arXiv subjects

Javier Cembrano

Publications and source records attributed to Javier Cembrano.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Faster Symmetric Rendezvous on Four or More Locations

In the symmetric rendezvous problem, two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus meet. A canonical strategy due to Anderson and Weber is known to be optimal for $n=2$ and $n=3$, but whether it remains optimal for larger values of $n$ has been an open question since 1990. We show that it does not remain optimal: for any finite $n\geq 4$, we construct an explicit symmetric strategy that achieves a strictly smaller expected meeting time than the Anderson--Weber strategy. In the Anderson--Weber strategy players stay at a dedicated home location for $n-1$ steps with a certain probability $\theta$ and with the remaining probability tour all non-home locations in a random order. Our improving strategy introduces carefully chosen correlations between consecutive tours of the non-home locations. The construction is uniform in $n$ and is guided by a graph-theoretic view in which tours correspond to permutations and meetings to edges in the complement of the derangement graph. By exploiting the clique structure of this graph we obtain a correlated strategy that improves on the Anderson--Weber strategy. For $n=4$, we give an exact expression for the improvement; for any $n\geq 5$, we obtain a lower bound on the expected improvement of $\frac{483(1-\theta)^6}{(n-1)^8}$, where $\theta \in [0,1)$ is the probability of staying at the home location. The graph-theoretic framework we introduce may be useful more widely in the design and analysis of correlated strategies for rendezvous.

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arXiv2026

Social Welfare in Budget Aggregation

We study budget aggregation under $\ell_1$-utilities, a model for collective decision making in which agents with heterogeneous preferences must allocate a public budget across a set of alternatives. Each agent reports their preferred allocation, and a mechanism selects an allocation. Early work focused on social welfare maximization, which in this setting admits truthful mechanisms, but may underrepresent minority groups, motivating the study of proportional mechanisms. However, the dominant proportionality notion, single-minded proportionality, is weak, as it only constrains outcomes when agents hold extreme preferences. To better understand proportionality and its interaction with welfare and truthfulness, we address three questions. First, how much welfare must be sacrificed to achieve proportionality? We formalize this via the price of proportionality, the best worst-case welfare ratio between a proportional mechanism and Util, the welfare-maximizing mechanism. We introduce a new single-minded proportional and truthful mechanism, UtilProp, and show that it achieves the optimal worst-case ratio. Second, how do proportional mechanisms compare in terms of welfare? We define an instance-wise welfare dominance relation and use it to compare mechanisms from the literature. In particular, we show that UtilProp welfare-dominates all previously known single-minded proportional and truthful mechanisms. Third, can stronger notions of proportionality be achieved without compromising welfare guarantees? We answer this question in the affirmative by studying decomposability and proposing GreedyDecomp, a decomposable mechanism with optimal worst-case welfare ratio. We further show that computing the welfare-dominant decomposable mechanism, UtilDecomp, is NP-hard, and that GreedyDecomp provides a 2-approximation to UtilDecomp in terms of welfare.

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arXiv2025

Impartial Selection with Predictions

We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true opinion about the eligibility of others to influence their own chances of selection. Impartial mechanisms circumvent this issue by guaranteeing that the selection of an agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. Previous research has established strong bounds on the performance of impartial mechanisms, measured by their ability to approximate the number of nominations for the most highly nominated agents. We study to what extent the performance of impartial mechanisms can be improved if they are given a prediction of a set of agents receiving a maximum number of nominations. Specifically, we provide bounds on the consistency and robustness of such mechanisms, where consistency measures the performance of the mechanisms when the prediction is accurate and robustness its performance when the prediction is inaccurate. For the general setting where up to $k$ agents are to be selected and agents nominate any number of other agents, we give a mechanism with consistency $1-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$ and robustness $1-\frac{1}{e}-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$. For the special case of selecting a single agent based on a single nomination per agent, we prove that $1$-consistency can be achieved while guaranteeing $\frac{1}{2}$-robustness. A close comparison with previous results shows that (asymptotically) optimal consistency can be achieved with little to no sacrifice in terms of robustness.

