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Jannik Peters

Publications and source records attributed to Jannik Peters.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Decision Transformer for Enhancing Neural Local Search on the Job Shop Scheduling Problem

The job shop scheduling problem (JSSP) and its solution algorithms have been of enduring interest in both academia and industry for decades. In recent years, machine learning (ML) is playing an increasingly important role in advancing existing and building new heuristic solutions for the JSSP, aiming to find better solutions in shorter computation times. In this paper we build on top of a state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agent, called Neural Local Search (NLS), which can efficiently and effectively control a large local neighborhood search on the JSSP. In particular, we develop a method for training the decision transformer (DT) algorithm on search trajectories taken by a trained NLS agent to further improve upon the learned decision-making sequences. Our experiments show that the DT successfully learns local search strategies that are different and, in many cases, more effective than those of the NLS agent itself. In terms of the tradeoff between solution quality and acceptable computational time needed for the search, the DT is particularly superior in application scenarios where longer computational times are acceptable. In this case, it makes up for the longer inference times required per search step, which are caused by the larger neural network architecture, through better quality decisions per step. Thereby, the DT achieves state-of-the-art results for solving the JSSP with ML-enhanced search.

cs.AI↗

Quantifying Core Stability Relaxations in Hedonic Games

We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $α$-hedonic games, which contains previously studied variants such as fractional and additively separable hedonic games. In particular, we derive an upper bound on the maximum factor with which a blocking coalition of a certain size can improve upon an outcome in which no deviating coalition of size at most $q$ exists. Counterintuitively, we show that larger blocking coalitions might sometimes have lower improvement factors. We discuss the tightness conditions of our bound, as well as its implications on the price of anarchy of core relaxations. Our general result has direct implications for several well-studied classes of hedonic games, allowing us to prove two open conjectures by Fanelli et al. (2021) for fractional hedonic games.

cs.GT↗

Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods

We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting -- GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV) -- and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.

cs.GT↗

Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting

When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of outcomes focus on groups of agents and demand that sufficiently large and cohesive groups are ''represented'' in the sense that candidates approved by some group members are selected. Crucially, these criteria say nothing about the representation of individual agents, even if these agents are members of groups that deserve representation. In this paper, we formalize the concept of individual representation (IR) and explore to which extent, and under which circumstances, it can be achieved. We show that checking whether an IR outcome exists is computationally intractable, and we verify that all common approval-based voting rules may fail to provide IR even in cases where this is possible. We then focus on domain restrictions and establish an interesting contrast between ''voter interval'' and ''candidate interval'' preferences. This contrast can also be observed in our experimental results, where we analyze the attainability of IR for realistic preference profiles.

cs.GT↗

Margin of Victory for Weighted Tournament Solutions

Determining how close a winner of an election is to becoming a loser, or distinguishing between different possible winners of an election, are major problems in computational social choice. We tackle these problems for so-called weighted tournament solutions by generalizing the notion of margin of victory (MoV) for tournament solutions by Brill et. al to weighted tournament solutions. For these, the MoV of a winner (resp. loser) is the total weight that needs to be changed in the tournament to make them a loser (resp. winner). We study three weighted tournament solutions: Borda's rule, the weighted Uncovered Set, and Split Cycle. For all three rules, we determine whether the MoV for winners and non-winners is tractable and give upper and lower bounds on the possible values of the MoV. Further, we axiomatically study and generalize properties from the unweighted tournament setting to weighted tournaments.

cs.GT↗

Beyond Training: Optimizing Reinforcement Learning Based Job Shop Scheduling Through Adaptive Action Sampling

Learned construction heuristics for scheduling problems have become increasingly competitive with established solvers and heuristics in recent years. In particular, significant improvements have been observed in solution approaches using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). While much attention has been paid to the design of network architectures and training algorithms to achieve state-of-the-art results, little research has investigated the optimal use of trained DRL agents during inference. Our work is based on the hypothesis that, similar to search algorithms, the utilization of trained DRL agents should be dependent on the acceptable computational budget. We propose a simple yet effective parameterization, called $δ$-sampling that manipulates the trained action vector to bias agent behavior towards exploration or exploitation during solution construction. By following this approach, we can achieve a more comprehensive coverage of the search space while still generating an acceptable number of solutions. In addition, we propose an algorithm for obtaining the optimal parameterization for such a given number of solutions and any given trained agent. Experiments extending existing training protocols for job shop scheduling problems with our inference method validate our hypothesis and result in the expected improvements of the generated solutions.

