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Jena D. Hwang

Publications and source records attributed to Jena D. Hwang.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

CULTURE-GEN: Revealing Global Cultural Perception in Language Models through Natural Language Prompting

As the utilization of large language models (LLMs) has proliferated world-wide, it is crucial for them to have adequate knowledge and fair representation for diverse global cultures. In this work, we uncover culture perceptions of three SOTA models on 110 countries and regions on 8 culture-related topics through culture-conditioned generations, and extract symbols from these generations that are associated to each culture by the LLM. We discover that culture-conditioned generation consist of linguistic "markers" that distinguish marginalized cultures apart from default cultures. We also discover that LLMs have an uneven degree of diversity in the culture symbols, and that cultures from different geographic regions have different presence in LLMs' culture-agnostic generation. Our findings promote further research in studying the knowledge and fairness of global culture perception in LLMs. Code and Data can be found here: https://github.com/huihanlhh/Culture-Gen/

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Relying on the Unreliable: The Impact of Language Models' Reluctance to Express Uncertainty

As natural language becomes the default interface for human-AI interaction, there is a need for LMs to appropriately communicate uncertainties in downstream applications. In this work, we investigate how LMs incorporate confidence in responses via natural language and how downstream users behave in response to LM-articulated uncertainties. We examine publicly deployed models and find that LMs are reluctant to express uncertainties when answering questions even when they produce incorrect responses. LMs can be explicitly prompted to express confidences, but tend to be overconfident, resulting in high error rates (an average of 47%) among confident responses. We test the risks of LM overconfidence by conducting human experiments and show that users rely heavily on LM generations, whether or not they are marked by certainty. Lastly, we investigate the preference-annotated datasets used in post training alignment and find that humans are biased against texts with uncertainty. Our work highlights new safety harms facing human-LM interactions and proposes design recommendations and mitigating strategies moving forward.

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UNcommonsense Reasoning: Abductive Reasoning about Uncommon Situations

Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate an explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the performance differences between human explainers and the best-performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

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"You Are An Expert Linguistic Annotator": Limits of LLMs as Analyzers of Abstract Meaning Representation

Large language models (LLMs) show amazing proficiency and fluency in the use of language. Does this mean that they have also acquired insightful linguistic knowledge about the language, to an extent that they can serve as an "expert linguistic annotator"? In this paper, we examine the successes and limitations of the GPT-3, ChatGPT, and GPT-4 models in analysis of sentence meaning structure, focusing on the Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR; Banarescu et al. 2013) parsing formalism, which provides rich graphical representations of sentence meaning structure while abstracting away from surface forms. We compare models' analysis of this semantic structure across two settings: 1) direct production of AMR parses based on zero- and few-shot prompts, and 2) indirect partial reconstruction of AMR via metalinguistic natural language queries (e.g., "Identify the primary event of this sentence, and the predicate corresponding to that event."). Across these settings, we find that models can reliably reproduce the basic format of AMR, and can often capture core event, argument, and modifier structure -- however, model outputs are prone to frequent and major errors, and holistic analysis of parse acceptability shows that even with few-shot demonstrations, models have virtually 0% success in producing fully accurate parses. Eliciting natural language responses produces similar patterns of errors. Overall, our findings indicate that these models out-of-the-box can capture aspects of semantic structure, but there remain key limitations in their ability to support fully accurate semantic analyses or parses.

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SPLAIN: Augmenting Cybersecurity Warnings with Reasons and Data

Effective cyber threat recognition and prevention demand comprehensible forecasting systems, as prior approaches commonly offer limited and, ultimately, unconvincing information. We introduce Simplified Plaintext Language (SPLAIN), a natural language generator that converts warning data into user-friendly cyber threat explanations. SPLAIN is designed to generate clear, actionable outputs, incorporating hierarchically organized explanatory details about input data and system functionality. Given the inputs of individual sensor-induced forecasting signals and an overall warning from a fusion module, SPLAIN queries each signal for information on contributing sensors and data signals. This collected data is processed into a coherent English explanation, encompassing forecasting, sensing, and data elements for user review. SPLAIN's template-based approach ensures consistent warning structure and vocabulary. SPLAIN's hierarchical output structure allows each threat and its components to be expanded to reveal underlying explanations on demand. Our conclusions emphasize the need for designers to specify the "how" and "why" behind cyber warnings, advocate for simple structured templates in generating consistent explanations, and recognize that direct causal links in Machine Learning approaches may not always be identifiable, requiring some explanations to focus on general methodologies, such as model and training data.