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arXiv2025

Online Proportional Apportionment

Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a one-shot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable for some settings, dynamic aspects play an important role in many others. We initiate the study of apportionment problems in an online setting. Specifically, we introduce a framework for proportional apportionment with no information about the future. In this model, time is discrete and there are $n$ parties that receive a certain share of the votes at each time step. An online algorithm needs to irrevocably assign a prescribed number of seats at each time, ensuring that each party receives its fractional share rounded up or down, and that the cumulative number of seats allocated to each party remains close to its cumulative share up to that time. We study deterministic and randomized online apportionment methods. For deterministic methods, we construct a family of adversarial instances that yield a lower bound, linear in $n$, on the worst-case deviation between the seats allocated to a party and its cumulative share. We show that this bound is best possible and is matched by a natural greedy method. As a consequence, a method guaranteeing that the cumulative number of seats assigned to each party up to any step equals its cumulative share rounded up or down (global quota) exists if and only if $n\leq 3$. Then, we turn to randomized allocations and show that, for $n\leq 3$, we can randomize over methods satisfying global quota with the additional guarantee that each party receives, in expectation, its proportional share in every step. Our proof is constructive: Any method satisfying these properties can be obtained from a flow on a recursively constructed network. We showcase the applicability of our results to obtain approximate solutions in the context of online dependent rounding procedures.

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arXiv2025

Near-feasible Fair Allocations in Two-sided Markets

We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical contribution is to show the existence of a range of near-feasible resource allocations parameterized in different model primitives to give flexibility when balancing the different policymaking requirements, allowing policy designers to fix these values according to the specific application. To construct our near-feasible allocations, we start from a fractional resource allocation and perform an iterative rounding procedure to get an integer allocation. We show a simple yet flexible and strong sufficient condition for the target feasibility deviations to guarantee that the rounding procedure succeeds, exhibiting the underlying trade-offs between market capacities, agents' demand, and fairness. To showcase our framework's modeling and algorithmic capabilities, we consider three prominent market design problems: school allocation, stable matching with couples, and political apportionment. In each of them, we obtain strengthened guarantees on the existence of near-feasible allocations capturing the corresponding fairness notions, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, and stability.

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arXiv2025

Metric Distortion in Peer Selection

In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of $k$ candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a social cost, defined as a function of the distances between voters and their chosen representatives, while the voting rule only has access to ordinal preferences. The distortion of a rule is the worst-case ratio between the social cost of its outcome and that of the optimal committee, taken over all consistent preferences and metrics. We initiate the study of metric distortion in peer selection, where voters and candidates coincide. We consider four objectives, obtained by combining two aggregation rules with two types of social cost. Under additive aggregation, an individual's cost is the sum of their distances to all committee members; under $q$-cost, it is their distance to the $q$th closest member. The overall social cost is either utilitarian, given by the sum of all individual costs, or egalitarian, given by the maximum individual cost. Surprisingly, we find that even on the line metric, peer selection retains much of the hardness of the general case: Lower bounds remain strictly larger than one for all objectives, and cases where bounded distortion is impossible in general remain so here as well. On a positive note, cases with bounded distortion in the general setting achieve better constants in peer selection. For utilitarian cost, selecting the $k$ middle agents achieves a distortion between $1$ and $2$ under additive aggregation. Under $q$-cost, we show positive results for $q=k=2$, but impossibility results largely carry over. For egalitarian cost, selecting the extremes yields an optimal distortion of $2$ under additive aggregation and for $q$-cost with $q>k/3$. Thus, while peer selection on the line metric allows better constants, fundamental hardness barriers persist.

