicator dynamics but not to $δ$-passive rules. We address this gap using counterclockwise dissipativity (CCW). First, we prove that continuous memoryless payoff mechanisms are CCW if and only if they are potential games. Subsequently, under (possibly dynamic) CCW payoff mechanisms, we establish evolutionary Nash equilibrium learning for any rule within a convex cone spanned by imitation rules and continuous $δ$-passive rules.

cs.GT↗