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Faith and Fate: Limits of Transformers on Compositionality

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify transformer LLMs, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that transformer LLMs solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how autoregressive generations' performance can rapidly decay with\,increased\,task\,complexity.

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The Generative AI Paradox: "What It Can Create, It May Not Understand"

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

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Do Androids Laugh at Electric Sheep? Humor "Understanding" Benchmarks from The New Yorker Caption Contest

Large neural networks can now generate jokes, but do they really "understand" humor? We challenge AI models with three tasks derived from the New Yorker Cartoon Caption Contest: matching a joke to a cartoon, identifying a winning caption, and explaining why a winning caption is funny. These tasks encapsulate progressively more sophisticated aspects of "understanding" a cartoon; key elements are the complex, often surprising relationships between images and captions and the frequent inclusion of indirect and playful allusions to human experience and culture. We investigate both multimodal and language-only models: the former are challenged with the cartoon images directly, while the latter are given multifaceted descriptions of the visual scene to simulate human-level visual understanding. We find that both types of models struggle at all three tasks. For example, our best multimodal models fall 30 accuracy points behind human performance on the matching task, and, even when provided ground-truth visual scene descriptors, human-authored explanations are preferred head-to-head over the best machine-authored ones (few-shot GPT-4) in more than 2/3 of cases. We release models, code, leaderboard, and corpus, which includes newly-gathered annotations describing the image's locations/entities, what's unusual in the scene, and an explanation of the joke.

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COBRA Frames: Contextual Reasoning about Effects and Harms of Offensive Statements

Warning: This paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Understanding the harms and offensiveness of statements requires reasoning about the social and situational context in which statements are made. For example, the utterance "your English is very good" may implicitly signal an insult when uttered by a white man to a non-white colleague, but uttered by an ESL teacher to their student would be interpreted as a genuine compliment. Such contextual factors have been largely ignored by previous approaches to toxic language detection. We introduce COBRA frames, the first context-aware formalism for explaining the intents, reactions, and harms of offensive or biased statements grounded in their social and situational context. We create COBRACORPUS, a dataset of 33k potentially offensive statements paired with machine-generated contexts and free-text explanations of offensiveness, implied biases, speaker intents, and listener reactions. To study the contextual dynamics of offensiveness, we train models to generate COBRA explanations, with and without access to the context. We find that explanations by context-agnostic models are significantly worse than by context-aware ones, especially in situations where the context inverts the statement's offensiveness (29% accuracy drop). Our work highlights the importance and feasibility of contextualized NLP by modeling social factors.

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ClarifyDelphi: Reinforced Clarification Questions with Defeasibility Rewards for Social and Moral Situations

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

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I2D2: Inductive Knowledge Distillation with NeuroLogic and Self-Imitation

Commonsense capabilities of pre-trained language models dramatically improve with scale, leading many to believe that scale is the only winning recipe. But is it? Here, we investigate an alternative that a priori seems impossible: can smaller language models (e.g., GPT-2) win over models that are orders of magnitude larger and better (e.g., GPT-3), if powered with novel commonsense distillation algorithms? The key intellectual challenge is to design a learning algorithm that achieve a competitive level of commonsense acquisition, without relying on the benefits of scale. In particular, we study generative models of commonsense knowledge, focusing on the task of generating generics, statements of commonsense facts about everyday concepts, e.g., birds can fly. We introduce I2D2, a novel commonsense distillation framework that loosely follows the Symbolic Knowledge Distillation of West et al. but breaks the dependence on the extreme-scale teacher model with two innovations: (1) the novel adaptation of NeuroLogic Decoding to enhance the generation quality of the weak, off-the-shelf language models, and (2) self-imitation learning to iteratively learn from the model's own enhanced commonsense acquisition capabilities. Empirical results suggest that scale is not the only way, as novel algorithms can be a promising alternative. Moreover, our study leads to a new corpus of generics, Gen-A-tomic, that is the largest and highest quality available to date.

