arXiv subjects

Jasper Timm

Publications and source records attributed to Jasper Timm.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

AI Security Leaderboard: Methodology, Results and Minimal Standard

The AI Security Leaderboard is an independent benchmark that ranks the safeguards of frontier AI models from least to most secure. It tests models against the FAR$.$AI Minimal Standard for Safeguards, which represents a minimum bar for security: meeting it does not guarantee a secure model, but failing to meet it guarantees a lack of state-of-the-art security. Version 1.0 covers severe misuse requests across chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats and offensive cybersecurity. In this report, we tested four leading models for universal jailbreaks in the context of this minimal standard, and found more than a hundredfold difference in security. Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found; we estimate they would likely cost more than \$14,200 to jailbreak, if it is possible with this methodology at all. Meanwhile, we found hundreds of universal jailbreaks for Grok 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro; each broke for under \$300, with universal jailbreaks in Grok's weakest domain, cybersecurity, accessible for as little as \$24. The gap is fixable: every weakness we found belongs to a known class of attack that already has a defense deployed in production models. The leaderboard will be updated on a rolling basis as new models are released, and the evaluation methodology and Minimal Standard will be periodically revised to take into account the latest capabilities and the state-of-the-art in safeguards. The leaderboard is available at leaderboard.far.ai.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Multi-Turn Jailbreaks Are Simpler Than They Seem

While defenses against single-turn jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) have improved significantly, multi-turn jailbreaks remain a persistent vulnerability, often achieving success rates exceeding 70% against models optimized for single-turn protection. This work presents an empirical analysis of automated multi-turn jailbreak attacks across state-of-the-art models including GPT-4, Claude, and Gemini variants, using the StrongREJECT benchmark. Our findings challenge the perceived sophistication of multi-turn attacks: when accounting for the attacker's ability to learn from how models refuse harmful requests, multi-turn jailbreaking approaches are approximately equivalent to simply resampling single-turn attacks multiple times. Moreover, attack success is correlated among similar models, making it easier to jailbreak newly released ones. Additionally, for reasoning models, we find surprisingly that higher reasoning effort often leads to higher attack success rates. Our results have important implications for AI safety evaluation and the design of jailbreak-resistant systems. We release the source code at https://github.com/diogo-cruz/multi_turn_simpler

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g. large-scale, targeted political manipulation). Prior work has found models possess a significant and growing persuasive capability, measured by belief changes in simulated or real users. However, these benchmarks overlook a crucial risk factor: the propensity of a model to attempt to persuade in harmful contexts. Understanding whether a model will blindly ``follow orders'' to persuade on harmful topics (e.g. glorifying joining a terrorist group) is key to understanding the efficacy of safety guardrails. Moreover, understanding if and when a model will engage in persuasive behavior in pursuit of some goal is essential to understanding the risks from agentic AI systems. We propose the Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) benchmark, that shifts the focus from persuasion success to persuasion attempts, operationalized as a model's willingness to generate content aimed at shaping beliefs or behavior. Our evaluation framework probes frontier LLMs using a multi-turn conversational setup between simulated persuader and persuadee agents. APE explores a diverse spectrum of topics including conspiracies, controversial issues, and non-controversially harmful content. We introduce an automated evaluator model to identify willingness to persuade and measure the frequency and context of persuasive attempts. We find that many open and closed-weight models are frequently willing to attempt persuasion on harmful topics and that jailbreaking can increase willingness to engage in such behavior. Our results highlight gaps in current safety guardrails and underscore the importance of evaluating willingness to persuade as a key dimension of LLM risk. APE is available at github.com/AlignmentResearch/AttemptPersuadeEval

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Tailored Truths: Optimizing LLM Persuasion with Personalization and Fabricated Statistics

Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly persuasive, demonstrating the ability to personalize arguments in conversation with humans by leveraging their personal data. This may have serious impacts on the scale and effectiveness of disinformation campaigns. We studied the persuasiveness of LLMs in a debate setting by having humans $(n=33)$ engage with LLM-generated arguments intended to change the human's opinion. We quantified the LLM's effect by measuring human agreement with the debate's hypothesis pre- and post-debate and analyzing both the magnitude of opinion change, as well as the likelihood of an update in the LLM's direction. We compare persuasiveness across established persuasion strategies, including personalized arguments informed by user demographics and personality, appeal to fabricated statistics, and a mixed strategy utilizing both personalized arguments and fabricated statistics. We found that static arguments generated by humans and GPT-4o-mini have comparable persuasive power. However, the LLM outperformed static human-written arguments when leveraging the mixed strategy in an interactive debate setting. This approach had a $\mathbf{51\%}$ chance of persuading participants to modify their initial position, compared to $\mathbf{32\%}$ for the static human-written arguments. Our results highlight the concerning potential for LLMs to enable inexpensive and persuasive large-scale disinformation campaigns.

cs.CL↗