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Jeff Shamma

Publications and source records attributed to Jeff Shamma.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimism as Risk-Seeking in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Risk sensitivity has become a central theme in reinforcement learning (RL), where convex risk measures and robust formulations provide principled ways to model preferences beyond expected return. Recent extensions to multi-agent RL (MARL) have largely emphasized the risk-averse setting, prioritizing robustness to uncertainty. In cooperative MARL, however, such conservatism often leads to suboptimal equilibria, and a parallel line of work has shown that optimism can promote cooperation. Existing optimistic methods, though effective in practice, are typically heuristic and lack theoretical grounding. Building on the dual representation for convex risk measures, we propose a principled framework that interprets risk-seeking objectives as optimism. We introduce optimistic value functions, which formalize optimism as divergence-penalized risk-seeking evaluations. Building on this foundation, we derive a policy-gradient theorem for optimistic value functions, including explicit formulas for the entropic risk/KL-penalty setting, and develop decentralized optimistic actor-critic algorithms that implement these updates. Empirical results on cooperative benchmarks demonstrate that risk-seeking optimism consistently improves coordination over both risk-neutral baselines and heuristic optimistic methods. Our framework thus unifies risk-sensitive learning and optimism, offering a theoretically grounded and practically effective approach to cooperation in MARL.

cs.LG

Zeroth-Order Constrained Optimization from a Control Perspective via Feedback Linearization

Safe derivative-free optimization under unknown constraints is a fundamental challenge in modern learning and control. Existing zeroth-order (ZO) methods typically still assume access to a first-order oracle of the constraint functions or restrict attention to convex settings, leaving nonconvex optimization with black-box constraints largely unexplored. We propose the zeroth-order feedback-linearization (ZOFL) algorithm for ZO constrained optimization that enforces feasibility without access to the first-order oracle of the constraint functions and applies to both equality and inequality constraints. The proposed approach relies only on noisy, sample-based gradient estimates obtained via two-point estimators, yet provably guarantees constraint satisfaction under mild regularity conditions. It adopts a control-theoretic perspective on ZO constrained optimization and leverages feedback linearization, a nonlinear control technique, to enforce feasibility. Finite-time bounds on constraint violation and asymptotic global convergence guarantees are established for the ZOFL algorithm. A midpoint discretization variant is further developed to improve feasibility without sacrificing optimality. Empirical results demonstrate that ZOFL consistently outperforms standard ZO baselines, achieving competitive objective values while maintaining feasibility.

math.OC

Constrained Optimization From a Control Perspective via Feedback Linearization

Tools from control and dynamical systems have proven valuable for analyzing and developing optimization methods. In this paper, we establish rigorous theoretical foundations for using feedback linearization (FL) -- a well-established nonlinear control technique -- to solve constrained optimization problems. For equality-constrained optimization, we establish global convergence rates to first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points and uncover the close connection between the FL method and the Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) algorithm. Building on this relationship, we extend the FL approach to handle inequality-constrained problems. Furthermore, we introduce a momentum-accelerated feedback linearization algorithm and provide a rigorous convergence guarantee.

math.OC

Equilibrium Selection for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Unified Framework

While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has produced numerous algorithms that converge to Nash or related equilibria, such equilibria are often non-unique and can exhibit widely varying efficiency. This raises a fundamental question: how can one design learning dynamics that not only converge to equilibrium but also select equilibria with desirable performance, such as high social welfare? In contrast to the MARL literature, equilibrium selection has been extensively studied in normal-form games, where decentralized dynamics are known to converge to potential-maximizing or Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria (NEs). Motivated by these results, we study equilibrium selection in finite-horizon stochastic games. We propose a unified actor-critic framework in which a critic learns state-action value functions, and an actor applies a classical equilibrium-selection rule state-wise, treating learned values as stage-game payoffs. We show that, under standard stochastic stability assumptions, the stochastically stable policies of the resulting dynamics inherit the equilibrium selection properties of the underlying normal-form learning rule. As consequences, we obtain potential-maximizing policies in Markov potential games and Pareto-optimal (Markov perfect) equilibria in general-sum stochastic games, together with sample-based implementation of the framework.

cs.GT

Non-asymptotic System Identification for Linear Systems with Nonlinear Policies

This paper considers a single-trajectory system identification problem for linear systems under general nonlinear and/or time-varying policies with i.i.d. random excitation noises. The problem is motivated by safe learning-based control for constrained linear systems, where the safe policies during the learning process are usually nonlinear and time-varying for satisfying the state and input constraints. In this paper, we provide a non-asymptotic error bound for least square estimation when the data trajectory is generated by any nonlinear and/or time-varying policies as long as the generated state and action trajectories are bounded. This significantly generalizes the existing non-asymptotic guarantees for linear system identification, which usually consider i.i.d. random inputs or linear policies. Interestingly, our error bound is consistent with that for linear policies with respect to the dependence on the trajectory length, system dimensions, and excitation levels. Lastly, we demonstrate the applications of our results by safe learning with robust model predictive control and provide numerical analysis.