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Causal schema induction for knowledge discovery

Making sense of familiar yet new situations typically involves making generalizations about causal schemas, stories that help humans reason about event sequences. Reasoning about events includes identifying cause and effect relations shared across event instances, a process we refer to as causal schema induction. Statistical schema induction systems may leverage structural knowledge encoded in discourse or the causal graphs associated with event meaning, however resources to study such causal structure are few in number and limited in size. In this work, we investigate how to apply schema induction models to the task of knowledge discovery for enhanced search of English-language news texts. To tackle the problem of data scarcity, we present Torquestra, a manually curated dataset of text-graph-schema units integrating temporal, event, and causal structures. We benchmark our dataset on three knowledge discovery tasks, building and evaluating models for each. Results show that systems that harness causal structure are effective at identifying texts sharing similar causal meaning components rather than relying on lexical cues alone. We make our dataset and models available for research purposes.

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Penguins Don't Fly: Reasoning about Generics through Instantiations and Exceptions

Generics express generalizations about the world (e.g., birds can fly) that are not universally true (e.g., newborn birds and penguins cannot fly). Commonsense knowledge bases, used extensively in NLP, encode some generic knowledge but rarely enumerate such exceptions and knowing when a generic statement holds or does not hold true is crucial for developing a comprehensive understanding of generics. We present a novel framework informed by linguistic theory to generate exemplars -- specific cases when a generic holds true or false. We generate ~19k exemplars for ~650 generics and show that our framework outperforms a strong GPT-3 baseline by 12.8 precision points. Our analysis highlights the importance of linguistic theory-based controllability for generating exemplars, the insufficiency of knowledge bases as a source of exemplars, and the challenges exemplars pose for the task of natural language inference.

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Symbolic Knowledge Distillation: from General Language Models to Commonsense Models

The common practice for training commonsense models has gone from-human-to-corpus-to-machine: humans author commonsense knowledge graphs in order to train commonsense models. In this work, we investigate an alternative, from-machine-to-corpus-to-machine: general language models author these commonsense knowledge graphs to train commonsense models. Our study leads to a new framework, Symbolic Knowledge Distillation. As with prior art in Knowledge Distillation (Hinton et al., 2015), our approach uses larger models to teach smaller models. A key difference is that we distill knowledge symbolically-as text-in addition to the neural model. We also distill only one aspect-the commonsense of a general language model teacher, allowing the student to be a different type, a commonsense model. Altogether, we show that careful prompt engineering and a separately trained critic model allow us to selectively distill high-quality causal commonsense from GPT-3, a general language model. Empirical results demonstrate that, for the first time, a human-authored commonsense knowledge graph is surpassed by our automatically distilled variant in all three criteria: quantity, quality, and diversity. In addition, it results in a neural commonsense model that surpasses the teacher model's commonsense capabilities despite its 100x smaller size. We apply this to the ATOMIC resource, and share our new symbolic knowledge graph and commonsense models.

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ComFact: A Benchmark for Linking Contextual Commonsense Knowledge

Understanding rich narratives, such as dialogues and stories, often requires natural language processing systems to access relevant knowledge from commonsense knowledge graphs. However, these systems typically retrieve facts from KGs using simple heuristics that disregard the complex challenges of identifying situationally-relevant commonsense knowledge (e.g., contextualization, implicitness, ambiguity). In this work, we propose the new task of commonsense fact linking, where models are given contexts and trained to identify situationally-relevant commonsense knowledge from KGs. Our novel benchmark, ComFact, contains ~293k in-context relevance annotations for commonsense triplets across four stylistically diverse dialogue and storytelling datasets. Experimental results confirm that heuristic fact linking approaches are imprecise knowledge extractors. Learned fact linking models demonstrate across-the-board performance improvements (~34.6% F1) over these heuristics. Furthermore, improved knowledge retrieval yielded average downstream improvements of 9.8% for a dialogue response generation task. However, fact linking models still significantly underperform humans, suggesting our benchmark is a promising testbed for research in commonsense augmentation of NLP systems.

