arXiv subjects

Jean-Pierre Tillich

Publications and source records attributed to Jean-Pierre Tillich.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Towards low overhead magic state distillation

Magic state distillation is a resource intensive sub-routine for quantum computation. The ratio of noisy input states to output states with error rate at most $ε$ scales as $O(\log^γ(1/ε))$ (Bravyi and Haah, PRA 2012). In a breakthrough paper, Hastings and Haah (PRL 2018) showed that it is possible to construct distillation routines with sub-logarithmic overhead, achieving $γ\approx 0.6779$ and falsifying a conjecture that $γ$ is lower bounded by $1$. They then ask whether $γ$ can be made arbitrarily close to $0$. We answer this question in the affirmative for magic state distillation routines using qudits ($d$ dimensional quantum systems).

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arXiv2018

Two attacks on rank metric code-based schemes: RankSign and an Identity-Based-Encryption scheme

RankSign [GRSZ14a] is a code-based signature scheme proposed to the NIST competition for quantum-safe cryptography [AGHRZ17] and, moreover, is a fundamental building block of a new Identity-Based-Encryption (IBE) [GHPT17a]. This signature scheme is based on the rank metric and enjoys remarkably small key sizes, about 10KBytes for an intended level of security of 128 bits. Unfortunately we will show that all the parameters proposed for this scheme in [AGHRZ17] can be broken by an algebraic attack that exploits the fact that the augmented LRPC codes used in this scheme have very low weight codewords. Therefore, without RankSign the IBE cannot be instantiated at this time. As a second contribution we will show that the problem is deeper than finding a new signature in rank-based cryptography, we also found an attack on the generic problem upon which its security reduction relies. However, contrarily to the RankSign scheme, it seems that the parameters of the IBE scheme could be chosen in order to avoid our attack. Finally, we have also shown that if one replaces the rank metric in the [GHPT17a] IBE scheme by the Hamming metric, then a devastating attack can be found.

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arXiv2018

Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

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arXiv2018

Attack on the Edon-K Key Encapsulation Mechanism

The key encapsulation mechanism Edon-K was proposed in response to the call for post-quantum cryptography standardization issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST). This scheme is inspired by the McEliece scheme but uses another family of codes defined over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ instead of $\mathbb{F}_2$ and is not based on the Hamming metric. It allows significantly shorter public keys than the McEliece scheme. In this paper, we give a polynomial time algorithm that recovers the encapsulated secret. This attack makes the scheme insecure for the intended use. We obtain this result by observing that recovering the error in the McEliece scheme corresponding to Edon-K can be viewed as a decoding problem for the rank-metric. We show that the code used in Edon-K is in fact a super-code of a Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) code of very small rank (1 or 2). A suitable parity-check matrix for the super-code of such low rank can be easily derived from for the public key. We then use this parity-check matrix in a decoding algorithm that was devised for LRPC codes to recover the error. Finally we explain how we decapsulate the secret once we have found the error.

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arXiv2018

The decoding failure probability of MDPC codes

Moderate Density Parity Check (MDPC) codes are defined here as codes which have a parity-check matrix whose row weight is $O(\sqrt{n})$ where $n$ is the length $n$ of the code. They can be decoded like LDPC codes but they decode much less errors than LDPC codes: the number of errors they can decode in this case is of order $Θ(\sqrt{n})$. Despite this fact they have been proved very useful in cryptography for devising key exchange mechanisms. They have also been proposed in McEliece type cryptosystems. However in this case, the parameters that have been proposed in \cite{MTSB13} were broken in \cite{GJS16}. This attack exploits the fact that the decoding failure probability is non-negligible. We show here that this attack can be thwarted by choosing the parameters in a more conservative way. We first show that such codes can decode with a simple bit-flipping decoder any pattern of $O\left(\frac{\sqrt{n} \log \log n}{\log n}\right)$ errors. This avoids the previous attack at the cost of significantly increasing the key size of the scheme. We then show that under a very reasonable assumption the decoding failure probability decays almost exponentially with the codelength with just two iterations of bit-flipping. With an additional assumption it has even been proved that it decays exponentially with an unbounded number of iterations and we show that in this case the increase of the key size which is required for resisting to the attack of \cite{GJS16} is only moderate.

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arXiv2017

The problem with the SURF scheme

There is a serious problem with one of the assumptions made in the security proof of the SURF scheme. This problem turns out to be easy in the regime of parameters needed for the SURF scheme to work. We give afterwards the old version of the paper for the reader's convenience.

