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James Ortiz

Publications and source records attributed to James Ortiz.

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Execution-Time Opacity Logic: A Logic for Ensuring ET-Opacity in Timed Systems

Ensuring confidentiality in Cyber-Physical Systems is critical, especially when attackers exploit execution times to infer sensitiveinformation. Traditional opacity models are inadequate for timed systems, as verifying opacity in Timed Automata is undecidable. To address this challenge, we propose Execution-Time Opacity Logic (ETOL), a new formalism that specifies opacity by requiring that for every execution satisfying a secret formula, there exists another execution of the same duration that does not satisfy it. ETOL guarantees that timing observations cannot reveal confidential agent activities. We present a decidable and efficient verification framework based on zone-based model checking, supported by a dedicated algorithm that systematically identifies duration-equivalent executions. Our approach is validated through an ATM case study, showing that ETOL enables efficient verification of execution-time confidentiality under timing attacks. We also developed a prototype tool for the ETOL logic that supports symbolic model checking over timed systems. It allows users to verify ETOL formulas based on clock-constrained execution paths.

cs.FL

A Timed Obstruction Logic for Dynamic Game Models

Real-time cybersecurity and privacy applications require reliable verification methods and system design tools to ensure their correctness. Many of these reactive real-time applications embedded in various infrastructures, such as airports, hospitals, and oil pipelines, are potentially vulnerable to malicious cyber-attacks. Recently, a growing literature has recognized Timed Game Theory as a sound theoretical foundation for modeling strategic interactions between attackers and defenders. This paper proposes Timed Obstruction Logic (TOL), an extension of Obstruction Logic (OL), a formalism for verifying specific timed games with real-time objectives unfolding in dynamic models. These timed games involve players whose discrete and continuous actions can impact the underlying timed game model. We show that TOL can be used to describe important timed properties of real-time cybersecurity games. Finally, in addition to introducing our new logic and adapting it to specify properties in the context of cybersecurity, we provide a verification procedure for TOL and show that its complexity is PSPACE-complete, meaning that it is not higher than that of classical timed temporal logics like TCTL. Thus, we increase the expressiveness of properties without incurring any cost in terms of complexity.

cs.LO

Probabilistic Obstruction Temporal Logic: a Probabilistic Logic to Reason about Dynamic Models

In this paper, we propose a novel formalism called Probabilistic Obstruction Temporal Logic (POTL), which extends Obstruction Logic (OL) by incorporating probabilistic elements. POTL provides a robust framework for reasoning about the probabilistic behaviors and strategic interactions between attackers and defenders in environments where probabilistic events influence outcomes. We explore the model checking complexity of POTL and demonstrate that it is not higher than that of Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL), making it both expressive and computationally feasible for cybersecurity and privacy applications.

cs.LO