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arXiv2024

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment

The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich literature and has become well known in the context of the US House of Representatives. In this paper, we connect the design of monotone apportionment methods to classic problems from discrete geometry and combinatorial optimization and explore the extent to which randomization can enhance proportionality. We first focus on the well-studied family of stationary divisor methods, which satisfy the strong population monotonicity property, and show that this family produces only a slightly superlinear number of different outputs as a function of the number of states. While our upper and lower bounds leave a small gap, we show that--surprisingly--closing this gap would solve a long-standing open problem from discrete geometry, known as the complexity of $k$-levels in line arrangements. The main downside of divisor methods is their violation of the quota axiom, i.e., every state should receive $\lfloor q_i\rfloor$ or $\lceil q_i\rceil$ seats, where $q_i$ is the proportional share of the state. As we show that randomizing over divisor methods can only partially overcome this issue, we propose a relaxed version of divisor methods in which the total number of seats may slightly deviate from the house size. By randomizing over them, we can simultaneously satisfy population monotonicity, quota, and ex-ante proportionality. Finally, we turn our attention to quota-compliant methods that are house-monotone, i.e., no state may lose a seat when the house size is increased. We provide a polyhedral characterization based on network flows, which implies a simple description of all ex-ante proportional randomized methods that are house-monotone and quota-compliant.

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arXiv2024

Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents

This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their items in the knapsack. This is a natural setting, e.g., when agencies select projects for funding, companies select products for sale in their shops, or hospitals schedule MRI scans for the day. A mechanism governing the packing of the knapsack is strategyproof if no agent can benefit from hiding items controlled by them to the mechanism. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof and $\alpha$-approximate in the sense that they always approximate the maximum value of the knapsack by a factor of $\alpha \in [0,1]$. First, we give a deterministic mechanism that is $\frac{1}{3}$-approximate. For the special case where all items have unit density, we design a $\frac{1}{\phi}$-approximate mechanism where $1/\phi \approx 0.618$ is the inverse of the golden ratio. This result is tight as we show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better approximation exists. We further give randomized mechanisms with approximation guarantees of $1/2$ for the general case and $2/3$ for the case of unit densities. For both cases, no strategyproof mechanism can achieve an approximation guarantee better than $1/(5\phi -7)\approx 0.917$.

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arXiv2024

Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems

How to elect the representatives in legislative bodies is a question that every modern democracy has to answer. This design task has to consider various elements so as to fulfill the citizens' expectations and contribute to the maintenance of a healthy democracy. The notion of proportionality, in that the support of a given idea in the house should be nearly proportional to its support in the general public, lies at the core of this design task. In the last decades, demographic aspects beyond political support have been incorporated by requiring that they are also fairly represented in the body, giving rise to a multidimensional version of the apportionment problem. In this work, we provide an axiomatic justification for a recently proposed notion of multidimensional proportionality and extend it to encompass two relevant constraints often used in electoral systems: a threshold on the number of votes that a list needs in order to be eligible and the election of the most-voted candidate in each district. We then build upon these results to design methods based on multidimensional proportionality. We use the Chilean Constitutional Convention election (May 15-16, 2021) results as a testing ground -- where the dimensions are given by political lists, districts, and genders -- and compare the apportionment obtained under each method according to three criteria: proportionality, representativeness, and voting power. While local and global methods exhibit a natural trade-off between local and global proportionality, including the election of most-voted candidates on top of methods based on 3-dimensional proportionality allows us to incorporate both notions while ensuring higher levels of representativeness and a balanced voting power.

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arXiv2024

Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints

Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the selection of each agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. This paper initiates the study of impartial selection problems where the nominations are weighted and the set of agents that can be selected is restricted by a combinatorial constraint. We call a selection mechanism $\alpha$-optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the total sum of weighted nominations of the selected set and that of the best feasible set of agents is at least $\alpha$. We show that a natural extension of a mechanism studied for the selection of a single agent remains impartial and $\frac{1}{4}$-optimal for general independence systems, and we generalize upper bounds from the selection of multiple agents by parameterizing them by the girth of the independence system. We then focus on independence systems defined by knapsack and matroid constraints, giving impartial mechanisms that exploit a greedy order of the agents and achieve approximation ratios of $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$, respectively, when agents cast a single nomination. For graphic matroids, we further devise an impartial and $\frac{1}{3}$-optimal mechanism for an arbitrary number of unweighted nominations.