cs.AI↗

Can a Few Decide for Many? The Metric Distortion of Sortition

Recent works have studied the design of algorithms for selecting representative sortition panels. However, the most central question remains unaddressed: Do these panels reflect the entire population's opinion? We present a positive answer by adopting the concept of metric distortion from computational social choice, which aims to quantify how much a panel's decision aligns with the ideal decision of the population when preferences and agents lie on a metric space. We show that uniform selection needs only logarithmically many agents in terms of the number of alternatives to achieve almost optimal distortion. We also show that Fair Greedy Capture, a selection algorithm introduced recently by Ebadian & Micha (2024), matches uniform selection's guarantees of almost optimal distortion and also achieves constant ex-post distortion, ensuring a "best of both worlds" performance.

cs.GT↗

Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspective

We study the proportional clustering problem of Chen et al. [ICML'19] and relate it to the area of multiwinner voting in computational social choice. We show that any clustering satisfying a weak proportionality notion of Brill and Peters [EC'23] simultaneously obtains the best known approximations to the proportional fairness notion of Chen et al. [ICML'19], but also to individual fairness [Jung et al., FORC'20] and the "core" [Li et al. ICML'21]. In fact, we show that any approximation to proportional fairness is also an approximation to individual fairness and vice versa. Finally, we also study stronger notions of proportional representation, in which deviations do not only happen to single, but multiple candidate centers, and show that stronger proportionality notions of Brill and Peters [EC'23] imply approximations to these stronger guarantees.

cs.LG↗

Completing Priceable Committees: Utilitarian and Representation Guarantees for Proportional Multiwinner Voting

When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of represented voters) of the selected committee. Previous work has studied the impact on utilitarian welfare and coverage when requiring the committee to satisfy minimal requirements such as justified representation or weak proportionality. In this paper, we consider the impact of imposing much more demanding proportionality axioms. We identify a class of voting rules that achieve strong guarantees on utilitarian welfare and coverage when combined with appropriate completions. This class is defined via a weakening of priceability and contains prominent rules such as the Method of Equal Shares. We show that committees selected by these rules (i) can be completed to achieve optimal coverage and (ii) can be completed to achieve an asymptotically optimal approximation to the utilitarian welfare if they additionally satisfy EJR+. Answering an open question of Elkind et al. (2022), we use the Greedy Justified Candidate Rule to obtain the best possible utilitarian guarantee subject to proportionality. We also consider completion methods suggested in the participatory budgeting literature and other objectives besides welfare and coverage.

cs.GT↗

Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common - but very different - ways to measure the satisfaction of a voter consider (i) the number of approved projects and (ii) the total cost of approved projects, respectively. In general, it is difficult to decide which measure of satisfaction best reflects the voters' true utilities. In this paper, we study proportionality axioms with respect to large classes of approval-based satisfaction functions. We establish logical implications among our axioms and related notions from the literature, and we ask whether outcomes can be achieved that are proportional with respect to more than one satisfaction function. We show that this is impossible for the two commonly used satisfaction functions when considering proportionality notions based on extended justified representation, but achievable for a notion based on proportional justified representation. For the latter result, we introduce a strengthening of priceability and show that it is satisfied by several polynomial-time computable rules, including the Method of Equal Shares and Phragmèn's sequential rule.

cs.GT↗

schlably: A Python Framework for Deep Reinforcement Learning Based Scheduling Experiments

Research on deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based production scheduling (PS) has gained a lot of attention in recent years, primarily due to the high demand for optimizing scheduling problems in diverse industry settings. Numerous studies are carried out and published as stand-alone experiments that often vary only slightly with respect to problem setups and solution approaches. The programmatic core of these experiments is typically very similar. Despite this fact, no standardized and resilient framework for experimentation on PS problems with DRL algorithms could be established so far. In this paper, we introduce schlably, a Python-based framework that provides researchers a comprehensive toolset to facilitate the development of PS solution strategies based on DRL. schlably eliminates the redundant overhead work that the creation of a sturdy and flexible backbone requires and increases the comparability and reusability of conducted research work.

cs.LG↗

Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are Dummett's proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) and Aziz et al.'s extended justified representation (EJR). Both guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters who have very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, these notions lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or almost cohesive. In this paper, we propose proportionality axioms that are more robust: they guarantee representation also to groups that do not qualify as solid or cohesive. Further, our novel axioms can be easily verified: Given a committee, we can check in polynomial time whether it satisfies the axiom or not. This is in contrast to many established notions like EJR, for which the corresponding verification problem is known to be intractable. In the setting with approval preferences, we propose a robust and verifiable variant of EJR and a simply greedy procedure to compute committees satisfying it. In the setting with ranked preferences, we propose a robust variant PSC, which can be efficiently verified even for general weak preferences. In the special case of strict preferences, our notion is the first known satisfiable proportionality axiom that is violated by the Single Transferable Vote (STV). We also discuss implications of our results for participatory budgeting, querying procedures, and to the notion of proportionality degree.