math.OC

Algebraic Lyapunov Functions for Homogeneous Dynamic Systems

A method for constructing homogeneous Lyapunov functions of degree 1 from polynomial invariant sets is presented for linear time varying systems, homogeneous dynamic systems and the class of nonlinear systems that can be represented as such. The method allows the development of Lyapunov functions that are not necessarily symmetric about the origin, unlike the polynomial, homogeneous Lyapunov functions discussed in the prior literature. The work is illustrated by very simple examples.

math.DS

Online switching control with stability and regret guarantees

This paper considers online switching control with a finite candidate controller pool, an unknown dynamical system, and unknown cost functions. The candidate controllers can be unstabilizing policies. We only require at least one candidate controller to satisfy certain stability properties, but we do not know which one is stabilizing. We design an online algorithm that guarantees finite-gain stability throughout the duration of its execution. We also provide a sublinear policy regret guarantee compared with the optimal stabilizing candidate controller. Lastly, we numerically test our algorithm on quadrotor planar flights and compare it with a classical switching control algorithm, falsification-based switching, and a classical multi-armed bandit algorithm, Exp3 with batches.

math.OC

Safe Adaptive Learning-based Control for Constrained Linear Quadratic Regulators with Regret Guarantees

We study the adaptive control of an unknown linear system with a quadratic cost function subject to safety constraints on both the states and actions. The challenges of this problem arise from the tension among safety, exploration, performance, and computation. To address these challenges, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that guarantees feasibility and constraint satisfaction with high probability under proper conditions. Our algorithm is implemented on a single trajectory and does not require system restarts. Further, we analyze the regret of our learning algorithm compared to the optimal safe linear controller with known model information. The proposed algorithm can achieve a $\tilde O(T^{2/3})$ regret, where $T$ is the number of stages and $\tilde O(\cdot)$ absorbs some logarithmic terms of $T$.

eess.SY

Distributed Submodular Minimization And Motion Coordination Over Discrete State Space

We develop a framework for the distributed minimization of submodular functions. Submodular functions are a discrete analog of convex functions and are extensively used in large-scale combinatorial optimization problems. While there has been significant interest in the distributed formulations of convex optimization problems, distributed minimization of submodular functions has received relatively little research attention. Our framework relies on an equivalent convex reformulation of a submodular minimization problem, which is efficiently computable. We then use this relaxation to exploit methods for the distributed optimization of convex functions. The proposed framework is applicable to submodular set functions as well as to a wider class of submodular functions defined over certain lattices. We also propose an approach for solving distributed motion coordination problems in discrete state space based on submodular function minimization. We establish through a challenging setup of capture the flag game that submodular functions over lattices can be used to design artificial potential fields over discrete state space in which the agents are attracted towards their goals and are repulsed from obstacles and from each other for collision avoidance.

math.OC

An LP Approach for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Games

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are independently chosen according to the initial probabilities, and are kept the same all through the game. At every stage, players simultaneously choose actions, and announce their actions publicly. For finite horizon cases, an explicit linear program is provided to compute players' security strategies. Moreover, based on the existing results in [1], this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics, which is independent of the strategy of the other player, consists of the belief over the player's own type, the regret with respect to the other player's type, and the stage. Explicit linear programs are provided to compute the initial regrets, and the security strategies that only depends on the sufficient statistics. For discounted cases, following the same idea in the finite horizon, this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics consists of the belief of the player's own type and the anti-discounted regret with respect to the other player's type. Besides, an approximated security strategy depending on the sufficient statistics is provided, and an explicit linear program to compute the approximated security strategy is given. This paper also obtains a bound on the performance difference between the approximated security strategy and the security strategy.

cs.GT

Passivity Analysis of Higher Order Evolutionary Dynamics and Population Games

In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called "stable games". In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Here, generalization refers to "higher order" games where the population payoffs may be a dynamic function of the population state. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.

math.OC

Gain Scheduling Control of Gas Turbine Engines: Absolute Stability by Finding a Common Lyapunov Matrix

This manuscript aims to develop and describe gain scheduling control concept for a gas turbine engine which drives a variable pitch propeller. An architecture for gain-scheduling control is developed that controls the turboshaft engine for large thrust commands in stable fashion with good performance. Fuel ow and propeller pitch angle are the two control inputs of the system. New stability proof has been developed for gain scheduling control of gas turbine engines using global linearization and LMI techniques. This approach guarantees absolute stability of the closed loop gas turbine engine systems with gain-scheduling controllers.

math.OC