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Jared Smith

Publications and source records attributed to Jared Smith.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Vision-language models know more about agriculture than they show and rubric-grounded verifications close the gap

Vision-language models (VLMs) show promise for agricultural classification, but zero-shot performance on disease, pest, damage, quality, and species identification remains poor, and it is unclear whether this reflects weak visual features or a failure to connect them to domain knowledge. We build a benchmark of 116 datasets, 834 classes, and 8,324 images spanning these tasks to isolate where the gap arises. Linear probing shows VLM vision encoders already encode agricultural features nearly as separable as a self-supervised DINOv3 baseline, ruling out weak visual representations as the primary bottleneck. Conditioning each model on an oracle reference description (an upper bound on its parametric knowledge) closes most of the gap left by an unaided lower bound, showing VLMs already know more about agriculture than they show. To close this gap without an oracle description at inference time, we structure test-time reasoning around a fixed, per-task diagnostic rubric: the model generates $K$ candidate responses and a Probabilistic Pivot Tournament (PPT) verifier, scored pairwise against the rubric, selects the best one. This nearly doubles judged F1 over the lower bound and matches or exceeds the upper bound on several tasks, notably pushing Gemma 4 E4B-it's disease F1 to 0.71, above its own upper bound of 0.60. However, the verifier's letter-scale confidence score has the opposite of its intended effect: filtering to its most confident predictions does not improve accuracy and correlates negatively with correctness across every model and pool size tested, so the score cannot serve as a measure of predictive uncertainty, and most of the observed gain likely comes from rubric-grounded generation rather than pairwise verification.

cs.CV

An Assessment of the Usability of Machine Learning Based Tools for the Security Operations Center

Gartner, a large research and advisory company, anticipates that by 2024 80% of security operation centers (SOCs) will use machine learning (ML) based solutions to enhance their operations. In light of such widespread adoption, it is vital for the research community to identify and address usability concerns. This work presents the results of the first in situ usability assessment of ML-based tools. With the support of the US Navy, we leveraged the national cyber range, a large, air-gapped cyber testbed equipped with state-of-the-art network and user emulation capabilities, to study six US Naval SOC analysts' usage of two tools. Our analysis identified several serious usability issues, including multiple violations of established usability heuristics form user interface design. We also discovered that analysts lacked a clear mental model of how these tools generate scores, resulting in mistrust and/or misuse of the tools themselves. Surprisingly, we found no correlation between analysts' level of education or years of experience and their performance with either tool, suggesting that other factors such as prior background knowledge or personality play a significant role in ML-based tool usage. Our findings demonstrate that ML-based security tool vendors must put a renewed focus on working with analysts, both experienced and inexperienced, to ensure that their systems are usable and useful in real-world security operations settings.

cs.HC

Measuring Irregular Geographic Exposure on the Internet

We examine the extent of needless traffic exposure by the routing infrastructure to nations geographically irrelevant to packet transmission. We quantify what countries are geographically logical to observe on a network path traveling between two nations through the use of convex hulls circumscribing major population centers. We then compare that to the nation states observed in over 2.5 billion measured paths. We examine both the entire geographic topology of the Internet and a subset of the topology that a Tor user would typically interact with. We find that 44% of paths across the entire geographic topology of the Internet and 33% of paths in the user experience subset unnecessarily expose traffic to one or more nations. Finally, we consider the scenario where countries exercise both legal and physical control over autonomous systems, gaining access to traffic outside of their geographic borders, but carried by organizations that fall under the AS's registered country's legal jurisdiction. At least 49% of paths in both measurements expose traffic to a geographically irrelevant country when considering both the physical and legal countries that a path traverses.

cs.NI