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Jan Pennekamp

Publications and source records attributed to Jan Pennekamp.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

Hidden Secrets in the arXiv: Discovering, Analyzing, and Preventing Unintentional Information Disclosure in Source Files of Scientific Preprints

Preprints are essential for the timely and open dissemination of research. arXiv, the most widely used preprint service, takes the idea of open science one step further by not only publishing the actual preprints but also LaTeX sources and other files used to create them. As known from other contexts, such as GitHub repositories, and anecdotally exemplified for arXiv, making source code publicly available risks disclosing otherwise "hidden" information. Consequently, the public availability of paper sources raises the question of how much sensitive content is (unintentionally) disclosed through them. In this paper, we systematically answer this question for all 2.7M arXiv submissions with available source files across three dimensions of source file-induced information disclosure: (1) inclusion of unnecessary files, (2) metadata embedded in files, and (3) irrelevant content in files such as source code comments. Our analysis reveals that nearly every arXiv submission contains some form of "hidden" information. Notable findings range from links to editable web documents for internal coordination over API and private keys to complete Git histories. While different tools promise to remove such information from source files, we show that they fail to reliably achieve the intended cleaning functionality. To mitigate this situation, we provide ALC-NG to comprehensively remove files, metadata, and comments that are not needed to compile a LaTeX paper.

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Supporting Artifact Evaluation with LLMs: A Study with Published Security Research Papers

Artifact Evaluation (AE) is essential for ensuring the transparency and reliability of research, closing the gap between exploratory work and real-world deployment is particularly important in cybersecurity, particularly in IoT and CPSs, where large-scale, heterogeneous, and privacy-sensitive data meet safety-critical actuation. Yet, manual reproducibility checks are time-consuming and do not scale with growing submission volumes. In this work, we demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) can provide powerful support for AE tasks: (i) text-based reproducibility rating, (ii) autonomous sandboxed execution environment preparation, and (iii) assessment of methodological pitfalls. Our reproducibility-assessment toolkit yields an accuracy of over 72% and autonomously sets up execution environments for 28% of runnable cybersecurity artifacts. Our automated pitfall assessment detects seven prevalent pitfalls with high accuracy ($F_1$ > 92%). Hence, the toolkit significantly reduces reviewer effort and, when integrated into established AE processes, could incentivize authors to submit higher-quality and more reproducible artifacts. IoT, CPS, and cybersecurity conferences and workshops may integrate the toolkit into their peer-review processes to support reviewers' decisions on awarding artifact badges, improving the overall sustainability of the process.

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PASTA-4-PHT: A Pipeline for Automated Security and Technical Audits for the Personal Health Train

With the introduction of data protection regulations, the need for innovative privacy-preserving approaches to process and analyse sensitive data has become apparent. One approach is the Personal Health Train (PHT) that brings analysis code to the data and conducts the data processing at the data premises. However, despite its demonstrated success in various studies, the execution of external code in sensitive environments, such as hospitals, introduces new research challenges because the interactions of the code with sensitive data are often incomprehensible and lack transparency. These interactions raise concerns about potential effects on the data and increases the risk of data breaches. To address this issue, this work discusses a PHT-aligned security and audit pipeline inspired by DevSecOps principles. The automated pipeline incorporates multiple phases that detect vulnerabilities. To thoroughly study its versatility, we evaluate this pipeline in two ways. First, we deliberately introduce vulnerabilities into a PHT. Second, we apply our pipeline to five real-world PHTs, which have been utilised in real-world studies, to audit them for potential vulnerabilities. Our evaluation demonstrates that our designed pipeline successfully identifies potential vulnerabilities and can be applied to real-world studies. In compliance with the requirements of the GDPR for data management, documentation, and protection, our automated approach supports researchers using in their data-intensive work and reduces manual overhead. It can be used as a decision-making tool to assess and document potential vulnerabilities in code for data processing. Ultimately, our work contributes to an increased security and overall transparency of data processing activities within the PHT framework.

