arXiv subjects

Jayakrishnan Nair

Publications and source records attributed to Jayakrishnan Nair.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Sequence prediction under a lying oracle

We consider the problem of sequential prediction of an $m$-ary sequence, where at each epoch, (i) the environment selects an outcome from an $m$-ary alphabet, (ii) the learner selects a probability distribution over the same alphabet (unaware of the outcome generated by the environment), and finally, (iii) the learner incurs a cost that depends on the probability assigned to the outcome. The cost function we consider captures the complexity of predicting the outcome generated by the environment, in a scenario where the aforementioned prediction is performed via comparative queries to a lying oracle. We consider both stochastic and adversarial environments, propose algorithms for both settings, and establish logarithmic upper bounds on their regret.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

MDPs with a State Sensing Cost

In many practical sequential decision-making problems, tracking the state of the environment incurs a sensing/communication/computation cost. In these settings, the agent's interaction with its environment includes the additional component of deciding when to sense the state, in a manner that balances the value associated with optimal (state-specific) actions and the cost of sensing. We formulate this as an expected discounted cost Markov Decision Process (MDP), wherein the agent incurs an additional cost for sensing its next state, but has the option to take actions while remaining `blind' to the system state. We pose this problem as a classical discounted cost MDP with an expanded (countably infinite) state space. While computing the optimal policy for this MDP is intractable in general, we derive lower bounds on the optimal value function, which allow us to bound the suboptimality gap of any policy. We also propose a computationally efficient algorithm SPI, based on policy improvement, which in practice performs close to the optimal policy. Finally, we benchmark against the state-of-the-art via a numerical case study.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Influence of Recommender Systems on Users: A Dynamical Systems Analysis

We analyze the unintended effects that recommender systems have on the preferences of users that they are learning. We consider a contextual multi-armed bandit recommendation algorithm that learns optimal product recommendations based on user and product attributes. It is well known that the sequence of recommendations affects user preferences. However, typical learning algorithms treat the user attributes as static and disregard the impact of their recommendations on user preferences. Our interest is to analyze the effect of this mismatch between the model assumption of a static environment and the reality of an evolving environment affected by the recommendations. To perform this analysis, we introduce a model for the coupled evolution of a linear bandit recommendation system and its users, whose preferences are drawn towards the recommendations made by the algorithm. We describe a method, that is grounded in stochastic approximation theory, to come up with a dynamical system model that asymptotically approximates the mean behavior of the stochastic model. The resulting dynamical system captures the coupled evolution of the population preferences and the learning algorithm. Analyzing this dynamical system gives insight into the long-term properties of user preferences and the learning algorithm. Under certain conditions, we show that the RS is able to learn the population preferences in spite of the model mismatch. We discuss and characterize the relation between various parameters of the model and the long term preferences of users in this work. A key observation is that the exploration-exploitation tradeoff used by the recommendation algorithm significantly affects the long term preferences of users. Algorithms that exploit more can polarize user preferences, leading to the well-known filter bubble phenomenon.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Equilibrium Cycle: A "Dynamic" Equilibrium

In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, an equilibrium cycle is a set-valued solution concept that can be demonstrated even in games where best responses do not exist (for example, in discontinuous games). The equilibrium cycle identifies a Cartesian product set of action profiles that satisfies three important properties: stability against external deviations, instability against internal deviations, and minimality. This set-valued equilibrium concept generalizes the classical notion of the minimal curb set to discontinuous games. In finite games, the equilibrium cycle is related to strongly connected sink components of the best response graph.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition

