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Jakob Weissteiner

Publications and source records attributed to Jakob Weissteiner.

9 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them All

We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, recent work has proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most critical information from bidders to maximize efficiency. However, while the SOTA ML-based algorithms elicit bidders' preferences via value queries, ICAs that are used in practice elicit information via \emph{demand queries}. In this paper, we introduce a novel ML algorithm that provably makes use of the full information from both value and demand queries, and we show via experiments that combining both query types results in significantly better learning performance in practice. Building on these insights, we present MLHCA, a new ML-powered auction that uses value and demand queries. MLHCA significantly outperforms the previous SOTA, reducing efficiency loss by up to a factor 10, with up to 58\% fewer queries. Thus, MLHCA achieves large efficiency improvements while also reducing bidders' cognitive load, establishing a new benchmark for both practicability and efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/MLHCA.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

JUCAL: Jointly Calibrating Aleatoric and Epistemic Uncertainty in Classification Tasks

We study post-calibration uncertainty for trained ensembles of classifiers. Specifically, we consider both aleatoric (label noise) and epistemic (model) uncertainty. Among the most popular and widely used calibration methods in classification are temperature scaling (i.e., pool-then-calibrate) and conformal methods. However, the main shortcoming of these calibration methods is that they do not balance the proportion of aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. Not balancing these uncertainties can severely misrepresent predictive uncertainty, leading to overconfident predictions in some input regions while being underconfident in others. To address this shortcoming, we present a simple but powerful calibration algorithm Joint Uncertainty Calibration (JUCAL) that jointly calibrates aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. JUCAL jointly calibrates two constants to weight and scale epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties by optimizing the negative log-likelihood (NLL) on the validation/calibration dataset. JUCAL can be applied to any trained ensemble of classifiers (e.g., transformers, CNNs, or tree-based methods), with minimal computational overhead, without requiring access to the models' internal parameters. We experimentally evaluate JUCAL on various text classification tasks, for ensembles of varying sizes and with different ensembling strategies. Our experiments show that JUCAL significantly outperforms SOTA calibration methods across all considered classification tasks, reducing NLL and predictive set size by up to 15% and 20%, respectively. Interestingly, even applying JUCAL to an ensemble of size 5 can outperform temperature-scaled ensembles of size up to 50 in terms of NLL and predictive set size, resulting in up to 10 times smaller inference costs. Thus, we propose JUCAL as a new go-to method for calibrating ensembles in classification.

stat.ML↗
arXiv2024

Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction

We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from bidders. However, from a practical point of view, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that those designs elicit bidders' preferences via value queries (i.e., ``What is your value for the bundle $\{A,B\}$?''). In most real-world ICA domains, value queries are considered impractical, since they impose an unrealistically high cognitive burden on bidders, which is why they are not used in practice. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by designing an ML-powered combinatorial clock auction that elicits information from the bidders only via demand queries (i.e., ``At prices $p$, what is your most preferred bundle of items?''). We make two key technical contributions: First, we present a novel method for training an ML model on demand queries. Second, based on those trained ML models, we introduce an efficient method for determining the demand query with the highest clearing potential, for which we also provide a theoretical foundation. We experimentally evaluate our ML-based demand query mechanism in several spectrum auction domains and compare it against the most established real-world ICA: the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). Our mechanism significantly outperforms the CCA in terms of efficiency in all domains, it achieves higher efficiency in a significantly reduced number of rounds, and, using linear prices, it exhibits vastly higher clearing potential. Thus, with this paper we bridge the gap between research and practice and propose the first practical ML-powered ICA.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation

We study the course allocation problem, where universities assign course schedules to students. The current state-of-the-art mechanism, Course Match, has one major shortcoming: students make significant mistakes when reporting their preferences, which negatively affects welfare and fairness. To address this issue, we introduce a new mechanism, Machine Learning-powered Course Match (MLCM). At the core of MLCM is a machine learning-powered preference elicitation module that iteratively asks personalized pairwise comparison queries to alleviate students' reporting mistakes. Extensive computational experiments, grounded in real-world data, demonstrate that MLCM, with only ten comparison queries, significantly increases both average and minimum student utility by 7%-11% and 17%-29%, respectively. Finally, we highlight MLCM's robustness to changes in the environment and show how our design minimizes the risk of upgrading to MLCM while making the upgrade process simple for universities and seamless for their students.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment