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Unconsidered Installations: Discovering IoT Deployments in the IPv6 Internet

Internet-wide studies provide extremely valuable insight into how operators manage their Internet of Things (IoT) deployments in reality and often reveal grievances, e.g., significant security issues. However, while IoT devices often use IPv6, past studies resorted to comprehensively scan the IPv4 address space. To fully understand how the IoT and all its services and devices is operated, including IPv6-reachable deployments is inevitable-although scanning the entire IPv6 address space is infeasible. In this paper, we close this gap and examine how to best discover IPv6-reachable IoT deployments. To this end, we propose a methodology that allows combining various IPv6 scan direction approaches to understand the findability and prevalence of IPv6-reachable IoT deployments. Using three sources of active IPv6 addresses and eleven address generators, we discovered 6658 IoT deployments. We derive that the available address sources are a good starting point for finding IoT deployments. Additionally, we show that using two address generators is sufficient to cover most found deployments and save time as well as resources. Assessing the security of the deployments, we surprisingly find similar issues as in the IPv4 Internet, although IPv6 deployments might be newer and generally more up-to-date: Only 39% of deployments have access control in place and only 6.2% make use of TLS inviting attackers, e.g., to eavesdrop sensitive data.

cs.NI

SoK: Evaluations in Industrial Intrusion Detection Research

Industrial systems are increasingly threatened by cyberattacks with potentially disastrous consequences. To counter such attacks, industrial intrusion detection systems strive to timely uncover even the most sophisticated breaches. Due to its criticality for society, this fast-growing field attracts researchers from diverse backgrounds, resulting in 130 new detection approaches in 2021 alone. This huge momentum facilitates the exploration of diverse promising paths but likewise risks fragmenting the research landscape and burying promising progress. Consequently, it needs sound and comprehensible evaluations to mitigate this risk and catalyze efforts into sustainable scientific progress with real-world applicability. In this paper, we therefore systematically analyze the evaluation methodologies of this field to understand the current state of industrial intrusion detection research. Our analysis of 609 publications shows that the rapid growth of this research field has positive and negative consequences. While we observe an increased use of public datasets, publications still only evaluate 1.3 datasets on average, and frequently used benchmarking metrics are ambiguous. At the same time, the adoption of newly developed benchmarking metrics sees little advancement. Finally, our systematic analysis enables us to provide actionable recommendations for all actors involved and thus bring the entire research field forward.

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Reputation Systems for Supply Chains: The Challenge of Achieving Privacy Preservation

Consumers frequently interact with reputation systems to rate products, services, and deliveries. While past research extensively studied different conceptual approaches to realize such systems securely and privacy-preservingly, these concepts are not yet in use in business-to-business environments. In this paper, (1) we thus outline which specific challenges privacy-cautious stakeholders in volatile supply chain networks introduce, (2) give an overview of the diverse landscape of privacy-preserving reputation systems and their properties, and (3) based on well-established concepts from supply chain information systems and cryptography, we further propose an initial concept that accounts for the aforementioned challenges by utilizing fully homomorphic encryption. For future work, we identify the need of evaluating whether novel systems address the supply chain-specific privacy and confidentiality needs.

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An Interdisciplinary Survey on Information Flows in Supply Chains

Supply chains form the backbone of modern economies and therefore require reliable information flows. In practice, however, supply chains face severe technical challenges, especially regarding security and privacy. In this work, we consolidate studies from supply chain management, information systems, and computer science from 2010-2021 in an interdisciplinary meta-survey to make this topic holistically accessible to interdisciplinary research. In particular, we identify a significant potential for computer scientists to remedy technical challenges and improve the robustness of information flows. We subsequently present a concise information flow-focused taxonomy for supply chains before discussing future research directions to provide possible entry points.

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Poster: Accountable Processing of Reported Street Problems

Municipalities increasingly depend on citizens to file digital reports about issues such as potholes or illegal trash dumps to improve their response time. However, the responsible authorities may be incentivized to ignore certain reports, e.g., when addressing them inflicts high costs. In this work, we explore the applicability of blockchain technology to hold authorities accountable regarding filed reports. Our initial assessment indicates that our approach can be extended to benefit citizens and authorities in the future.

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Evolving the Digital Industrial Infrastructure for Production: Steps Taken and the Road Ahead

The Internet of Production (IoP) leverages concepts such as digital shadows, data lakes, and a World Wide Lab (WWL) to advance today's production. Consequently, it requires a technical infrastructure that can support the agile deployment of these concepts and corresponding high-level applications, which, e.g., demand the processing of massive data in motion and at rest. As such, key research aspects are the support for low-latency control loops, concepts on scalable data stream processing, deployable information security, and semantically rich and efficient long-term storage. In particular, such an infrastructure cannot continue to be limited to machines and sensors, but additionally needs to encompass networked environments: production cells, edge computing, and location-independent cloud infrastructures. Finally, in light of the envisioned WWL, i.e., the interconnection of production sites, the technical infrastructure must be advanced to support secure and privacy-preserving industrial collaboration. To evolve today's production sites and lay the infrastructural foundation for the IoP, we identify five broad streams of research: (1) adapting data and stream processing to heterogeneous data from distributed sources, (2) ensuring data interoperability between systems and production sites, (3) exchanging and sharing data with different stakeholders, (4) network security approaches addressing the risks of increasing interconnectivity, and (5) security architectures to enable secure and privacy-preserving industrial collaboration. With our research, we evolve the underlying infrastructure from isolated, sparsely networked production sites toward an architecture that supports high-level applications and sophisticated digital shadows while facilitating the transition toward a WWL.

