arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Jean-Michel Lasry.
We study an infinite horizon stochastic optimal control problem by means of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The problem we are studying has the particularity of having a discount factor which can take both signs, depending on the value of the state.
Considering a simple economy, we derive a new Hamilton-Jacobi equation which is satisfied by the value of a ''bubble'' asset. We then show, by providing a rigorous mathematical analysis of this equation, that a unique non-zero stable solution exists under certain assumptions. The economic interpretation of this result is that, if the bubble asset can produce more stable returns than fiat money, agents protect themselves from hazardous situations through the bubble asset, thus forming a bubble's consensus value. Our mathematical analysis uses different ideas coming from the study of semi-linear elliptic equations.
This paper is the second of a series devoted to the study of the dynamics of the spectrum of large random matrices. We study general extensions of the partial differential equation arising to characterize the limit spectral measure of the Dyson Brownian motion. We provide a regularizing result for those generalizations. We also show that several results of part I extend to cases in which there is no spectral dominance property. We then provide several modeling extensions of such models as well as several identities for the Dyson Brownian motion.
In the first part of this paper, we derive an infinite dimensional partial differential equation which describes an economic equilibrium in a model of storage which includes an infinite number of non-atomic agents. This equation has the form of a mean field game master equation. The second part of the paper is devoted to the mathematical study of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation from which the previous equation derives. This last equation is both singular and set on a Hilbert space and thus raises new mathematical difficulties.
We develop a theory of existence and uniqueness of solutions of MFG master equations when the initial condition is Lipschitz continuous. Namely, we show that as long as the solution of the master equation is Lipschitz continuous in space, it is uniquely defined. Because we do not impose any structural assumptions, such as monotonicity for instance, there is a maximal time of existence for the notion of solution we provide. We analyze three cases: the case of a finite state space, the case of master equation set on a Hilbert space, and finally on the set of probability measures, all in cases involving common noises. In the last case, the Lipschitz continuity we refer to is on the gradient of the value function with respect to the state variable of the player.
The celebrated Krusel-Smith growth model is an important example of a Mean Field Game with a common noise. The Mean Field Game is encoded in the master equation, a partial differential equation satisfied by the value of the game which depends on the whole distribution of states. The latter equation is therefore posed in an infinite dimensional space. This makes the numerical simulations quite challenging. However, Krusell and Smith conjectured that the value function of the game mostly depends on the state distribution through low dimensional quantities. In this paper, we wish to propose a numerical method for approximating the solutions of the master equation arising in Krusell-Smith model, and for adaptively identifying low-dimensional variables which retain an important part of the information. This new numerical framework is based on a semi-Lagrangian method and uses neural networks as an important ingredient.
This paper presents a novel approach to characterize the dynamics of the limit spectrum of large random matrices. This approach is based upon the notion we call "spectral dominance". In particular, we show that the limit spectral measure can be determined as the derivative of the unique viscosity solution of a partial integro-differential equation. This also allows to make general and "short" proofs for the convergence problem. We treat the cases of Dyson Brownian motions, Wishart processes and present a general class of models for which this characterization holds.
We present examples of equations arising in the theory of mean field games that can be reduced to a system in smaller dimensions. Such examples come up in certain applications, and they can be used as modeling tools to numerically approximate more complicated problems. General conditions that bring about reduction phenomena are presented in both the finite and infinite state-space cases. We also compare solutions of equations with noise with their reduced versions in a small-noise expansion.
This is a work in progress. The aim is to propose a plausible mechanism for the short term dynamics of the oil market based on the interaction of economic agents. This is a theoretical research which by no means aim at describing all the aspects of the oil market. In particular, we use the tools and terminology of game theory, but we do not claim that this game actually exists in the real world. In parallel, we are currently studying and calibrating a long term model for the oil industry, which addresses the interactions of a monopolists with a competitive fringe of small producers. It is the object of another paper that will be available soon. The present premiminary version does not contain all the economic arguments and all the connections with our long term model. It mostly addresses the description of the model, the equations and numerical simulations focused on the oil industry short term dynamics. A more complete version will be available soon.