We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact sequentially with the menu following a cascade click model, and their purchase decisions are influenced by price sensitivity and positions of various items in the menu. We model the seller-platform interaction as a Stackelberg game with sellers as leaders and consider two different games depending on whether the prices are set by the platform or prefixed by the sellers. It is complicated to find the optimal policy of the platform in complete generality; hence, we solve the problem in an important asymptotic regime. The core contribution of this paper lies in characterizing the equilibrium structure of the limit game. We show that when sellers are of different strengths, the standard Nash equilibrium does not exist due to discontinuities in utilities. We instead establish the existence of a novel equilibrium solution, namely `$μ$-connected equilibrium cycle' ($μ$-EC), which captures oscillatory strategic responses at the equilibrium. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best responses, this is a set-valued solution concept of connected components. This novel equilibrium concept identifies a Cartesian product set of connected action profiles in the continuous action space that satisfies four important properties: stability against external deviations, no external chains, instability against internal deviations, and minimality. We extend a recently introduced solution concept equilibrium cycle to include stability against measure-zero violations and, by avoiding topological difficulties to propose $μ$-EC.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Blotto on the Ballot: A Ballot Stuffing Blotto Game

We consider the following Colonel Blotto game between parties $P_1$ and $P_A.$ $P_1$ deploys a non negative number of troops across $J$ battlefields, while $P_A$ chooses $K,$ $K < J,$ battlefields to remove all of $P_1$'s troops from the chosen battlefields. $P_1$ has the objective of maximizing the number of surviving troops while $P_A$ wants to minimize it. Drawing an analogy with ballot stuffing by a party contesting an election and the countermeasures by the Election Commission to negate that, we call this the Ballot Stuffing Game. For this zero-sum resource allocation game, we obtain the set of Nash equilibria as a solution to a convex combinatorial optimization problem. We analyze this optimization problem and obtain insights into the several non trivial features of the equilibrium behavior. These features in turn allows to describe the structure of the solutions and efficient algorithms to obtain then. The model is described as ballot stuffing game in a plebiscite but has applications in security and auditing games. The results are extended to a parliamentary election model. Numerical examples illustrate applications of the game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

On the interplay between pricing, competition and QoS in ride-hailing

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a fixed rate, while the arrival process of (price-sensitive) passengers is split across the two platforms based on Quality of Service (QoS) considerations. As a benchmark, we also consider a monopolistic scenario, where each platform gets half the market share irrespective of its pricing strategy. The key novelty of our formulation is that the total market share is fixed across the platforms. The game thus captures the competition between the platforms over market share, with pricing being the lever used by each platform to influence its share of the market. The market share split is modeled via two different QoS metrics: (i) probability that an arriving passenger obtains a ride, and (ii) the average passenger pick-up time. The platform aims to maximize the rate of revenue generated from matching drivers and passengers. In each of the above settings, we analyse the equilibria associated with the game in certain limiting regimes. We also show that these equilibria remain relevant in the more practically meaningful 'pre-limit.' Interestingly, we show that for a certain range of system parameters, no pure Nash equilibrium exists. Instead, we demonstrate a novel solution concept called an \textit{equilibrium cycle}, which has interesting dynamic connotations. Our results highlight the interplay between competition, passenger-side price sensitivity, and passenger/driver arrival rates.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Representative Arm Identification: A fixed confidence approach to identify cluster representatives

We study the representative arm identification (RAI) problem in the multi-armed bandits (MAB) framework, wherein we have a collection of arms, each associated with an unknown reward distribution. An underlying instance is defined by a partitioning of the arms into clusters of predefined sizes, such that for any $j > i$, all arms in cluster $i$ have a larger mean reward than those in cluster $j$. The goal in RAI is to reliably identify a certain prespecified number of arms from each cluster, while using as few arm pulls as possible. The RAI problem covers as special cases several well-studied MAB problems such as identifying the best arm or any $M$ out of the top $K$, as well as both full and coarse ranking. We start by providing an instance-dependent lower bound on the sample complexity of any feasible algorithm for this setting. We then propose two algorithms, based on the idea of confidence intervals, and provide high probability upper bounds on their sample complexity, which orderwise match the lower bound. Finally, we do an empirical comparison of both algorithms along with an LUCB-type alternative on both synthetic and real-world datasets, and demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed schemes in most cases.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Capacity Provisioning Motivated Online Non-Convex Optimization Problem with Memory and Switching Cost