We study the combinatorial assignment domain, which includes combinatorial auctions and course allocation. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from agents. However, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that it does not model a mechanism's uncertainty over values for not yet elicited bundles. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting a Bayesian optimization-based combinatorial assignment (BOCA) mechanism. Our key technical contribution is to integrate a method for capturing model uncertainty into an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism. Concretely, we design a new method for estimating an upper uncertainty bound that can be used to define an acquisition function to determine the next query to the agents. This enables the mechanism to properly explore (and not just exploit) the bundle space during its preference elicitation phase. We run computational experiments in several spectrum auction domains to evaluate BOCA's performance. Our results show that BOCA achieves higher allocative efficiency than state-of-the-art approaches.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2023

NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty

We study methods for estimating model uncertainty for neural networks (NNs) in regression. To isolate the effect of model uncertainty, we focus on a noiseless setting with scarce training data. We introduce five important desiderata regarding model uncertainty that any method should satisfy. However, we find that established benchmarks often fail to reliably capture some of these desiderata, even those that are required by Bayesian theory. To address this, we introduce a new approach for capturing model uncertainty for NNs, which we call Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty (NOMU). The main idea of NOMU is to design a network architecture consisting of two connected sub-NNs, one for model prediction and one for model uncertainty, and to train it using a carefully-designed loss function. Importantly, our design enforces that NOMU satisfies our five desiderata. Due to its modular architecture, NOMU can provide model uncertainty for any given (previously trained) NN if given access to its training data. We evaluate NOMU in various regressions tasks and noiseless Bayesian optimization (BO) with costly evaluations. In regression, NOMU performs at least as well as state-of-the-art methods. In BO, NOMU even outperforms all considered benchmarks.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2023

Deep Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

In this paper, we study the design of deep learning-powered iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). We build on prior work where preference elicitation was done via kernelized support vector regressions (SVRs). However, the SVR-based approach has limitations because it requires solving a machine learning (ML)-based winner determination problem (WDP). With expressive kernels (like gaussians), the ML-based WDP cannot be solved for large domains. While linear or quadratic kernels have better computational scalability, these kernels have limited expressiveness. In this work, we address these shortcomings by using deep neural networks (DNNs) instead of SVRs. We first show how the DNN-based WDP can be reformulated into a mixed integer program (MIP). Second, we experimentally compare the prediction performance of DNNs against SVRs. Third, we present experimental evaluations in two medium-sized domains which show that even ICAs based on relatively small-sized DNNs lead to higher economic efficiency than ICAs based on kernelized SVRs. Finally, we show that our DNN-powered ICA also scales well to very large CA domains.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment

Many important resource allocation problems involve the combinatorial assignment of items, e.g., auctions or course allocation. Because the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items, preference elicitation is a key challenge in these domains. Recently, researchers have proposed ML-based mechanisms that outperform traditional mechanisms while reducing preference elicitation costs for agents. However, one major shortcoming of the ML algorithms that were used is their disregard of important prior knowledge about agents' preferences. To address this, we introduce monotone-value neural networks (MVNNs), which are designed to capture combinatorial valuations, while enforcing monotonicity and normality. On a technical level, we prove that our MVNNs are universal in the class of monotone and normalized value functions, and we provide a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulation to make solving MVNN-based winner determination problems (WDPs) practically feasible. We evaluate our MVNNs experimentally in spectrum auction domains. Our results show that MVNNs improve the prediction performance, they yield state-of-the-art allocative efficiency in the auction, and they also reduce the run-time of the WDPs. Our code is available on GitHub: https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/MVNN.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Recent advances in Fourier analysis have brought new tools to efficiently represent and learn set functions. In this paper, we bring the power of Fourier analysis to the design of combinatorial auctions (CAs). The key idea is to approximate bidders' value functions using Fourier-sparse set functions, which can be computed using a relatively small number of queries. Since this number is still too large for practical CAs, we propose a new hybrid design: we first use neural networks (NNs) to learn bidders' values and then apply Fourier analysis to the learned representations. On a technical level, we formulate a Fourier transform-based winner determination problem and derive its mixed integer program formulation. Based on this, we devise an iterative CA that asks Fourier-based queries. We experimentally show that our hybrid ICA achieves higher efficiency than prior auction designs, leads to a fairer distribution of social welfare, and significantly reduces runtime. With this paper, we are the first to leverage Fourier analysis in CA design and lay the foundation for future work in this area. Our code is available on GitHub: https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/FA-based-ICAs.

cs.GT↗