cs.GT↗

Online Elicitation of Necessarily Optimal Matchings

In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting preferences of agents in the house allocation model. For this we build on a recent model of Hosseini et al.[AAAI'21] and focus on the task of eliciting preferences to find matchings which are necessarily optimal, i.e., optimal under all possible completions of the elicited preferences. In particular, we follow the approach of Hosseini et al. and investigate the elicitation of necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) and necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) matchings. Most importantly, we answer their open question and give an online algorithm for eliciting an NRM matching in the next-best query model which is 3/2-competitive, i.e., it takes at most 3/2 as many queries as an optimal algorithm. Besides this, we extend this field of research by introducing two new natural models of elicitation and by studying both the complexity of determining whether a necessarily optimal matching exists in them, and by giving online algorithms for these models.

cs.GT↗

Pareto optimal and popular house allocation with lower and upper quotas

In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and an upper quota. A feasible matching assigns the applicants to the projects in such a way that a project is either matched to no applicant or to a number of applicants between its lower and upper quota. In this model we study two classic optimality concepts: Pareto optimality and popularity. We show that finding a popular matching is hard even if the maximum lower quota is 2 and that finding a perfect Pareto optimal matching, verifying Pareto optimality, and verifying popularity are all NP-complete even if the maximum lower quota is 3. We complement the last three negative results by showing that the problems become polynomial-time solvable when the maximum lower quota is 2, thereby answering two open questions of Cechlárová and Fleiner. Finally, we also study the parameterized complexity of all four mentioned problems.

cs.GT↗

Three-Dimensional Popular Matching with Cyclic Preferences

Two actively researched problem settings in matchings under preferences are popular matchings and the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. In this paper, we apply the optimality notion of the first topic to the input characteristics of the second one. We investigate the connection between stability, popularity, and their strict variants, strong stability and strong popularity in three-dimensional instances with cyclic preferences. Furthermore, we also derive results on the complexity of these problems when the preferences are derived from master lists.

cs.GT↗

Efficiency and Stability in Euclidean Network Design

Network Design problems typically ask for a minimum cost sub-network from a given host network. This classical point-of-view assumes a central authority enforcing the optimum solution. But how should networks be designed to cope with selfish agents that own parts of the network? In this setting, agents will deviate from a minimum cost network if this decreases their individual cost. Hence, designed networks should be both efficient in terms of total cost and stable in terms of the agents' willingness to accept the network. We study this novel type of Network Design problem by investigating the creation of $(β,γ)$-networks, that are in $β$-approximate Nash equilibrium and have a total cost of at most $γ$ times the optimal cost, for the recently proposed Euclidean Generalized Network Creation Game by Bilò et al. [SPAA 2019]. There, $n$ agents corresponding to points in Euclidean space create costly edges among themselves to optimize their centrality in the created network. Our main result is a simple $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$-time algorithm that computes a $(β,β)$-network with low $β$ for any given set of points. Moreover, on integer grid point sets or random point sets our algorithm achieves a low constant $β$. Besides these results, we discuss a generalization of our algorithm to instances with arbitrary, even non-metric, edge lengths. Moreover, we show that no such positive results are possible when focusing on either optimal networks or perfectly stable networks as in both cases NP-hard problems arise, there exist instances with very unstable optimal networks, and there are instances for perfectly stable networks with high total cost. Along the way, we significantly improve several results from Bilò et al. and we asymptotically resolve their conjecture about the Price of Anarchy by providing a tight bound.

cs.GT↗

Maps for Learning Indexable Classes

We study learning of indexed families from positive data where a learner can freely choose a hypothesis space (with uniformly decidable membership) comprising at least the languages to be learned. This abstracts a very universal learning task which can be found in many areas, for example learning of (subsets of) regular languages or learning of natural languages. We are interested in various restrictions on learning, such as consistency, conservativeness or set-drivenness, exemplifying various natural learning restrictions. Building on previous results from the literature, we provide several maps (depictions of all pairwise relations) of various groups of learning criteria, including a map for monotonicity restrictions and similar criteria and a map for restrictions on data presentation. Furthermore, we consider, for various learning criteria, whether learners can be assumed consistent.

cs.LG↗