arXiv subjects

Jeenal Chaudhary

Publications and source records attributed to Jeenal Chaudhary.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

TriCalRAG: A Three-Strategy, Retrieval-Augmented Benchmark for On-Premise LLM-Based Root Cause Analysis in AIOps

Operational logs create a need for private, resource-efficient incident analysis, but aggregate detection scores can conceal severe prediction bias. We present TriCalRAG, a reproducible benchmark for log-anomaly detection with generated root-cause and remediation outputs across BGL, HDFS, Thunderbird, and OpenStack. The primary evaluation compares Qwen2.5-14B and Mistral-Small-22B, served through vLLM on one NVIDIA RTX PRO 6000 GPU (96 GB), under zero-shot, few-shot, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) prompting across three data-sampling seeds. We report F1, bootstrap confidence intervals, predicted-positive rates, throughput, and memory use, with DeepLog as a held-out classical baseline. Mistral-Small attains a higher macro-averaged F1 than Qwen2.5-14B (0.644 versus 0.560), whereas Qwen provides approximately twice the throughput. A separate log-probability evaluation compares raw decisions with Contextual Calibration (CC) and Batch Calibration (BC): neither correction consistently improves prediction-balance diagnostics across prompting strategies. Supplementary single-run comparisons extend evaluation to 4-bit Llama-3.1-70B via local Ollama and Claude Haiku 4.5 via Anthropic's cloud API; RAG improves F1 on all four datasets for both models. Claude's reported aggregate F1 increases from 0.566 to 0.695, while the estimated API cost rises from \$0.94 to \$2.15 per 1,000 incidents. Local deployment ablations show approximately 41-fold throughput scaling with batching and 20% lower latency with 4-bit quantization on the tested workload. These findings support retrieval as useful context for anomaly decisions, while the supplementary protocols, unvalidated explanation quality, and prediction-balance diagnostics limit broader claims about RCA accuracy and probabilistic calibration.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2026

TriFleetRCA: On-Premise LLM Root Cause Analysis for Kubernetes

Root cause analysis at a remote site is slow: evidence is scattered across pod logs, Kubernetes events and cluster-level objects, and many operators cannot send production logs to a hosted model at all. On-premise inference removes the second constraint but raises a question live-cluster benchmarks have not addressed: when one workstation GPU fixes both the model and the context budget, how should evidence be retrieved, and what happens when the runbooks the model consults have been tampered with? We present TriFleetRCA, a pipeline running entirely on one on-premise GPU that collects evidence at one of three scopes (pod, namespace, cluster), ranks it by template de-duplication then BM25, filters runbooks through an ingest guard, and returns a root cause with the evidence lines supporting it. We evaluate on a live Kubernetes cluster into which we inject four faults, so ground truth is known by construction, across 100 analyses with Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct at temperature 0. The hit rate was 0.85, 0.90 and 0.95 at pod, namespace and cluster scope; intervals overlap, but the whole scope effect comes from the one fault whose cause is a cluster-level object, and cluster scope costs 55% more tokens. De-duplication before ranking raised the hit rate from 0.75 to 0.90 at equal token cost. A poisoned runbook telling the model to delete the namespace was rejected by the guard every run; with the guard disabled the model declined to follow it in all 20 analyses, making the guard defence in depth rather than the sole barrier. Separating citation quality from accuracy proved informative: one fault was diagnosed correctly and cited incorrectly every trial, a failure mode accuracy conceals. Median latency was 1.6 s at 2,200 prompt tokens. We release the pipeline, the fault injector and all records.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

TriShieldRAG: 3 Rings, One Blind Spot in Layered Defenses for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds LLM answers in query-time retrieved documents, so reliability depends on what the retriever returns. PoisonedRAG (Zou et al., USENIX Security'25) showed five crafted documents mislead an undefended system in nearly 90% of cases, and that single-stage defenses give limited robustness. We propose TriShieldRAG, a three-layered framework: an Ingest Guard for document-level screening, a Retrieval Scorer for trust-aware re-ranking, and a Cross-LLM Consensus over three diverse models. We reasoned that collectively screening, re-ranking and validating retrieved evidence would give complementary protection, limiting the ability of poisoned documents to succeed through any single failure. We evaluate against non-adaptive and adaptive poisoning. Non-adaptively, on the full 2.68M-passage Natural Questions (NQ) corpus with the original PoisonedRAG attack, it cuts attack success from 79 +/- 1.0% to 1 +/- 0.0%. Adaptive attacks expose fundamental limits of layering. By changing only the document formatting, without modifying the poison text or accessing the retriever, the attacker reduces the Ingest Guard score from 0.500 to 0.000 and bypasses it on all 500 tested documents across three corpora. The remaining layers then give no protection: 62 +/- 0.8% attack success against a 56 +/- 2.5% undefended baseline on NQ, and 85 +/- 0.6% against 86 +/- 0.6% on HotpotQA. Layered defenses relying on the same retrieved evidence fail together: poisoned context misleads both re-ranking and consensus validation. Minority-poison thresholds prove corpus-dependent, at 0.214, 0.251 and 0.558 rather than the derived 0.5; a closed form we proposed for these failed a pre-registered prediction and is retracted. Cross-model agreement is misleading, reaching 0.96 while attack success approaches 99%. We release the framework, the evasion-certification methodology and artifacts.

cs.CR↗