arXiv subjects

Jamie Morgenstern

Publications and source records attributed to Jamie Morgenstern.

57 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Learning Valuation Distributions from Partial Observation

Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders' valuation distributions are known to the auctioneer, such as in the celebrated, revenue-optimal Myerson auction. However, this theory does not describe how the auctioneer comes to possess this information. Recently, Cole and Roughgarden [2014] showed that an approximation based on a finite sample of independent draws from each bidder's distribution is sufficient to produce a near-optimal auction. In this work, we consider the problem of learning bidders' valuation distributions from much weaker forms of observations. Specifically, we consider a setting where there is a repeated, sealed-bid auction with $n$ bidders, but all we observe for each round is who won, but not how much they bid or paid. We can also participate (i.e., submit a bid) ourselves, and observe when we win. From this information, our goal is to (approximately) recover the inherently recoverable part of the underlying bid distributions. We also consider extensions where different subsets of bidders participate in each round, and where bidders' valuations have a common-value component added to their independent private values.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Draft Auctions

We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium over sequential item auctions where predetermined items are auctioned at each time step. Specifically, we show that for any subadditive valuation the social welfare at equilibrium is an $O(\log^2(m))$-approximation to the optimal social welfare, where $m$ is the number of items. We also provide tighter approximation results for several subclasses. Our welfare guarantees hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria and for no-regret learning outcomes, via the smooth-mechanism framework. Of independent interest, our techniques show that in a combinatorial auction setting, efficiency guarantees of a mechanism via smoothness for a very restricted class of cardinality valuations, extend with a small degradation, to subadditive valuations, the largest complement-free class of valuations. Variants of draft auctions have been used in practice and have been experimentally shown to outperform other auctions. Our results provide a theoretical justification.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Additive Approximation for Near-Perfect Phylogeny Construction

We study the problem of constructing phylogenetic trees for a given set of species. The problem is formulated as that of finding a minimum Steiner tree on $n$ points over the Boolean hypercube of dimension $d$. It is known that an optimal tree can be found in linear time if the given dataset has a perfect phylogeny, i.e. cost of the optimal phylogeny is exactly $d$. Moreover, if the data has a near-perfect phylogeny, i.e. the cost of the optimal Steiner tree is $d+q$, it is known that an exact solution can be found in running time which is polynomial in the number of species and $d$, yet exponential in $q$. In this work, we give a polynomial-time algorithm (in both $d$ and $q$) that finds a phylogenetic tree of cost $d+O(q^2)$. This provides the best guarantees known - namely, a $(1+o(1))$-approximation - for the case $\log(d) \ll q \ll \sqrt{d}$, broadening the range of settings for which near-optimal solutions can be efficiently found. We also discuss the motivation and reasoning for studying such additive approximations.

cs.DS↗