arXiv subjects

Jan Walleczek

Publications and source records attributed to Jan Walleczek.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2016

The super-indeterminism in orthodox quantum mechanics does not implicate the reality of experimenter free will

The concept of 'super-indeterminism' captures the notion that the free choice assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent's free-choice performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, "universal indeterminism"). Any additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter "freedom", "free will", or "free choice", is redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly, super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen. The concept of super-indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of "free variables" as used by John Bell. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational, effective free will theorem, one based upon the notion of "determinism without predetermination", i.e., one wherein "free variables" represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.

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arXiv2016

Is the World Local or Nonlocal? Towards an Emergent Quantum Mechanics in the 21st Century

What defines an emergent quantum mechanics (EmQM)? Can new insight be advanced into the nature of quantum nonlocality by seeking new links between quantum and emergent phenomena as described by self-organization, complexity, or emergence theory? Could the development of a future EmQM lead to a unified, relational image of the cosmos? One key motivation for adopting the concept of emergence in relation to quantum theory concerns the persistent failure in standard physics to unify the two pillars in the foundations of physics: quantum theory and general relativity theory (GRT). The total contradiction in the foundational, metaphysical assumptions that define orthodox quantum theory versus GRT might render inter-theoretic unification impossible. On the one hand, indeterminism and non-causality define orthodox quantum mechanics, and, on the other hand, GRT is governed by causality and determinism. How could these two metaphysically-contradictory theories ever be reconciled? The present work argues that metaphysical contradiction necessarily implies physical contradiction. The contradictions are essentially responsible also for the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. A common foundation may be needed for overcoming the contradictions between the two foundational theories. The concept of emergence, and the development of an EmQM, might help advance a common foundation - physical and metaphysical - as required for successful inter-theory unification.

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arXiv2016

Nonlocal quantum information transfer without superluminal signalling and communication

It is a frequent assumption that - via superluminal information transfers - superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a 'no-go' theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell's theorem, we argue that Bell employed both interpretations at different times. Bell finally pursued an explicitly operational position on non-signalling which is often associated with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie-Bohm theory. This position we refer to as "effective non-signalling". By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as "axiomatic non-signalling". In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between "axiomatic" and "effective" non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon's mathematical theory of communication. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems, which we call (1) non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) non-signification-control (NSC) theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet - at the same time - effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.

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arXiv2014

The Non-Signalling theorem in generalizations of Bell's theorem

Does "epistemic non-signalling" ensure the peaceful coexistence of special relativity and quantum nonlocality? The possibility of an affirmative answer is of great importance to deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics given recent developments towards generalizations of Bell's theorem. By generalizations of Bell's theorem we here mean efforts that seek to demonstrate the impossibility of any deterministic theories to obey the predictions of Bell's theorem, including even nonlocal hidden-variables theories such as de Broglie-Bohm theory. The present work offers arguments showing why such efforts towards generalization may fall short of their stated goal. In particular, we reject the use of the non-signalling theorem as an argument against the logical possibility of deterministic quantum theories. We proceed by presenting an entirely informal treatment of key physical and metaphysical assumptions, and of their interrelationship, in attempts seeking to generalize Bell's theorem on the basis of an ontic, foundational interpretation of the non-signalling theorem. We here argue that the non-signalling theorem must instead be viewed as an epistemic, phenomenological, or operational theorem i.e. one that refers exclusively to what epistemic agents can, or rather cannot, do. That is, we emphasize that the non-signalling theorem is a theorem about the operational inability of epistemic agents, e.g. human observers, to signal information. A major reason in favor of our conclusion is that any definition of signalling or of non-signalling invariably requires a reference to epistemic agents, and what these agents can actually measure and report; otherwise, the non-signalling theorem would equal a general "no-influence" theorem.

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