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arXiv2024

Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by changing its vote. It is $α$-optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the votes received by the selected subset is at least a fraction of $α$ of the votes received by the subset of size $k$ with the highest number of votes. We study deterministic impartial mechanisms in a more general setting with arbitrarily weighted votes and provide the first approximation guarantee, roughly $1/\lceil 2n/k\rceil$. When the number of agents to select is large enough compared to the total number of agents, this yields an improvement on the previously best known approximation ratio of $1/k$ for the unweighted setting. We further show that our mechanism can be adapted to the impartial assignment problem, in which multiple sets of up to $k$ agents are to be selected, with a loss in the approximation ratio of $1/2$.

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arXiv2023

Impartial Rank Aggregation

We study functions that produce a ranking of $n$ individuals from $n$ such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not depend on the input ranking submitted by that individual. When $n \geq 4$, two properties concerning the quality of the output in relation to the input can be achieved in addition to impartiality: individual full rank, which requires that each individual can appear in any position of the output ranking; and monotonicity, which requires that an individual cannot move down in the output ranking if it moves up in an input ranking. When $n \geq 5$, monotonicity can be dropped to strengthen individual full rank to weak unanimity, requiring that a ranking submitted by every individual must be chosen as the output ranking. Mechanisms achieving these results can be implemented in polynomial time. Both results are best possible in terms of their dependence on $n$. The second result cannot be strengthened further to a notion of unanimity that requires agreement on pairwise comparisons to be preserved.

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arXiv2023

Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection

We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be randomized, selects one individual from a group of $n$ based on nominations among members of the group; a mechanism is impartial if the selection of an individual is independent of nominations cast by that individual, and $α$-optimal if under any circumstance the expected number of nominations received by the selected individual is at least $α$ times that received by any individual. In a many-nominations model, where individuals may cast an arbitrary number of nominations, the so-called permutation mechanism is $1/2$-optimal, and this is best possible. In the single-nomination model, where each individual casts exactly one nomination, the permutation mechanism does better and prior to this work was known to be $67/108$-optimal but no better than $2/3$-optimal. We show that it is in fact $2/3$-optimal for all $n$. This result is obtained via tight bounds on the performance of the mechanism for graphs with maximum degree $Δ$, for any $Δ$, which we prove using an adversarial argument. We then show that the permutation mechanism is not best possible; indeed, by combining the permutation mechanism, another mechanism called plurality with runner-up, and some new ideas, $2105/3147$-optimality can be achieved for all $n$. We finally give new upper bounds on $α$ for any $α$-optimal impartial mechanism. They improve on the existing upper bounds for all $n\geq 7$ and imply that no impartial mechanism can be better than $76/105$-optimal for all $n$; they do not preclude the existence of a $(3/4-\varepsilon)$-optimal impartial mechanism for arbitrary $\varepsilon>0$ if $n$ is large.

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arXiv2023

Optimal Impartial Correspondences

We study mechanisms that select a subset of the vertex set of a directed graph in order to maximize the minimum indegree of any selected vertex, subject to an impartiality constraint that the selection of a particular vertex is independent of the outgoing edges of that vertex. For graphs with maximum outdegree $d$, we give a mechanism that selects at most $d+1$ vertices and only selects vertices whose indegree is at least the maximum indegree in the graph minus one. We then show that this is best possible in the sense that no impartial mechanism can only select vertices with maximum degree, even without any restriction on the number of selected vertices. We finally obtain the following trade-off between the maximum number of vertices selected and the minimum indegree of any selected vertex: when selecting at most~$k$ vertices out of $n$, it is possible to only select vertices whose indegree is at least the maximum indegree minus $\lfloor(n-2)/(k-1)\rfloor+1$.

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arXiv2022

Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion

Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic mechanism with an additive performance guarantee of $O(n^{(1+\kappa)/2})$ in a setting with $n$ individuals where each individual casts $O(n^{\kappa})$ nominations, where $\kappa\in[0,1]$. For $\kappa=0$, i.e., when each individual casts at most a constant number of nominations, this bound is $O(\sqrt{n})$. This matches the best-known guarantee for randomized mechanisms and a single nomination. For $\kappa=1$ the bound is $O(n)$. This is trivial, as even a mechanism that never selects provides an additive guarantee of $n-1$. We show, however, that it is also best possible: for every deterministic impartial mechanism there exists a situation in which some individual is nominated by every other individual and the mechanism either does not select or selects an individual not nominated by anyone.

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