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Missed Opportunities: Measuring the Untapped TLS Support in the Industrial Internet of Things

The ongoing trend to move industrial appliances from previously isolated networks to the Internet requires fundamental changes in security to uphold secure and safe operation. Consequently, to ensure end-to-end secure communication and authentication, (i) traditional industrial protocols, e.g., Modbus, are retrofitted with TLS support, and (ii) modern protocols, e.g., MQTT, are directly designed to use TLS. To understand whether these changes indeed lead to secure Industrial Internet of Things deployments, i.e., using TLS-based protocols, which are configured according to security best practices, we perform an Internet-wide security assessment of ten industrial protocols covering the complete IPv4 address space. Our results show that both, retrofitted existing protocols and newly developed secure alternatives, are barely noticeable in the wild. While we find that new protocols have a higher TLS adoption rate than traditional protocols (7.2% vs. 0.4%), the overall adoption of TLS is comparably low (6.5% of hosts). Thus, most industrial deployments (934,736 hosts) are insecurely connected to the Internet. Furthermore, we identify that 42% of hosts with TLS support (26,665 hosts) show security deficits, e.g., missing access control. Finally, we show that support in configuring systems securely, e.g., via configuration templates, is promising to strengthen security.

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Scalable and Privacy-Focused Company-Centric Supply Chain Management

Blockchain technology promises to overcome trust and privacy concerns inherent to centralized information sharing. However, current decentralized supply chain management systems do either not meet privacy and scalability requirements or require a trustworthy consortium, which is challenging for increasingly dynamic supply chains with constantly changing participants. In this paper, we propose CCChain, a scalable and privacy-aware supply chain management system that stores all information locally to give companies complete sovereignty over who accesses their data. Still, tamper protection of all data through a permissionless blockchain enables on-demand tracking and tracing of products as well as reliable information sharing while affording the detection of data inconsistencies. Our evaluation confirms that CCChain offers superior scalability in comparison to alternatives while also enabling near real-time tracking and tracing for many, less complex products.

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A False Sense of Security? Revisiting the State of Machine Learning-Based Industrial Intrusion Detection

Anomaly-based intrusion detection promises to detect novel or unknown attacks on industrial control systems by modeling expected system behavior and raising corresponding alarms for any deviations.As manually creating these behavioral models is tedious and error-prone, research focuses on machine learning to train them automatically, achieving detection rates upwards of 99%. However, these approaches are typically trained not only on benign traffic but also on attacks and then evaluated against the same type of attack used for training. Hence, their actual, real-world performance on unknown (not trained on) attacks remains unclear. In turn, the reported near-perfect detection rates of machine learning-based intrusion detection might create a false sense of security. To assess this situation and clarify the real potential of machine learning-based industrial intrusion detection, we develop an evaluation methodology and examine multiple approaches from literature for their performance on unknown attacks (excluded from training). Our results highlight an ineffectiveness in detecting unknown attacks, with detection rates dropping to between 3.2% and 14.7% for some types of attacks. Moving forward, we derive recommendations for further research on machine learning-based approaches to ensure clarity on their ability to detect unknown attacks.

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Collaboration is not Evil: A Systematic Look at Security Research for Industrial Use

