arXiv subjects

Jenny Tang

Publications and source records attributed to Jenny Tang.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Automatic Generation of Web Censorship Probe Lists

Domain probe lists--used to determine which URLs to probe for Web censorship--play a critical role in Internet censorship measurement studies. Indeed, the size and accuracy of the domain probe list limits the set of censored pages that can be detected; inaccurate lists can lead to an incomplete view of the censorship landscape or biased results. Previous efforts to generate domain probe lists have been mostly manual or crowdsourced. This approach is time-consuming, prone to errors, and does not scale well to the ever-changing censorship landscape. In this paper, we explore methods for automatically generating probe lists that are both comprehensive and up-to-date for Web censorship measurement. We start from an initial set of 139,957 unique URLs from various existing test lists consisting of pages from a variety of languages to generate new candidate pages. By analyzing content from these URLs (i.e., performing topic and keyword extraction), expanding these topics, and using them as a feed to search engines, our method produces 119,255 new URLs across 35,147 domains. We then test the new candidate pages by attempting to access each URL from servers in eleven different global locations over a span of four months to check for their connectivity and potential signs of censorship. Our measurements reveal that our method discovered over 1,400 domains--not present in the original dataset--we suspect to be blocked. In short, automatically updating probe lists is possible, and can help further automate censorship measurements at scale.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Buying Privacy: User Perceptions of Privacy Threats from Mobile Apps

As technology and technology companies have grown in power, ubiquity, and societal influence, some companies -- and notably some mobile apps -- have come to be perceived as privacy threats. Prior work has considered how various factors impact perceptions of threat, including social factors, political speech, and user-interface design. In this work, we investigate how user-visible context clues impact perceptions about whether a mobile application application poses a privacy threat. We conduct a user study with 2109 users in which we find that users depend on context clues -- such as presence of advertising and occurrence (and timing of payment) -- to determine the extent to which a mobile app poses a privacy threat. We also quantify how accurately user assessments match published data collection practices, and we identify a commonly-held misconception about how payments are processed. This work provides new insight into how users assess the privacy threat posed by mobile apps and into social norms around data collection.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2022

How Well Do My Results Generalize Now? The External Validity of Online Privacy and Security Surveys

Privacy and security researchers often rely on data collected through online crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Prolific. Prior work -- which used data collected in the United States between 2013 and 2017 -- found that MTurk responses regarding security and privacy were generally representative for people under 50 or with some college education. However, the landscape of online crowdsourcing has changed significantly over the last five years, with the rise of Prolific as a major platform and the increasing presence of bots. This work attempts to replicate the prior results about the external validity of online privacy and security surveys. We conduct an online survey on MTurk (n=800), a gender-balanced survey on Prolific (n=800), and a representative survey on Prolific (n=800) and compare the responses to a probabilistic survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (n=4272). We find that MTurk response quality has degraded over the last five years, and our results do not replicate the earlier finding about the generalizability of MTurk responses. By contrast, we find that data collected through Prolific is generally representative for questions about user perceptions and experiences, but not for questions about security and privacy knowledge. We also evaluate the impact of Prolific settings, attention check questions, and statistical methods on the external validity of online surveys, and we develop recommendations about best practices for conducting online privacy and security surveys.

cs.HC↗