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arXiv2017

Quantum Information Set Decoding Algorithms

The security of code-based cryptosystems such as the McEliece cryptosystem relies primarily on the difficulty of decoding random linear codes. The best decoding algorithms are all improvements of an old algorithm due to Prange: they are known under the name of information set decoding techniques. It is also important to assess the security of such cryptosystems against a quantum computer. This research thread started in Overbeck and Sendrier's 2009 survey on code-based cryptography, and the best algorithm to date has been Bernstein's quantising of the simplest information set decoding algorithm, namely Prange's algorithm. It consists in applying Grover's quantum search to obtain a quadratic speed-up of Prange's algorithm. In this paper, we quantise other information set decoding algorithms by using quantum walk techniques which were devised for the subset-sum problem by Bernstein, Jeffery, Lange and Meurer. This results in improving the worst-case complexity of $2^{0.06035n}$ of Bernstein's algorithm to $2^{0.05869n}$ with the best algorithm presented here (where $n$ is the codelength).

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arXiv2017

Statistical Decoding

The security of code-based cryptography relies primarily on the hardness of generic decoding with linear codes. The best generic decoding algorithms are all improvements of an old algorithm due to Prange: they are known under the name of information set decoding techniques (ISD). A while ago a generic decoding algorithm which does not belong to this family was proposed: statistical decoding. It is a randomized algorithm that requires the computation of a large set of parity-check equations of moderate weight. We solve here several open problems related to this decoding algorithm. We give in particular the asymptotic complexity of this algorithm, give a rather efficient way of computing the parity-check equations needed for it inspired by ISD techniques and give a lower bound on its complexity showing that when it comes to decoding on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound it can never be better than Prange's algorithm.

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arXiv2017

Attaining Capacity with Algebraic Geometry Codes through the $(U|U+V)$ Construction and Koetter-Vardy Soft Decoding

In this paper we show how to attain the capacity of discrete symmetric channels with polynomial time decoding complexity by considering iterated $(U|U+V)$ constructions with Reed-Solomon code or algebraic geometry code components. These codes are decoded with a recursive computation of the {\em a posteriori} probabilities of the code symbols together with the Koetter-Vardy soft decoder used for decoding the code components in polynomial time. We show that when the number of levels of the iterated $(U|U+V)$ construction tends to infinity, we attain the capacity of any discrete symmetric channel in this way. This result follows from the polarization theorem together with a simple lemma explaining how the Koetter-Vardy decoder behaves for Reed-Solomon codes of rate close to $1$. However, even if this way of attaining the capacity of a symmetric channel is essentially the Arıkan polarization theorem, there are some differences with standard polar codes. Indeed, with this strategy we can operate succesfully close to channel capacity even with a small number of levels of the iterated $(U|U+V)$ construction and the probability of error decays quasi-exponentially with the codelength in such a case (i.e. exponentially if we forget about the logarithmic terms in the exponent). We can even improve on this result by considering the algebraic geometry codes constructed in \cite{TVZ82}. In such a case, the probability of error decays exponentially in the codelength for any rate below the capacity of the channel. Moreover, when comparing this strategy to Reed-Solomon codes (or more generally algebraic geometry codes) decoded with the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm, it does not only improve the noise level that the code can tolerate, it also results in a significant complexity gain.

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arXiv2016

RankSynd a PRNG Based on Rank Metric

In this paper, we consider a pseudo-random generator based on the difficulty of the syndrome decoding problem for rank metric codes. We also study the resistance of this problem against a quantum computer. Our results show that with rank metric it is possible to obtain fast PRNG with small public data, without considering additional structure for public matrices like quasi-cyclicity for Hamming distance.

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arXiv2016

Algebraic Properties of Polar Codes From a New Polynomial Formalism

Polar codes form a very powerful family of codes with a low complexity decoding algorithm that attain many information theoretic limits in error correction and source coding. These codes are closely related to Reed-Muller codes because both can be described with the same algebraic formalism, namely they are generated by evaluations of monomials. However, finding the right set of generating monomials for a polar code which optimises the decoding performances is a hard task and channel dependent. The purpose of this paper is to reveal some universal properties of these monomials. We will namely prove that there is a way to define a nontrivial (partial) order on monomials so that the monomials generating a polar code devised fo a binary-input symmetric channel always form a decreasing set. This property turns out to have rather deep consequences on the structure of the polar code. Indeed, the permutation group of a decreasing monomial code contains a large group called lower triangular affine group. Furthermore, the codewords of minimum weight correspond exactly to the orbits of the minimum weight codewords that are obtained from (evaluations) of monomials of the generating set. In particular, it gives an efficient way of counting the number of minimum weight codewords of a decreasing monomial code and henceforth of a polar code.

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arXiv2016

Using Reed-Solomon codes in the $\left( U\mid U+V\right)$ construction and an application to cryptography

In this paper we present a modification of Reed-Solomon codes that beats the Guruwami-Sudan $1-\sqrt{R}$ decoding radius of Reed-Solomon codes at low rates $R$. The idea is to choose Reed-Solomon codes $U$ and $V$ with appropriate rates in a $\left( U\mid U+V\right)$ construction and to decode them with the Koetter-Vardy soft information decoder. We suggest to use a slightly more general version of these codes (but which has the same decoding performances as the $\left( U\mid U+V\right)$-construction) for code-based cryptography, namely to build a McEliece scheme. The point is here that these codes not only perform nearly as well (or even better in the low rate regime) as Reed-Solomon codes, their structure seems to avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack which broke a previous McEliece proposal based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes.