Following the recent Internet of Things-induced trends on digitization in general, industrial applications will further evolve as well. With a focus on the domains of manufacturing and production, the Internet of Production pursues the vision of a digitized, globally interconnected, yet secure environment by establishing a distributed knowledge base. Background. As part of our collaborative research of advancing the scope of industrial applications through cybersecurity and privacy, we identified a set of common challenges and pitfalls that surface in such applied interdisciplinary collaborations. Aim. Our goal with this paper is to support researchers in the emerging field of cybersecurity in industrial settings by formalizing our experiences as reference for other research efforts, in industry and academia alike. Method. Based on our experience, we derived a process cycle of performing such interdisciplinary research, from the initial idea to the eventual dissemination and paper writing. This presented methodology strives to successfully bootstrap further research and to encourage further work in this emerging area. Results. Apart from our newly proposed process cycle, we report on our experiences and conduct a case study applying this methodology, raising awareness for challenges in cybersecurity research for industrial applications. We further detail the interplay between our process cycle and the data lifecycle in applied research data management. Finally, we augment our discussion with an industrial as well as an academic view on this research area and highlight that both areas still have to overcome significant challenges to sustainably and securely advance industrial applications. Conclusions. With our proposed process cycle for interdisciplinary research in the intersection of cybersecurity and industrial application, we provide a foundation for further research.

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CoinPrune: Shrinking Bitcoin's Blockchain Retrospectively

Popular cryptocurrencies continue to face serious scalability issues due to their ever-growing blockchains. Thus, modern blockchain designs began to prune old blocks and rely on recent snapshots for their bootstrapping processes instead. Unfortunately, established systems are often considered incapable of adopting these improvements. In this work, we present CoinPrune, our block-pruning scheme with full Bitcoin compatibility, to revise this popular belief. CoinPrune bootstraps joining nodes via snapshots that are periodically created from Bitcoin's set of unspent transaction outputs (UTXO set). Our scheme establishes trust in these snapshots by relying on CoinPrune-supporting miners to mutually reaffirm a snapshot's correctness on the blockchain. This way, snapshots remain trustworthy even if adversaries attempt to tamper with them. Our scheme maintains its retrospective deployability by relying on positive feedback only, i.e., blocks containing invalid reaffirmations are not rejected, but invalid reaffirmations are outpaced by the benign ones created by an honest majority among CoinPrune-supporting miners. Already today, CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements for Bitcoin nodes by two orders of magnitude, as joining nodes need to fetch and process only 6 GiB instead of 271 GiB of data in our evaluation, reducing the synchronization time of powerful devices from currently 7 h to 51 min, with even larger potential drops for less powerful devices. CoinPrune is further aware of higher-level application data, i.e., it conserves otherwise pruned application data and allows nodes to obfuscate objectionable and potentially illegal blockchain content from their UTXO set and the snapshots they distribute.

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Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments

Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.

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Utilizing Public Blockchains for the Sybil-Resistant Bootstrapping of Distributed Anonymity Services

Distributed anonymity services, such as onion routing networks or cryptocurrency tumblers, promise privacy protection without trusted third parties. While the security of these services is often well-researched, security implications of their required bootstrapping processes are usually neglected: Users either jointly conduct the anonymization themselves, or they need to rely on a set of non-colluding privacy peers. However, the typically small number of privacy peers enable single adversaries to mimic distributed services. We thus present AnonBoot, a Sybil-resistant medium to securely bootstrap distributed anonymity services via public blockchains. AnonBoot enforces that peers periodically create a small proof of work to refresh their eligibility for providing secure anonymity services. A pseudo-random, locally replicable bootstrapping process using on-chain entropy then prevents biasing the election of eligible peers. Our evaluation using Bitcoin as AnonBoot's underlying blockchain shows its feasibility to maintain a trustworthy repository of 1000 peers with only a small storage footprint while supporting arbitrarily large user bases on top of most blockchains.

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How to Securely Prune Bitcoin's Blockchain

Bitcoin was the first successful decentralized cryptocurrency and remains the most popular of its kind to this day. Despite the benefits of its blockchain, Bitcoin still faces serious scalability issues, most importantly its ever-increasing blockchain size. While alternative designs introduced schemes to periodically create snapshots and thereafter prune older blocks, already-deployed systems such as Bitcoin are often considered incapable of adopting corresponding approaches. In this work, we revise this popular belief and present CoinPrune, a snapshot-based pruning scheme that is fully compatible with Bitcoin. CoinPrune can be deployed through an opt-in velvet fork, i.e., without impeding the established Bitcoin network. By requiring miners to publicly announce and jointly reaffirm recent snapshots on the blockchain, CoinPrune establishes trust into the snapshots' correctness even in the presence of powerful adversaries. Our evaluation shows that CoinPrune reduces the storage requirements of Bitcoin already by two orders of magnitude today, with further relative savings as the blockchain grows. In our experiments, nodes only have to fetch and process 5 GiB instead of 230 GiB of data when joining the network, reducing the synchronization time on powerful devices from currently 5 h to 46 min, with even more savings for less powerful devices.

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Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments

To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.

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