arXiv subjects

Jeff S. Shamma

Publications and source records attributed to Jeff S. Shamma.

39 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2013

Dynamics in atomic signaling games

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

math.PR↗

arXiv2011

Aspiration Learning in Coordination Games

We consider the problem of distributed convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games through dynamics based on aspiration learning. Under aspiration learning, a player continues to play an action as long as the rewards received exceed a specified aspiration level. Here, the aspiration level is a fading memory average of past rewards, and these levels also are subject to occasional random perturbations. A player becomes dissatisfied whenever a received reward is less than the aspiration level, in which case the player experiments with a probability proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction. Our first contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain of the iterated process in terms of an equivalent finite-state Markov chain. We then characterize explicitly the behavior of the proposed aspiration learning in a generalized version of coordination games, examples of which include network formation and common-pool games. In particular, we show that in generic coordination games the frequency at which an efficient action profile is played can be made arbitrarily large. Although convergence to efficient outcomes is desirable, in several coordination games, such as common-pool games, attainability of fair outcomes, i.e., sequences of plays at which players experience highly rewarding returns with the same frequency, might also be of special interest. To this end, we demonstrate through analysis and simulations that aspiration learning also establishes fair outcomes in all symmetric coordination games, including common-pool games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2009

Multiple-Model Adaptive Control With Set-Valued Observers

This paper proposes a multiple-model adaptive control methodology, using set-valued observers (MMAC-SVO) for the identification subsystem, that is able to provide robust stability and performance guarantees for the closed-loop, when the plant, which can be open-loop stable or unstable, has significant parametric uncertainty. We illustrate, with an example, how set-valued observers (SVOs) can be used to select regions of uncertainty for the parameters of the plant. We also discuss some of the most problematic computational shortcomings and numerical issues that arise from the use of this kind of robust estimation methods. The behavior of the proposed control algorithm is demonstrated in simulation.

math.OC↗