An online non-convex optimization problem is considered where the goal is to minimize the flow time (total delay) of a set of jobs by modulating the number of active servers, but with a switching cost associated with changing the number of active servers over time. Each job can be processed by at most one fixed speed server at any time. Compared to the usual online convex optimization (OCO) problem with switching cost, the objective function considered is non-convex and more importantly, at each time, it depends on all past decisions and not just the present one. Both worst-case and stochastic inputs are considered; for both cases, competitive algorithms are derived.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Fixed confidence community mode estimation

Our aim is to estimate the largest community (a.k.a., mode) in a population composed of multiple disjoint communities. This estimation is performed in a fixed confidence setting via sequential sampling of individuals with replacement. We consider two sampling models: (i) an identityless model, wherein only the community of each sampled individual is revealed, and (ii) an identity-based model, wherein the learner is able to discern whether or not each sampled individual has been sampled before, in addition to the community of that individual. The former model corresponds to the classical problem of identifying the mode of a discrete distribution, whereas the latter seeks to capture the utility of identity information in mode estimation. For each of these models, we establish information theoretic lower bounds on the expected number of samples needed to meet the prescribed confidence level, and propose sound algorithms with a sample complexity that is provably asymptotically optimal. Our analysis highlights that identity information can indeed be utilized to improve the efficiency of community mode estimation.

math.ST↗

arXiv2023

Best Arm Identification in Bandits with Limited Precision Sampling

We study best arm identification in a variant of the multi-armed bandit problem where the learner has limited precision in arm selection. The learner can only sample arms via certain exploration bundles, which we refer to as boxes. In particular, at each sampling epoch, the learner selects a box, which in turn causes an arm to get pulled as per a box-specific probability distribution. The pulled arm and its instantaneous reward are revealed to the learner, whose goal is to find the best arm by minimising the expected stopping time, subject to an upper bound on the error probability. We present an asymptotic lower bound on the expected stopping time, which holds as the error probability vanishes. We show that the optimal allocation suggested by the lower bound is, in general, non-unique and therefore challenging to track. We propose a modified tracking-based algorithm to handle non-unique optimal allocations, and demonstrate that it is asymptotically optimal. We also present non-asymptotic lower and upper bounds on the stopping time in the simpler setting when the arms accessible from one box do not overlap with those of others.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

On the ubiquity of duopolies in constant sum congestion games

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. In fact, under classical notions of stability (defined via blocking by any coalition), we show that no partition is stable. This motivates us to introduce more restricted (and relevant) notions of blocking; interestingly, we find that the stable configurations under these novel notions of stability are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. Furthermore, we completely characterise the stable duopolies in heavy and light traffic regimes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Constrained regret minimization for multi-criterion multi-armed bandits

We consider a stochastic multi-armed bandit setting and study the problem of constrained regret minimization over a given time horizon. Each arm is associated with an unknown, possibly multi-dimensional distribution, and the merit of an arm is determined by several, possibly conflicting attributes. The aim is to optimize a 'primary' attribute subject to user-provided constraints on other 'secondary' attributes. We assume that the attributes can be estimated using samples from the arms' distributions, and that the estimators enjoy suitable concentration properties. We propose an algorithm called Con-LCB that guarantees a logarithmic regret, i.e., the average number of plays of all non-optimal arms is at most logarithmic in the horizon. The algorithm also outputs a Boolean flag that correctly identifies, with high probability, whether the given instance is feasible/infeasible with respect to the constraints. We also show that Con-LCB is optimal within a universal constant, i.e., that more sophisticated algorithms cannot do much better universally. Finally, we establish a fundamental trade-off between regret minimization and feasibility identification. Our framework finds natural applications, for instance, in financial portfolio optimization, where risk constrained maximization of expected return is meaningful.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Constrained Pure Exploration Multi-Armed Bandits with a Fixed Budget