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arXiv2015

Polynomial Time Attack on Wild McEliece Over Quadratic Extensions

We present a polynomial time structural attack against the McEliece system based on Wild Goppa codes from a quadratic finite field extension. This attack uses the fact that such codes can be distinguished from random codes to compute some filtration, that is to say a family of nested subcodes which will reveal their secret algebraic description.

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arXiv2015

New algorithms for decoding in the rank metric and an attack on the LRPC cryptosystem

We consider the decoding problem or the problem of finding low weight codewords for rank metric codes. We show how additional information about the codeword we want to find under the form of certain linear combinations of the entries of the codeword leads to algorithms with a better complexity. This is then used together with a folding technique for attacking a McEliece scheme based on LRPC codes. It leads to a feasible attack on one of the parameters suggested in \cite{GMRZ13}.

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arXiv2015

Quantum Expander Codes

We present an efficient decoding algorithm for constant rate quantum hypergraph-product LDPC codes which provably corrects adversarial errors of weight $Ω(\sqrt{n})$ for codes of length $n$. The algorithm runs in time linear in the number of qubits, which makes its performance the strongest to date for linear-time decoding of quantum codes. The algorithm relies on expanding properties, not of the quantum code's factor graph directly, but of the factor graph of the original classical code it is constructed from.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2015

A Polynomial-Time Attack on the BBCRS Scheme

The BBCRS scheme is a variant of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme where the hiding phase is performed by taking the inverse of a matrix which is of the form $\mathbf{T} +\mathbf{R}$ where $\mathbf{T}$ is a sparse matrix with average row/column weight equal to a very small quantity $m$, usually $m < 2$, and $\mathbf{R}$ is a matrix of small rank $z\geqslant 1$. The rationale of this new transformation is the reintroduction of families of codes, like generalized Reed-Solomon codes, that are famously known for representing insecure choices. We present a key-recovery attack when $z = 1$ and $m$ is chosen between $1$ and $1 + R + O( \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} )$ where $R$ denotes the code rate. This attack has complexity $O(n^6)$ and breaks all the parameters suggested in the literature.

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arXiv2014

Folding Alternant and Goppa Codes with Non-Trivial Automorphism Groups

The main practical limitation of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme is probably the size of its key. A famous trend to overcome this issue is to focus on subclasses of alternant/Goppa codes with a non trivial automorphism group. Such codes display then symmetries allowing compact parity-check or generator matrices. For instance, a key-reduction is obtained by taking quasi-cyclic (QC) or quasi-dyadic (QD) alternant/Goppa codes. We show that the use of such symmetric alternant/Goppa codes in cryptography introduces a fundamental weakness. It is indeed possible to reduce the key-recovery on the original symmetric public-code to the key-recovery on a (much) smaller code that has not anymore symmetries. This result is obtained thanks to a new operation on codes called folding that exploits the knowledge of the automorphism group. This operation consists in adding the coordinates of codewords which belong to the same orbit under the action of the automorphism group. The advantage is twofold: the reduction factor can be as large as the size of the orbits, and it preserves a fundamental property: folding the dual of an alternant (resp. Goppa) code provides the dual of an alternant (resp. Goppa) code. A key point is to show that all the existing constructions of alternant/Goppa codes with symmetries follow a common principal of taking codes whose support is globally invariant under the action of affine transformations (by building upon prior works of T. Berger and A. D{ü}r). This enables not only to present a unified view but also to generalize the construction of QC, QD and even quasi-monoidic (QM) Goppa codes. All in all, our results can be harnessed to boost up any key-recovery attack on McEliece systems based on symmetric alternant or Goppa codes, and in particular algebraic attacks.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2014

Distinguisher-Based Attacks on Public-Key Cryptosystems Using Reed-Solomon Codes

Because of their interesting algebraic properties, several authors promote the use of generalized Reed-Solomon codes in cryptography. Niederreiter was the first to suggest an instantiation of his cryptosystem with them but Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that this choice is insecure. Wieschebrink proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which consists in concatenating a few random columns to a generator matrix of a secretly chosen generalized Reed-Solomon code. More recently, new schemes appeared which are the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Bogdanov and Lee, and a variation of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et \textit{al.} which hides the generalized Reed-Solomon code by means of matrices of very low rank. In this work, we show how to mount key-recovery attacks against these public-key encryption schemes. We use the concept of distinguisher which aims at detecting a behavior different from the one that one would expect from a random code. All the distinguishers we have built are based on the notion of component-wise product of codes. It results in a powerful tool that is able to recover the secret structure of codes when they are derived from generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Lastly, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack by building a filtration which enables to completely recover the support and the non-zero scalars defining the secret generalized Reed-Solomon code.

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