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Jarrod Burgh

Publications and source records attributed to Jarrod Burgh.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

On the Optimality of Mental Accounting

Mental accounting is usually explained by self-control, and two-stage budgeting by separable preferences. We propose a third explanation based on sellers' market power. A consumer who commits to spend a fixed number of dollars in a category has unit-elastic demand, so a seller in that category gains nothing by restricting quantity. A consumer who instead targets a fixed physical quantity has perfectly inelastic demand, a case that a monopolist can exploit. We characterize the commitments that remove a seller's incentive to mark up prices, and show that the fixed dollar budget is the least restrictive. We then show that what matters is budget rigidity rather than separability of preferences. A consumer who re-optimizes her category budget when prices change is insulated from market power only if categories are substitutes; a rigid budget insulates her in every case. Mental accounting can therefore be read as a commitment device against markups, a rationale that is separate from the self-control motive in the existing literature.

econ.GN↗

Risk-Averse Welfare Maximization via Marginal Treatment Effects

This paper studies risk-averse treatment allocation when individuals self-select into treatment based on unobserved characteristics. We develop a framework that combines the marginal treatment effect approach to endogenous selection with a general class of coherent risk measures that capture distributional preferences over welfare outcomes. We show that the planner's problem admits equivalent interpretations in terms of uncertainty aversion, distributional robustness, and worst-case welfare. For law-invariant coherent risk measures, we derive a Kusuoka representation that expresses the planner's objective as a weighted evaluation of different regions of the welfare distribution and characterize the resulting optimal allocation rule. We further establish finite-sample regret guarantees for empirical risk-averse policy learning, showing how the statistical difficulty of learning a policy depends on the planner's sensitivity to adverse welfare outcomes. The framework nests the risk-neutral policy learning model of \cite{Kiatagawa_Tetenov_2018} as a special case. An application to the \cite{Card1995} college proximity data demonstrates that incorporating risk aversion can lead to economically meaningful changes in optimal college admission policies.

econ.EM↗

Censored Beliefs and Wishful Thinking

We present a model elucidating wishful thinking, which comprehensively incorporates both the costs and benefits associated with biased beliefs. Our findings reveal that wishful thinking behavior can be characterized as equivalent to superquantile-utility maximization within the domain of threshold beliefs distortion cost functions. By leveraging this equivalence, we establish WT as driving decision-makers to exhibit a preference for choices characterized by skewness and increased risk. Furthermore, we discuss how our framework facilitates the study of optimistic stochastic choice and optimistic risk aversion.

econ.TH↗

Wishful Thinking is Risky Thinking

We develop a model of wishful thinking that incorporates the costs and benefits of biased beliefs. We establish the connection between distorted beliefs and risk, revealing how wishful thinking can be understood in terms of risk measures. Our model accommodates extreme beliefs, allowing wishful-thinking decision-makers to assign zero probability to undesirable states and positive probability to otherwise impossible states.

econ.TH↗