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James Hsin-yu Chiang

Publications and source records attributed to James Hsin-yu Chiang.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

MOSAIC: Masked Outsourcing of Secure AI Computations

We address the challenge of securely and efficiently outsourcing AI computations from a trusted but computationally weak client to an untrusted but powerful server, in the setting where the client holds both the input and the model, and the server must learn neither. We present MOSAIC, whose core is a novel matrix-multiplication masking protocol that scales to far larger matrices than prior work, enabling the safe outsourcing of modern workloads such as large transformer inference. By introducing small amounts of noise to the multiplication result and thereby relaxing correctness, MOSAIC achieves optimal asymptotic client overhead and concrete runtimes orders of magnitude faster than prior work. Its security reduces to the decisional LWE and LPN assumptions. Because this noise accumulates across the many layers of a transformer, a key technical challenge is bounding error growth; MOSAIC addresses this with an error-scaling mechanism based on random Hadamard rotations. On large 70B transformer models, MOSAIC's perplexity is comparable to popular quantization approaches and even matches full-precision BF16 inference on HumanEval. Finally, we present an end-to-end implementation showing how ideas like MOSAIC can promise a path towards large-scale confidential AI in modern data centers. Non-confidential inference is already distributed across phase (prefill/decode), layer, and time to maximize utilization of heterogeneous hardware, using RDMA-like networking to move activations, cached KV values, and weights across nodes. MOSAIC enables scaling of confidential compute by keeping the trusted computing base (TCB) small and outsourcing the bulk of the AI computation to untrusted accelerators.

cs.CR↗

Crypto x AI, AI x Crypto: A Survey

The intersection of crypto x AI is spawning papers, products, online posts, and companies. All the surrounding buzz, though, obscures what exactly has been done, what the opportunities and challenges are, and what open questions deserve attention. This survey paper asks what AI can do for blockchain-based technologies (broadly construed as "crypto") (crypto x AI), and vice versa (AI x crypto). We systematize existing work, summarize key takeaways, highlight open research questions, and offer a perspective on pervasive industry misconceptions, concluding that AI and crypto are still in the very early stages of meaningful integration.

cs.CR↗

A theory of Automated Market Makers in DeFi

Automated market makers (AMMs) are one of the most prominent decentralized finance (DeFi) applications. AMMs allow users to trade different types of crypto-tokens, without the need to find a counter-party. There are several implementations and models for AMMs, featuring a variety of sophisticated economic mechanisms. We present a theory of AMMs. The core of our theory is an abstract operational model of the interactions between users and AMMs, which can be concretised by instantiating the economic mechanisms. We exploit our theory to formally prove a set of fundamental properties of AMMs, characterizing both structural and economic aspects. We do this by abstracting from the actual economic mechanisms used in implementations, and identifying sufficient conditions which ensure the relevant properties. Notably, we devise a general solution to the arbitrage problem, the main game-theoretic foundation behind the economic mechanisms of AMMs.

cs.FL↗

Maximizing Extractable Value from Automated Market Makers

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are decentralized applications that allow users to exchange crypto-tokens without the need for a matching exchange order. AMMs are one of the most successful DeFi use cases: indeed, major AMM platforms process a daily volume of transactions worth USD billions. Despite their popularity, AMMs are well-known to suffer from transaction-ordering issues: adversaries can influence the ordering of user transactions, and possibly front-run them with their own, to extract value from AMMs, to the detriment of users. We devise an effective procedure to construct a strategy through which an adversary can maximize the value extracted from user transactions.

cs.CR↗

SoK: Lending Pools in Decentralized Finance

Lending pools are decentralized applications which allow mutually untrusted users to lend and borrow crypto-assets. These applications feature complex, highly parametric incentive mechanisms to equilibrate the loan market. This complexity makes the behaviour of lending pools difficult to understand and to predict: indeed, ineffective incentives and attacks could potentially lead to emergent unwanted behaviours. Reasoning about lending pools is made even harder by the lack of executable models of their behaviour: to precisely understand how users interact with lending pools, eventually one has to inspect their implementations, where the incentive mechanisms are intertwined with low-level implementation details. Further, the variety of existing implementations makes it difficult to distill the common aspects of lending pools. We systematize the existing knowledge about lending pools, leveraging a new formal model of interactions with users, which reflects the archetypal features of mainstream implementations. This enables us to prove some general properties of lending pools, such as the correct handling of funds, and to precisely describe vulnerabilities and attacks. We also discuss the role of lending pools in the broader context of decentralized finance.

cs.CR↗