We present an analysis of the Proof-of-Work consensus algorithm, used on the Bitcoin blockchain, using a Mean Field Game framework. Using a master equation, we provide an equilibrium characterization of the total computational power devoted to mining the blockchain (hashrate). From a simple setting we show how the master equation approach allows us to enrich the model by relaxing most of the simplifying assumptions. The essential structure of the game is preserved across all the enrichments. In deterministic settings, the hashrate ultimately reaches a steady state in which it increases at the rate of technological progress. In stochastic settings, there exists a target for the hashrate for every possible random state. As a consequence, we show that in equilibrium the security of the underlying blockchain is either $i)$ constant, or $ii)$ increases with the demand for the underlying cryptocurrency.
We present results of existence, regularity and uniqueness of solutions of the master equation associated with the mean field planning problem in the finite state space case, in the presence of a common noise. The results hold under monotonicity assumptions, which are used crucially in the different proofs of the paper. We also make a link with the trajectories induced by the solution of the master equation and start a discussion on the case of boundary conditions.
This note is concerned with a modeling question arising from the mean field games theory. We show how to model mean field games involving a major player which has a strategic advantage, while only allowing closed loop markovian strategies for all the players. We illustrate this property through three examples.
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on complex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular, Real-Time Bidding (RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions -- usually Vickrey auctions -- throughout the day for buying ad-inventory with the aim of maximizing one or several key performance indicators (KPI). The optimization problems faced by companies building bidding strategies are new and interesting for the community of applied mathematicians. In this article, we introduce a stochastic optimal control model that addresses the question of the optimal bidding strategy in various realistic contexts: the maximization of the inventory bought with a given amount of cash in the framework of audience strategies, the maximization of the number of conversions/acquisitions with a given amount of cash, etc. In our model, the sequence of auctions is modeled by a Poisson process and the \textit{price to beat} for each auction is modeled by a random variable following almost any probability distribution. We show that the optimal bids are characterized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and that almost-closed form solutions can be found by using a fluid limit. Numerical examples are also carried out.
The paper studies the convergence, as $N$ tends to infinity, of a system of $N$ coupled Hamilton-Jacobi equations, the Nash system. This system arises in differential game theory. We describe the limit problem in terms of the so-called "master equation", a kind of second order partial differential equation stated on the space of probability measures. Our first main result is the well-posedness of the master equation. To do so, we first show the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the "mean field game system with common noise", which consists in a coupled system made of a backward stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi equation and a forward stochastic Kolmogorov equation and which plays the role of characteristics for the master equation. Our second main result is the convergence, in average, of the solution of the Nash system and a propagation of chaos property for the associated "optimal trajectories".
This paper deals with a stochastic order-driven market model with waiting costs, for order books with heterogenous traders. Offer and demand of liquidity drives price formation and traders anticipate future evolutions of the order book. The natural framework we use is mean field game theory, a class of stochastic differential games with a continuum of anonymous players. Several sources of heterogeneity are considered including the mean size of orders. Thus we are able to consider the coexistence of Institutional Investors and High Frequency Traders (HFT). We provide both analytical solutions and numerical experiments. Implications on classical quantities are explored: order book size, prices, and effective bid/ask spread. According to the model, in markets with Institutional Investors only we show the existence of inefficient liquidity imbalances in equilibrium, with two symmetrical situations corresponding to what we call liquidity calls for liquidity. During these situations the transaction price significantly moves away from the fair price. However this macro phenomenon disappears in markets with both Institutional Investors and HFT, although a more precise study shows that the benefits of the new situation go to HFT only, leaving Institutional Investors even with higher trading costs.
In spite of the growing consideration for optimal execution in the financial mathematics literature, numerical approximations of optimal trading curves are almost never discussed. In this article, we present a numerical method to approximate the optimal strategy of a trader willing to unwind a large portfolio. The method we propose is very general as it can be applied to multi-asset portfolios with any form of execution costs, including a bid-ask spread component, even when participation constraints are imposed. Our method, based on convex duality, only requires Hamiltonian functions to have $C^{1,1}$ regularity while classical methods require additional regularity and cannot be applied to all cases found in practice.