We consider a constrained, pure exploration, stochastic multi-armed bandit formulation under a fixed budget. Each arm is associated with an unknown, possibly multi-dimensional distribution and is described by multiple attributes that are a function of this distribution. The aim is to optimize a particular attribute subject to user-defined constraints on the other attributes. This framework models applications such as financial portfolio optimization, where it is natural to perform risk-constrained maximization of mean return. We assume that the attributes can be estimated using samples from the arms' distributions and that these estimators satisfy suitable concentration inequalities. We propose an algorithm called \textsc{Constrained-SR} based on the Successive Rejects framework, which recommends an optimal arm and flags the instance as being feasible or infeasible. A key feature of this algorithm is that it is designed on the basis of an information theoretic lower bound for two-armed instances. We characterize an instance-dependent upper bound on the probability of error under \textsc{Constrained-SR}, that decays exponentially with respect to the budget. We further show that the associated decay rate is nearly optimal relative to an information theoretic lower bound in certain special cases.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Pricing, competition and market segmentation in ride hailing

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a fixed rate, while the arrival process of passengers is split across the two providers based on QoS considerations. We also consider two monopolistic scenarios: (i) each platform has half the market share, and (ii) the platforms merge into a single entity, serving the entire passenger base using their combined driver resources. The key novelty of our formulation is that the total market share is fixed across the platforms. The game thus captures the competition among the platforms over market share, which is modeled using two different Quality of Service (QoS) metrics: (i) probability of driver availability, and (ii) probability that an arriving passenger takes a ride. The objective of the platforms is to maximize the profit generated from matching drivers and passengers. In each of the above settings, we analyse the equilibria associated with the game. Interestingly, under the second QoS metric, we show that for a certain range of parameters, no Nash equilibrium exists. Instead, we demonstrate a new solution concept called an equilibrium cycle. Our results highlight the interplay between competition, cooperation, passenger-side price sensitivity, and passenger/driver arrival rates.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Non-asymptotic near optimal algorithms for two sided matchings

A two-sided matching system is considered, where servers are assumed to arrive at a fixed rate, while the arrival rate of customers is modulated via a price-control mechanism. We analyse a loss model, wherein customers who are not served immediately upon arrival get blocked, as well as a queueing model, wherein customers wait in a queue until they receive service. The objective is to maximize the platform profit generated from matching servers and customers, subject to quality of service constraints, such as the expected wait time of servers in the loss system model, and the stability of the customer queue in the queuing model. For the loss system, subject to a certain relaxation, we show that the optimal policy has a bang-bang structure. We also derive approximation guarantees for simple pricing policies. For the queueing system, we propose a simple bi-modal matching strategy and show that it achieves near optimal profit.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Unsupervised Crowdsourcing with Accuracy and Cost Guarantees

We consider the problem of cost-optimal utilization of a crowdsourcing platform for binary, unsupervised classification of a collection of items, given a prescribed error threshold. Workers on the crowdsourcing platform are assumed to be divided into multiple classes, based on their skill, experience, and/or past performance. We model each worker class via an unknown confusion matrix, and a (known) price to be paid per label prediction. For this setting, we propose algorithms for acquiring label predictions from workers, and for inferring the true labels of items. We prove that if the number of (unlabeled) items available is large enough, our algorithms satisfy the prescribed error thresholds, incurring a cost that is near-optimal. Finally, we validate our algorithms, and some heuristics inspired by them, through an extensive case study.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Statistically Robust, Risk-Averse Best Arm Identification in Multi-Armed Bandits

Traditional multi-armed bandit (MAB) formulations usually make certain assumptions about the underlying arms' distributions, such as bounds on the support or their tail behaviour. Moreover, such parametric information is usually 'baked' into the algorithms. In this paper, we show that specialized algorithms that exploit such parametric information are prone to inconsistent learning performance when the parameter is misspecified. Our key contributions are twofold: (i) We establish fundamental performance limits of statistically robust MAB algorithms under the fixed-budget pure exploration setting, and (ii) We propose two classes of algorithms that are asymptotically near-optimal. Additionally, we consider a risk-aware criterion for best arm identification, where the objective associated with each arm is a linear combination of the mean and the conditional value at risk (CVaR). Throughout, we make a very mild 'bounded moment' assumption, which lets us work with both light-tailed and heavy-tailed distributions within a unified framework.

cs.LG↗