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The Abduction of Sherlock Holmes: A Dataset for Visual Abductive Reasoning

Humans have remarkable capacity to reason abductively and hypothesize about what lies beyond the literal content of an image. By identifying concrete visual clues scattered throughout a scene, we almost can't help but draw probable inferences beyond the literal scene based on our everyday experience and knowledge about the world. For example, if we see a "20 mph" sign alongside a road, we might assume the street sits in a residential area (rather than on a highway), even if no houses are pictured. Can machines perform similar visual reasoning? We present Sherlock, an annotated corpus of 103K images for testing machine capacity for abductive reasoning beyond literal image contents. We adopt a free-viewing paradigm: participants first observe and identify salient clues within images (e.g., objects, actions) and then provide a plausible inference about the scene, given the clue. In total, we collect 363K (clue, inference) pairs, which form a first-of-its-kind abductive visual reasoning dataset. Using our corpus, we test three complementary axes of abductive reasoning. We evaluate the capacity of models to: i) retrieve relevant inferences from a large candidate corpus; ii) localize evidence for inferences via bounding boxes, and iii) compare plausible inferences to match human judgments on a newly-collected diagnostic corpus of 19K Likert-scale judgments. While we find that fine-tuning CLIP-RN50x64 with a multitask objective outperforms strong baselines, significant headroom exists between model performance and human agreement. Data, models, and leaderboard available at http://visualabduction.com/

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Can Machines Learn Morality? The Delphi Experiment

As AI systems become increasingly powerful and pervasive, there are growing concerns about machines' morality or a lack thereof. Yet, teaching morality to machines is a formidable task, as morality remains among the most intensely debated questions in humanity, let alone for AI. Existing AI systems deployed to millions of users, however, are already making decisions loaded with moral implications, which poses a seemingly impossible challenge: teaching machines moral sense, while humanity continues to grapple with it. To explore this challenge, we introduce Delphi, an experimental framework based on deep neural networks trained directly to reason about descriptive ethical judgments, e.g., "helping a friend" is generally good, while "helping a friend spread fake news" is not. Empirical results shed novel insights on the promises and limits of machine ethics; Delphi demonstrates strong generalization capabilities in the face of novel ethical situations, while off-the-shelf neural network models exhibit markedly poor judgment including unjust biases, confirming the need for explicitly teaching machines moral sense. Yet, Delphi is not perfect, exhibiting susceptibility to pervasive biases and inconsistencies. Despite that, we demonstrate positive use cases of imperfect Delphi, including using it as a component model within other imperfect AI systems. Importantly, we interpret the operationalization of Delphi in light of prominent ethical theories, which leads us to important future research questions.

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Adposition and Case Supersenses v2.6: Guidelines for English

This document offers a detailed linguistic description of SNACS (Semantic Network of Adposition and Case Supersenses; Schneider et al., 2018), an inventory of 52 semantic labels ("supersenses") that characterize the use of adpositions and case markers at a somewhat coarse level of granularity, as demonstrated in the STREUSLE corpus (https://github.com/nert-nlp/streusle/ ; version 4.5 tracks guidelines version 2.6). Though the SNACS inventory aspires to be universal, this document is specific to English; documentation for other languages will be published separately. Version 2 is a revision of the supersense inventory proposed for English by Schneider et al. (2015, 2016) (henceforth "v1"), which in turn was based on previous schemes. The present inventory was developed after extensive review of the v1 corpus annotations for English, plus previously unanalyzed genitive case possessives (Blodgett and Schneider, 2018), as well as consideration of adposition and case phenomena in Hebrew, Hindi, Korean, and German. Hwang et al. (2017) present the theoretical underpinnings of the v2 scheme. Schneider et al. (2018) summarize the scheme, its application to English corpus data, and an automatic disambiguation task. Liu et al. (2021) offer an English Lexical Semantic Recognition tagger that includes SNACS labels in its output. This documentation can also be browsed alongside corpus data on the Xposition website (Gessler et al., 2022): http://www.xposition.org/

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